




The Dissertation Committee for Julie Joanna Hunter
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:
Presuppositional Indexicals
Committee:









Julie Joanna Hunter, B.A.
DISSERTATION
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY





My advisors, Mark Sainsbury and David Beaver, helped me tremendously in writing
this dissertation and I thank them first. The other members of my committee—
François Recanati, Josh Dever, Daniel Bonevac, Ray Buchanan, and Hans Kamp—
deserve thanks as well. I am especially grateful to François for numerous helpful
discussions and multiple opportunities to present the material in this dissertation in
his seminars.
This dissertation has benefited from many discussions with friends and fellow
students including Alexandra Arapinis, Corien Bary, Derek Ball, Leah Lasell, Aidan
McGlynn, Tim Pickavance, Bryan Pickel, Anders Schoubye, Magdalena Schwager,
Frank Veltman, Sherilyn Villareal, and Malte Willer. I thank Maria Aloni and Emar
Maier for helpful input on some of the work in this dissertation.
Finally, I am grateful to my family for supporting me through my many
relationships with school and to Tasha and Boris for their warm, furry snuggles
while I was writing my dissertation. My deepest gratitude goes to Nicholas and
Isabel for their support and patience, among so many other wonderful things.
Julie Hunter





Julie Joanna Hunter, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2010
Co-Supervisors: R. Mark Sainsbury
David Beaver
I present and defend an account of indexicals that treats indexicals as pre-
suppositional expressions. I argue that the distinction between presupposed and
asserted content can replace the more restrictive distinction between character and
content that is characteristic of Kaplanian, two-dimensional views. My account, Pre-
suppositional Indexicals (PI), is simpler than a two-dimensional account because it
does not posit a special layer of meaning for indexicals that cannot interact with
truth-conditional content. PI also has broader scope than two-dimensional theories.
It opens the door to a general theory of definite noun phrases according to which all
definites have two components to their meaning: an asserted component, which con-
tributes new information to a discourse, and a presuppositional component, which
determines where asserted information will be attached in a discourse. PI does not
stipulate rigidity or referentiality for indexicals as many other theories do. Index-
icals do receive a special semantic treatment in PI, but their special semantics are
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Every indexical expression type has a context-invariant, linguistic meaning
that helps determine what entity, if any, is picked out by a given token of the index-
ical. Yet this level of meaning falls far short of delivering a referent for an indexical
token; in every case, information provided either by the utterance itself or by the
surrounding discourse context is required to fill the lacunae. An utterance of You
must come over here will be infelicitous for an interpreter if it is not clear to the
interpreter that there is an addressee or it is unclear who, among a possible set of
addressees, is being singled out. An utterance of This is made of gold will be similarly
infelicitous to an interpreter if it is not clear to him that there is a demonstratum
or it is unclear which object, among a possible set of objects, is being demonstrated.
In other words, in order for an utterance of a sentence containing an indexical to
be felicitous, it is necessary that the context of the utterance make salient, in the
relevant way, a referent for the token of the indexical.
I contend that this fact about indexicals is best understood by treating in-
dexicals as presuppositional expressions. The context-invariant level of meaning of
an indexical expression places a constraint on the context in which a given token of
the indexical is evaluated: the context must antecedently provide a referent for the
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indexical and it must present the referent in a way that conforms with the linguistic
meaning of the indexical. A speaker who uses the expression you, for example, pre-
supposes both that there is an addressee in the context and that this individual is
presented in the context in such a way that her audience will be able to identify the
addressee. Once a referent has been secured for a particular token of an indexical,
the work of the context-invariant meaning of the indexical is finished and only the
referent is passed on for predication and evaluation. This is precisely the behavior
one would expect from presuppositional content.
Presuppositional Indexicals (PI), the presuppositional theory that I will moti-
vate in this dissertation, is a discourse-based theory of indexicals that is inspired by
presuppositional accounts of other definite noun phrases developed by, most notably,
Heim (1982) and van der Sandt (1993). The aim of PI is to contribute an account
of indexicals to a larger, unified account of definite noun phrases—one that would
include indexicals, demonstratives, proper names, third person pronouns and definite
descriptions—according to which all definite noun phrases conventionally presuppose
their linguistic meanings and offer to asserted content only an individual.1 Previous
discourse-based theories of definites have focused predominantly on definite descrip-
tions and pronouns; indexicals have received comparatively little attention.2 Because
indexical expressions differ from other definites in important and well known ways,
however, bringing them into a discourse-based theory of definites requires extra care.
1In PI and the other discourse-based theories that I will consider, the individual contributed to
asserted content is a discourse referent, as I will explain in the next chapter.
2Some notable exceptions are Zeevat (2000), Schlenker (2003, 2005), and Maier (2006, 2009).
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The idea that indexicals are presuppositional expressions is latent in Kaplan’s
theory of demonstratives and at first sight, his theory might bear a strong resem-
blance to mine (Kaplan 1989a,b). Kaplan formalized what I call the presupposed
and asserted contents of indexicals with his character and content functions, respec-
tively, and designed his logic in such a way that if character fails to deliver a value
for a given indexical token, a sentence containing that indexical token fails to have
a complete, truth-evaluable content. Nevertheless, there is a very important struc-
tural difference between the presuppositional account that I will defend here and
Kaplan’s logic of demonstratives. Kaplan’s logic is two-dimensional in the sense
that a) evaluation of logical form takes place relative to two indices and b) the two
indices are of different types so that character cannot interact with content. This
latter feature—the true innovation of Kaplan’s double-index view—together with
the assumption that character always yields a non-functional entity, was offered to
ensure that indexicals would be de jure rigid designators whose values could never
be affected by linguistic operators. The side effects of Kaplan’s two-dimensional
logic are severe: his logic ensures that context sensitive expressions are never sen-
sitive to any linguistic operators (modal operators included), but this is intuitively
wrong for expressions—such as third person pronouns, demonstratives, and (more
controversially) definite descriptions—whose interpretations can be sensitive to the
linguistic context as well as to the extra-linguistic context.3 For these pronouns,
context sensitivity often amounts to operator sensitivity.
3cf. Dever 2004 for an interesting discussion of how Kaplan ties context sensitivity to rigidity
and for an independent argument of why these two features should be kept apart.
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PI rejects any theory that is two-dimensional in the sense outlined above. Its
aim is to offer an account of indexicals that can be subsumed under a more general
theory of definites that treats all definites in a unified way regardless of whether their
interpretations depend on the extra-linguistic context or on the linguistic context.
A crucial feature of such a general theory would be that it allow presuppositional
content to interact with linguistic operators.4 The most significant difference between
PI and Kaplanian, two-dimensional theories is that PI has this feature. While it may
be true that indexicals are not sensitive to modal operators, it is not necessary to
create a special layer of meaning for indexicals that shields their characters from any
interaction with the linguistic context to capture their standardly rigid behavior. It
is important to emphasize this break from Kaplan’s two dimensional theory, because
the claim that indexicals require a special, protected layer of meaning still pervades
much of the literature on indexicals. It even finds its way into presuppositional views
of indexicals very much like PI. Maier (2009), for example, adopts a presuppositional
theory of indexicals but argues that a presuppositional view must be supplemented
with a two-dimensional, Kaplanian framework. Mainstream discussions of monsters
also assume a two dimensional framework at least very similar to Kaplan’s (Schlenker
2003, Anand 2006).
PI also adopts a broader notion of indexicality than does Kaplan and many
4My criticism of Kaplanian, two-dimensional theories echoes the work of Heim (1982, 1983),
van der Sandt (1992), and Beaver (1997), among others, who rejected Karttunen and Peter’s
two-dimensional account of presupposition because it prohibited interaction between asserted and
presupposed content (Karttunen & Peters 1979). For a different argument against Kaplan’s two-
dimensional system, see Stojanovic (2002).
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others.5 For Kaplan, a token of an indexical must refer to some feature of the
utterance event in which it is tokened or to an entity that is functionally related to a
given feature of the event, as is the case, for instance, with tokens of tomorrow. PI is
less restrictive. My approach in this dissertation is to adopt the term indexical for a
specific class of expressions for which the term is normally used—I, you, now, here,
tomorrow, today, actual, actually, and so on (i.e., Kaplan’s list)—without making
an assumption about what indexicality is, or even about whether these expressions
really do define a clear-cut class of expressions in virtue of sharing a unique set of
semantic properties. My assumption is that there is an intuitive tie between these
expressions and that they share enough semantically interesting properties to justify
looking at them as a group, or at least taking them as a starting point, even if they
don’t end up being classified as a well-defined group in the end. If in exploring the
above list of expressions, we find that not all of them need to depend directly on
features of utterance events at all times, this does not require jettisoning these terms
from the class of indexical expressions, according to PI. Any more liberally behaved
expressions in the above list will nonetheless exhibit markedly similar behavior to
any indexicals that might fit the narrower notion, and it is this behavior that I
am interested in studying. I discuss the distinction between the narrow and broad
notions of indexicality introduced here in more detail in What ‘Now’?.
Even in the absence of a definition of indexicality, however, I offer what I
take to be basic marks of an indexical expression. The interpretation of a token of
5See, for example, Recanati 1993. Recanati adopts a fairly standard analysis of indexical ex-
pressions as token-reflexive expressions. I discuss his view in What ‘Now’?.
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an indexical will be, or depend on in some semantically constrained way, the agent,
addressee, time, location or world of some eventuality. Normally the relevant even-
tuality is identical to the utterance event in which the indexical is tokened, but this
is not necessary in PI. What is necessary is, first, that the interpretation of an in-
dexical have an ‘essentially’ indexical nature in the sense that it cannot be replaced
by a description or proper name that does not itself contain a demonstrative or an
expression that I am listing as indexical (see ‘Descriptive’ Indexicals).6 Next, the
interpretation of the indexical must depend on the perspective of the agent of the
utterance.
This dissertation has two main goals:
1. Its primary goal is to show that a presuppositional theory of indexicals can
replace, not merely supplement, a Kaplanian, two-dimensional theory of index-
icals.
2. Its secondary goal is to show that a presuppositional theory of indexicals can
do better than a two-dimensional theory by making way for a general theory
of definite noun phrases.
1.1 Constraints for a Presuppositional Theory of Indexicals
To help frame our discussion, I review in this section the most persuasive
arguments that have been used to motivate two-dimensional theories of indexicals
6cf. Perry (1979).
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and/or undermine presuppositional theories of indexicals. In so doing, I provide a
list of constraints that a presuppositional view of indexicals must respect. I will
return to this list of constraints in the final chapter, once all of the ingredients of PI
are in place, in order to show explicitly how PI addresses them.
(a) Indexicals are not anaphoric pronouns (in the traditional sense). Certain indexicals—
I, you, here and the temporal indexicals—cannot be used simply to pick up on in-
dividuals introduced in discourse, even if those individuals are highly salient due to
recent mention. They are not anaphoric expressions in the traditional sense.7 This
puts them in contrast with other seemingly similar expressions like he, she, there,
then, before, later, next, that, this and so on, as well as with definite descriptions.
(1.1) John told Kate that I would be coming to the party tonight (I6= John).
(1.2) I like to think back on the summer of ’95. *I was so happy now.
(1.3) The Richelieu house is special to me because I was born here. (Infelicitous if
the Richilieu house is not the place of utterance)8
The insensitivity of indexicals to their linguistic environment as seen in (1.1)-(1.3)
is partly what motivates two-dimensional, Kaplanian theories. By settling content
7I say that they are not anaphoric in the traditional sense, because they are not anaphoric in
the way that third person pronouns, the paradigm anaphoric expressions, are.
8The fact that here cannot refer to the Richilieu house in this example is particularly interesting
given that here can be used demonstratively and so can, at least prima facie, pick out places other
than the place of utterance.
• I think we should go here [pointing at a map of Siberia] for our next winter vacation!
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before composition takes place, character ensures that indexicals cannot be effected
by the discourse context.
(b) Indexicals are modally rigid. Indexicals, like proper names, are far more obstinate
about their referents than are definite descriptions in modal contexts.
(1.4) a. (Necessarily) Aristotle was fond of dogs.
b. (Necessarily) The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs.
(1.5) a. (Necessarily) I am hungry.
b. (Necessarily) The (current) speaker is hungry.
As Kripke (1972,1980) pointed out, there is a reading of (1.4b) such that it is true
in a world w just in case whoever is the last great philosopher of antiquity in w is
fond of dogs in w. On this reading, (1.4b) could be made true by a world in which
Aristotle was never born and Plato was the last great philosopher of antiquity and
he was fond of dogs. This reading is unavailable for (1.4a): only worlds in which
Aristotle was fond of dogs will serve as truth-makers for this example. The truth
conditions of (1.4a) and (1.4b) differ, and thus we are to conclude that Aristotle is
not synonymous with the last great philosopher of antiquity or any other (non-rigid)9
definite description that might be thought to give the meaning of the name Aristotle.
9Kripke did not consider rigidified definite descriptions, so I will ignore them here in this simple
presentation of the modal argument.
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Similar remarks can be made for (1.5). In this case, there is meant to be
a reading of (1.5b) according to which it is made true in a world w just in case
whoever is the speaker in w is hungry in w. By contrast, (1.5a) can only be made
true by a world w if the person who is speaking in the actual world is hungry in
w. Again, we are meant to conclude that because the truth conditions of (1.5a) and
(1.5b) differ, I is not synonymous with the (current) speaker or any other definite
description that might be thought to give the meaning of the indexical I. Setting up
the argument with indexicals is trickier than with names because it is difficult to
find a definite description that is a good candidate for being a synonym of I that
is not itself indexical. The difference between the indexical and description should
nevertheless be clear.
In the preface of Kripke (1980), Kripke laid out a wide-scope modal argument
using (1.4) without the modal operators in parentheses. He claimed that even the
simple sentence versions of (1.4a) and (1.4b) have different truth conditions and so
the difference in truth conditions when we add the modal operators (as in the original
argument) cannot be explained by saying that proper names are simply descriptions
that take wide scope over sentential operators. Throughout this dissertation, when
I refer to the Modal Argument (MA) or the Indexical Modal Argument (IMA), I am
talking about the wide scope versions of the modal arguments.
(c) The linguistic meaning of indexicals never figures in truth-conditional content
or ‘what is said’. Following Kripke (1980), a proper name is not synonymous with
a definite description (or a cluster of descriptions, etc.). Although speakers may
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associate a given name with a definite description, this association is not controlled
by the semantics of the name. Descriptive information associated with a name can
vary from one speaker to the next and does not determine the referent for the name.
The story is different for indexicals. Most indexicals do have context-invariable
meanings that could be more or less captured by a description and on which speak-
ers who know how to use these expressions would generally agree. Moreover, this
meaning plays a very important role in determining a referent for the indexical. Still,
at the level of truth-conditional content (asserted content in PI, content in Kaplan’s
theory), indexicals look a lot like names. The context-insensitive linguistic meaning
of the indexical is rarely, if ever, relevant for truth conditions. The sole purpose of
this meaning seems to be to find an object to contribute to asserted content.
(d) Indexicals are not blocked by plugs. Certain verbs like say, claim and tell stan-
dardly block, or plug, the projection of presuppositions triggered by expressions in
their scope as seen in (1.9b). (In each example, I underline the presupposition trigger
and italicize the associated presupposition.) Conditionals can also be used to block
standard presuppositions. In (1.6a,b), for instance, the presupposition that John has
a son does not project outside of the conditional. Indexicals, at least I, here and the
temporal indexicals, appear to be unaffected by presupposition plugs. Not only does
this mark a difference between indexicals and definite descriptions, but it is also a
prima facie problem for the thesis that indexicals are presuppositional expressions.
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(1.6) John’s son is tall. →John has a son
a. If John has a son, then John’s son is tall. 9John has a son
b. Had John had a son, John’s son would have been tall. 9John has a son
(1.7) I am speaking. →there is a speaker for this utterance
a. If there is a speaker for this utterance, then I am speaking. →there is a
speaker for this utterance
b. Had John made this utterance, then I would have been a man. →there
is a speaker for this utterance
(1.8) Had John made this utterance, then the speaker would have been a man 9
there is a speaker for the hypothetical utterance
(1.9) a. Mary recently stopped smoking. →Mary used to smoke
b. John said that Mary recently stopped smoking. (But that can’t be true
because Mary never smoked.) 9Mary used to smoke
(1.10) a. I recently stopped smoking. →there is a speaker of this utterance, I used
to smoke
b. John said that I recently stopped smoking. (But that’s not true. I’ve
never smoked a day in my life.) →there is a speaker for this utterance,
9I used to smoke
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(1.11) John said that the King of France recently stopped smoking, but that can’t
be true because France doesn’t have a king. 9 there is a King of France, 9
the King of France used to smoke
Neither say nor conditionals block the entailment of the proposition that there is
a speaker in examples involving I. In (1.7b), even though the speaker explicitly at-
tempts to shift the context away from that in which she is the actual speaker, the
presupposition of I—that there is a unique speaker available in the context—scopes
out of the conditional to be satisfied by the actual speaker. In (1.10b), the presuppo-
sition that the speaker used to smoke is blocked by the plug say while the supposed
presupposition for I escapes the very same plug. The presuppositions of the definite
descriptions in (1.8) and (1.11) do not take scope over the plugs, as expected for
presuppositional expressions. I do not mean to imply that the presence of I is what
accounts for the entailment that there is a speaker in the actual context when I is
used in the above examples. I wish only to report the fact that the proposition that
there is a speaker is entailed when I is used regardless of the presence of plugs or
filters.
(e) Indexicals cannot be accommodated. Even third person and demonstrative pro-
nouns, which can be plugged, cannot be accommodated. Again, this not only marks
a distinction between indexicals and (some) definite descriptions, but it also appears
to pose a problem for a presuppositional theory of indexicals and demonstratives
(and, of course, third person pronouns).
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(1.12) You are nice.
(1.13) This is made of gold.
(1.14) It might have been the case that this was made of gold.
If the context does not already make an addressee salient for a token of (1.12), then
an interpreter will be unable to accommodate the existence of an addressee. Simply
adding the information that there is an addressee in the context will not work. Sim-
ilarly, if there is no obvious demonstration accompanying an utterance of (1.13) or
it is not otherwise clear what object is being picked out, then the addressee cannot
simply add the information that something is being demonstrated or picked out in
order to repair the context; the resulting utterance is deviant. Even if we put the
demonstrative inside of a modal, as in (1.14), the same conclusion holds: we cannot
accommodate a demonstration or demonstratum.
A widely accepted conclusion drawn from (a)-(e)—and especially from (b)—
is that indexicals, along with proper names, are rigid designators. That is, for an
indexical i in a context c (represented as ic): if there is an x such that ic designates
x, then for all worlds w, if x exists in w then ic designates x in w and there are
no worlds w′ such that there is a y in w′ and ic designates y in w
′ and y 6= x.
Rigidity, however, does not explain the extent of the insensitivity of indexicals to their
linguistic environment. In particular, it cannot explain the behavior of indexicals
exhibited in (a) and (d), for third person-pronouns have uses that are both discourse
anaphoric and rigid, as the following examples show.
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(1.15) John is at home cooking because he is having a dinner party tonight.
(1.16) I told that man [pointing at a man] to come talk to you in a few minutes.
He’s having a dinner party and he needs some wine suggestions.
The second general conclusion drawn from the above arguments is that index-
icals are semantically referential expressions.10 This claim is understood differently
in different theories, but the general idea is that if an expression e is a member of a
class of referential expressions, then if e is not empty, there is some object x such that
the truth of a sentence containing e will in every world depend on how things are
with x.11 Usually, the property of being referential is meant to underly and explain
the property of being rigid and serves to more deeply separate indexicals (and proper
names) from definite descriptions.
Another, admittedly less popular conclusion to draw, especially from (b) but
also from (c) and to some extent (a) and (d) is that indexicals are definite descriptions
that must take wide scope. This conclusion is less popular because it is unclear how to
make sense of indexicals taking wide scope in seemingly simple sentences like (1.5a)
(I am hungry). However, PI is similar to a wide scope theory in some important
ways, so I introduce this conclusion here.
Neither the hypothesis that indexicals are referential nor the hypothesis that
indexicals are wide-scope, descriptive expressions sheds light on the behavior of in-
10Recanati (1993) draws this conclusion, as does Kaplan (1989a), among many others.
11A stronger statement, that requires referential expressions to refer would take out the clause
allowing empty referring expressions, but I don’t want to get into these issues now. See Recanati
(1993) and Sainsbury (2005) for further, in-depth discussion of what it means to be a referring
expression.
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dexicals in (a). We have already noted that anaphoric expressions can be referential;
saying that indexicals are referential, therefore, does not help explain why they differ
from paradigmatic anaphoric pronouns with regard to (a). On the other hand, say-
ing that they must take wide-scope is simply to reiterate what we see in (a), not to
explain it. Wide-scope, descriptive theories of indexicals will not be able to explain
(e), at least not straightforwardly, because accommodation for definite descriptions
is common, even for descriptions that take wide scope.
1.2 A Sketch of the Strategy
All of the ingredients needed for PI will be laid out in chapters 2-6. Chapter 6
will summarize the main body of the dissertation and show how all of the ingredients
presented in chapters 2-5 come together to address (a)-(e). It will also suggest some
applications for PI. Chapters 2-5 run as follows.
2. Presuppositional Indexicals presents the basic PI theory. I begin by present-
ing a simple version of Discourse Representation Theory or DRT (Kamp 1981,
Kamp & Reyle 1993). Although PI’s semantic theory requires only a generic
dynamic semantics, the structured contexts of DRT (Discourse Representation
Structures or DRSs) will be very helpful for explaining how PI works. PI ex-
tends the simple version of DRT in two ways. First, whereas original DRT was
designed to model information from the linguistic context only, PI incorpo-
rates information from the extra-linguistic context into the discourse contexts
of DRT. Second, PI introduces an operator, ↑, into the lexical entries of in-
dexicals. This operator takes scope over the presuppositional components of
15
indexical meanings and forces the presuppositional content to be bound to a
discourse referent for an actual utterance event in most cases. This feature cor-
responds to Kaplan’s Principle 1 and will play a crucial role in explaining why
indexicals are normally rigid and why their presuppositions do not normally
bind to antecedents introduced in local contexts, despite the fact that PI does
not stipulate that such binding is impossible.12
3. What ‘Now’? demonstrates an application of ↑. I argue that the presupposition
of now can in some cases bind to times introduced in discourse, contrary to
the predictions of a Kaplanian, two-dimensional theory. Now is used when
its presence either marks a contrast between two times or when a speaker
wishes to emphasize the present time to the exclusion of alternative times.
Thus, now makes a very important contribution to discourse that goes beyond
its contribution to asserted content (which is often redundant due to tense).
Normally, its contrastive or emphatic function is limited to times given in
the extra-linguistic context, but sometimes, when the discourse itself has a
contrastive structure, now can pick up on times introduced in discourse as
well. The result is that now can refer to past times in very special situations.
At the end of the chapter, I suggest that such discourse behavior is exhibited by
other indexicals as well, including here, actual, and actually. This behavior is
sufficiently widespread to be taken seriously by a semantic account of indexicals.
12Kaplan (1989)’s Principle 1, p. 492: “The referent of a pure indexical depends on the context,
and the referent of a demonstrative depends on the associated demonstration.”
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4. Wider Scope addresses a potential worry for PI, namely that even if PI can se-
cure rigidity for indexicals by forcing their presuppositions to take wide scope,
PI does not lay a solid foundation for a general theory of definites because it
cannot distinguish between rigid and non-rigid readings of definites in simple
sentences. I show that PI’s contexts do in fact have the structure necessary
to generate all of the requisite readings of definites in simple sentences. I then
turn to the question of what makes indexicals different from their fellow, non-
indexical definites. Why, for example, are indexicals incapable of having non-
rigid readings in simple sentences? I argue that while this difference between
indexicals and some other definites shows that PI cannot be extended straight-
forwardly to a general theory of definites, i.e. by prefixing the presuppositions
of all definites with ↑, this is not a problem for PI. The idiosyncrasies of index-
ical semantics are understood in terms of the particular resolution strategies
adopted by indexical presuppositions. To understand more about how index-
ical resolution strategies compare to those of other definites, we would have
to look deeper at the resolution behavior of different definites. I suggest some
frameworks that one might adopt to explore this question.
5. ‘Descriptive’ Indexicals discusses examples of so-called ‘descriptive indexicals,’
considered at length in Nunberg (1993). These examples would seem to pose
a problem for PI, which does not allow indexicals to have descriptive interpre-
tations, but I show that this problem is illusory. By supplementing PI with
simple, constrained pragmatic mechanisms, we can provide an analysis of the




This chapter introduces the basic framework of Presuppositional Indexicals
(PI). While each subsequent chapter will illuminate different features of PI, and
thereby contribute to a deeper understanding of the theory, the basic machinery
will be laid out here. I begin with a short introduction to Discourse Representation
Theory or DRT. I will adopt a generic dynamic semantics as the basis for PI, but the
Discourse Representation Structures (DRSs) of DRT will greatly ease our discussion.
After introducing DRSs, I turn to PI and explain how it builds on the basic DRS
framework. PI extends the notion of a discourse context to include not only the
contents of sentences uttered in a discourse, but also information derived from the
extra-linguistic context. It also introduces lexical entries for indexicals. These entries
make use of a new operator ↑ whose basic features I will outline in section 2.2. I
conclude with a brief discussion of how PI, which is designed for non-demonstrative
indexicals, could easily be extended to cover demonstratives as well.
2.1 Discourse Representation Structures
PI is set in a dynamic semantic framework that blends features of Discourse
Representation Theory (DRT; Kamp 1981, Kamp & Reyle 1993) and Dynamic Pred-
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icate Logic (DPL; Groenindijk & Stokhof 1991). The representational nature of DRT
is intuitive and I use its hierarchical logical forms (Discourse Representation Struc-
tures) to facilitate the discussion of different semantic contributions made by different
kinds of content, e.g. by presupposed and asserted contents. Nevertheless, the repre-
sentational level of DRT is not essential to the arguments that I will make concerning
PI, and the semantics of PI will be more in line with a dynamic semantic system like
DPL.
Discourse Representation Structures (DRSs), the logical forms of DRT, are
meant to be mental representations of information states, constructed from the point
of view of an (idealized) addressee.1 Each DRS consists of a set of discourse referents,
called the universe of the DRS, and a set of conditions. A discourse referent is
a variable under an assignment function that stands for an entity introduced in
discourse. The conditions in a DRS represent information that has been given in the
discourse about the entities picked out by the discourse referents. Atomic conditions
look like unbound, first-order formulas of the form C(x), for some condition C, or
x = y, where x and y are discourse referents. Compound conditions are formed by
letting logical operators take DRSs as arguments. For example, where K and K′ are
DRSs, compound conditions will have one of the following forms: ¬K, K→K′, K∨
K′, or K. Let (2.1) be the first sentence in a discourse so that the incoming DRS,
K0, is empty (i.e. K0 has no discourse referents and no conditions).
1I will assume throughout this dissertation, unless I clearly say otherwise, that the addressee is
a perfect addressee in the sense that if something is salient in the context, the addressee will realize
this, or if the speaker says something, the addressee will understand it perfectly. This allows me to
abstract away from specific problems of communication encountered in specific contexts and focus
on the question of how mental representations are updated with the contents of sentences.
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(2.1) A man came in.
In DRT, as in DPL and Heim’s File Change Semantics (Heim 1982, 1983), indefinite
noun phrases are understood neither as quantificational expressions nor as referring
expressions, but rather as expressions that introduce a discourse referent into the
context. Therefore, the first thing that we do to construct the DRS for (2.1) is add
a new discourse referent x to the universe. We then add the conditions man(x) and
came-in(x) to the set of conditions. The final DRS will look like this:
(2.2) [x : man(x), came-in(x)]2
The universe is the set of discourse referents to the left of the colon; the set of
conditions lies to the right of the colon. Divisions between contexts and sub-contexts
will be marked with square brackets.
Now suppose we add to our one sentence discourse the following sentence.
(2.3) He ordered a sandwich.
I will represent the logical form for (2.3) as follows.
(2.4) [y : ordered-sand(y) ∧ y =?]
2I use linear notation for DRSs because I think the presentation is sufficiently clear and it takes
up less space. It also makes clearer the relation between DRSs and their corresponding first order
formulas.
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The question mark signifies that y is anaphoric and needs to bind to a discourse
referent from an accessible DRS (I will explain accessibility below).3 When we update
(2.2) with (2.4), we can bind y to x with the following result:
(2.5) [x : man(x), came-in(x), ordered-sand(y), x = y]
DRSs are understood hierarchically: there is a global DRS which keeps track
of information that has been accepted by the conversational participants during a
discourse, but there can also be DRSs created within this global DRS, or even within
other DRSs within the global DRS, depending on the structure of the discourse.4
Consider the following examples, each of which involves the creation of sub-contexts
within the global context.
(2.6) I would like to get some chickens, but they might attract a fox. The fox
would hurt our cats/*The fox will hurt our cats.
3There are different ways to signify that a discourse referent is anaphoric. Geurts (1999), e.g.,
underlines an anaphoric discourse referent. In Geurts’ notation, (2.4) would have the form:
(y: ordered-sand(y))
I follow Wada and Asher (1986) in using the question mark notation. Kamp & Reyle’s original
version of DRT does not have a mechanism for marking anaphoric discourse referents, but this
is because in their theory, anaphoric discourse referents are bound during the DRS construction
procedure, rather than as a separate, second step.
4The notion of a global context is not DRT’s alone. The notion has been famously used by, for
example, Stalnaker. Though Stalnaker would not endorse a semantic discourse theory like DRT,
he would say that the global context is the common ground of information, determined by the
shared beliefs and presuppositions of the conversational participants. Others would disagree that
the global context should include so much information. In plain DRT, for instance, the starting
DRS for a discourse is always assumed to be empty and therefore does not contain contents of
beliefs shared by discourse participants at the start of a conversation.
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(2.7) a. There’s a fly in the kitchen. I can hear it buzzing.
b. There isn’t a fly in the kitchen. *I can’t hear it buzzing.
(2.8) If John has a son, he is very tall.
In (2.6), an example of modal subordination, the modal might introduces a sub-
context within the global context. The existence of the counterfactual fox under
discussion is not asserted, i.e. it is not added to the global context, but only supposed
inside of the context created by the modal. This is evidenced by the fact that a
non-modal assumption cannot be made about the fox. (2.7) shows that sometimes
indefinites introduce entities that can be picked up anaphorically and sometimes
they don’t. Whether or not they can be picked up anaphorically sometimes depends
on the presence of operators like negation. One way to explain this is to say that
negation creates a subcontext within the global context that is inaccessible to it in
the second sentence of (2.7b). In the third example, we cannot add the claim he is
tall to the global context, for he is linked anaphorically to John’s son and it is not a
part of the global context that John has a son. Within the context created by the
conditional, however, talking about John’s hypothetical son is perfectly natural.
2.2 PI
2.2.1 Introducing ↑
PI makes use of a new operator, ↑. Before we can introduce this operator,
however, we will need the notion of a sequence of DRSs and a notion of how presup-
positions are resolved by a sequence of DRSs. Let the most global level of a DRS K
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be labeled K0. Let the sub-DRS immediately subordinate to K0 be labeled K1 and so
on. If a DRS Kn contains more than one complex condition, number the sub-DRSs
introduced by these conditions according to the order in which they are introduced
into the DRS. We therefore get a sequence of DRSs, K0, K1, . . . , Kn, Kn+1, . . . for
the given DRS K. Now suppose that we have a sequence of DRSs K0, . . . , Kn in K
and that a presupposition φ is triggered in Kn. φ will be resolved in K0, . . . , Kn (and
therefore in K) just in case some subsequence Kl, . . . , Km, m ≤ n satisfies the pre-
supposition. If the presupposition has the form of an existential formula, satisfaction
will involve choosing a witness for the presupposition in some DRS in the sequence
Kl, . . . , Km. If there is no available witness, the presupposition can be satisfied by
accommodation, i.e. addition, of a witness at some DRS in the sequence Kl, . . . , Km,
so long as this does not lead to inconsistency.
Where φ is a presupposition, the operator ↑ in a formula of the form ↑ φ
forces the resolution of φ in the outermost context possible.5 ↑ gives instructions
to first look in the global context, K0, for an antecedent (a witness in the case of
an existential presupposition). If there is no antecedent in K0, the next option is to
accommodate an antecedent in K0. If accommodation is not possible at K0 because
of inconsistency, ↑ says that the next available option for resolution of φ is to bind
in K1. If an antecedent is not found in K1, then the next option is to accommodate
there if possible. This process will continue until an antecedent is found or until we
arrive back at the DRS in which φ was triggered. If no antecedent is found there and
5↑ may very well have uses for contents that project but are not considered presuppositional,
e.g. material in appositive constructions. I assume that φ is a presupposition here because I am
only concerned with projective material that is also presuppositional in this dissertation.
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no antecedent can be accommodated, the result is presupposition failure. Update
with the DRS in which φ is triggered cannot proceed.
So long as a presupposition φ in a formula of the form ↑ φ can find an
antecedent in a DRS Kj, it will ignore potential antecedents in any sub-DRS of
Kj. φ will be resolved in the most global context possible. For example, suppose a
formula of the form ♦ψ triggers the creation of a condition ♦Km in K0 of some DRS
K and suppose that φ is triggered in a DRS Kn in K such that m < n. So long as
φ finds an antecedent in some DRS Kj for j < m, φ will ignore the condition ♦Km.
If φ is resolved all the way at the top of K, at level K0, then the interpretation of
the expression that triggered φ will be rigid, as I explain in section 2.2.4. However,
if an antecedent cannot be found in a DRS in K that is prior to Km in the sequence
K0,. . . , Kn and Km contains an available antecedent for φ, or an antecedent can
be accommodated there, then φ will be resolved in Km and it will take narrow
scope with regard to ♦. Thus, although rigid interpretations will be preferred for
expressions whose presuppositions are prefixed with ↑, there are cases in which the
rigid interpretations are not possible. In these cases, a non-rigid interpretation of
the expression can result.
A formula of the form ↑ φ, like a formula of the form ¬φ or φ, etc., is added
to a DRS at the level at which it is triggered. Thus presuppositional content will sit
alongside asserted content in a DRS.6 This means that presuppositional content can
6DRSs are logical forms, so technically, conditions in a DRS cannot be contents of assertions.
They are rather representations of the contents of assertions. I sometimes refer to the logical forms
of asserted contents as contents, but it should be clear that I take them to be representations, not
the contents themselves. In this chapter, I am keeping the discussion of semantics to a minimum
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be treated compositionally and it underscores an idea that will be important in this
dissertation, namely that presuppositional content is a genuine form of content and
therefore deserves to be represented in a DRS.7 The difference between presupposi-
tional content and asserted content is simply that presuppositional content can, and
generally will, be resolved outside of the DRS in which it is triggered. Presupposi-
tional content and asserted content play different roles: asserted content adds new
content to a DRS and presuppositional content locates a site in a DRS at which to
attach this new information.
2.2.2 K0
PI builds off of the relational DRT offered in the previous section and ex-
tends it in two important ways. First, DRSs in PI will include not only discourse
referents and conditions introduced through discourse, but also discourse referents
and conditions introduced via the extra-linguistic context. This means, for example,
that DRSs can include representations of perceptual information. Most importantly
for PI, this extension allows for utterance events to be represented in DRSs. When
an agent utters a sentence s, not only will the content of s (relative to the input
context) be incorporated into the DRS for the discourse, but the event itself will
be represented. Moreover, its agent, addressee (if there is one), time, location, and
world will also be represented and they will be represented as the agent, addressee,
because I mainly want to bring out the structure of PI.
7Kaplan’s two-dimensional theory does not treat character as a form of content. Character
serves to determine a referent and then ‘exits the scene’. PI presents a very different view of the
context-invariable meanings of indexicals as will shortly become clear.
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time, location, and world of the particular utterance event.
Information from the extra-linguistic context will be represented in the most
global DRS, K0, while the contents of sentences uttered will be represented by sub-
DRSs of K0. This hierarchy reflects both the fact that information from the extra-
linguistic context comes from a special source and the fact that discourses take place
within an external context.8 It also reflects the fact that the extra-linguistic context
can effect the interpretation of what is said in a discourse while the converse claim
is not true.
The second way that PI extends DRT is by adding special lexical entries for
indexicals. These entries have two key features. First, they are under-specified for
an utterance event. That is, their presuppositions have an anaphoric element that
must be bound to a discourse referent for an utterance event. This captures the fact
that the interpretations of indexicals generally depend on features of utterances (or
thoughts). Second, PI prefixes the presuppositional components of indexical lexical
entries with ↑, which forces the presuppositions for indexicals to bind in the highest
context possible. For indexicals, this will almost always be the global context, but I
will discuss some exceptions to this general rule in What ‘Now’?. For now, what is
important is that ↑ captures the fact that indexicals generally do bind at the global
level without explicitly writing a rule into their entries to the effect that indexicals
can only be bound to the actual utterance event. The interaction of the linguistic
meanings of indexicals and their surrounding linguistic context is allowed in PI, if
8Works of fiction might be counterexamples to this claim. I am restricting my discussion here
to non-fictional discourses.
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the conditions are right. The fact is that the conditions usually aren’t right. From
the point of view of the entries of indexicals, the global context is not a special kind
of context. It contains discourse referents and conditions just like all other DRSs. It
is simply more global.
2.2.3 The lexical entries of indexicals
As mentioned above, PI assumes that when an utterance u of a sentence s is
made in a context C, information that the utterance has been made will be added
to C as will certain information about the utterance event itself, e.g. its agent, time,
location.9 The content of s will then be evaluated relative to the context C ′ which
results from updating C with information about u. PI formulates this assumption by
stipulating that an utterance event will be represented in K0 for a DRS K.
10 Consider
the simple example (2.9).
(2.9) Someone is tired.
An utterance of (2.9) will introduce a discourse referent eπ0 for the utterance event
11
as well as new discourse referents x0, y0, z0, t0, w0 to represent relevant features of the
utterance event. The predicates ag, ad, in, att and atw below stand for functions
9Recall that contexts in PI are structured information states. This notion of context is in line
with the dynamic semantic (and to some extent, the dynamic pragmatic) tradition, as we have
seen, but is very different from Kaplan’s very restricted notion of context.
10This stipulation is inspired by the utterance DRSs of Zeevat (2000).
11e is the standard discourse referent used for eventualities in DRT, following Davidson (1967).
I subscript markers for utterance events with a π to indicate that they are markers specifically
for eventualities introduced by utterances. In addition, I also sometimes subscript eπs in order to
distinguish them, i.e. eπ0 , eπ1 , eπ2 , . . ..
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over utterance events that map each utterance event to an agent, addressee, location,
time, and world, respectively. eπ is a non-descriptive condition that serves to pick
out a particular utterance event in a given world. I will say more about it when I
discuss how PI secures rigidity for indexicals.
• eπ(eπ0)
• ag(eπ0 , x0)
• ad(eπ0 , y0)
• in(eπ0 , z0)
• att(eπ0 , t0)
• atw(eπ0 , w0)
Suppose that (2.9) is the first sentence uttered in a discourse. We start with
an empty DRS K∅. Update with information on the utterance event contributes the
following discourse referents and conditions to the global DRS, K0:
(2.10) [eπ0 , x0, y0, z0, t0, w0 : eπ(eπ0), ag(eπ0 , x0), ad(eπ0 , y0), in(eπ0 , z0), att(eπ0 , t0),
atw(eπ0 , w0)]
Incorporation of the DRS for (2.9), [y : tired(y)], will then yield a new DRS K1.
There are no indexical expressions in this example, so the incorporation of (2.9) will
work as in standard DRT. Of course, the tense of the sentence could be treated as
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bound to the time of utterance. I include a very brief discussion of tense in the next
chapter.
Now consider an utterance of (2.11).
(2.11) I am tired.
We first update with information concerning the utterance event. Suppose that
update with information on the utterance yields the same DRS K0 introduced in
our discussion of (2.9), i.e., the DRS in (2.10). The content of (2.11) will then be
evaluated relative to this updated context, but to see how this works, we need to
specify the lexical entries for indexicals. PI posits the following lexical entries for
the indexicals I, you, here, now and tomorrow, where t2 in the entry for tomorrow
stands for a function that takes a time as an argument and delivers the following
day as output.12
• JIK : λP (∃x′(↑ ∃eπ(ag(eπ, x′) ∧ eπ =?) ∧ P (x′)))
• JyouK : λP (∃y′(↑ ∃eπ(ad(eπ, y′) ∧ eπ =?) ∧ P (y′)))
• JhereK : λP (∃z′(↑ ∃eπ(in(eπ, z′) ∧ eπ =?) ∧ P (z′)))
• JnowK : λP (∃t′(↑ ∃eπ(att(eπ, t′) ∧ eπ =?) ∧ P (t′)))
12λ-terms are not used in standard DRT. However, I am interested in showing how the semantics
of indexicals effect the semantics of sentences in which they figure; using compositional lexical entries
for indexicals allows me to do this. Kamp & Reyle’s DRT is not compositional. I follow Asher
(1993) and Muskens (1996), among others, in combining the λ-calculus with DRT. The semantics
for the lexical entries I offer here can be understood in line with Muskens 1996.
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• JtomorrowK : λP (∃t′∃t′′(↑ ∃eπ(t′′ =t2(t′)∧ att(eπ, t′) ∧ eπ =?) ∧ P (t′′)))
Each of these entries is underspecified with regard to an utterance event. This under-
specification is captured by the condition eπ =?, which indicates that the discourse
referent eπ must be bound to a discourse referent for an utterance event that is
accessible in the incoming context (K0 or K1 in this case). Thus, indexicals have
an anaphoric element just like anaphoric pronouns do. In fact, PI treats indexicals
very much like anaphoric pronouns, albeit anaphoric pronouns that are very picky
about their antecedents. Once the discourse referent eπ has been bound, the dis-
course referent figuring in the predication (e.g. x′ in the entry for I) will in effect
be bound as well. Consider the entry for I and assume that eπ has been bound to
an antecedent eπ0 so that eπ = eπ0 . If ag(eπ0 , x0) (given in the global context) then
ag(eπ, x0) (substitution). Because ag(eπ, x
′) (lexical entry for I), x0 = x
′, i.e. x′ is
bound to x0.
The ↑ operator in each of the lexical entries forces the presuppositions of
indexicals to be bound or accommodated in the highest context possible.13 As global
binding will be possible in almost every case, this means that indexicals will almost
always be bound to an antecedent in the global context, as desired. Note that once
the material in the scope of ↑ is bound (either to an old or accommodated antecedent),
13Kamp (1981) posits a rule that a proper name will introduce a discourse referent and condition
(e.g. x and x = john) into the most global DRS in order to make discourse referents introduced
by names accessible to all sub-DRSs. The effects of ↑ resemble the effects of Kamp’s rule for
names in obvious ways. However, there are also important differences. First, ↑ is an operator on
presuppositions. Second, ↑ is more nuanced than Kamp’s rule because it allows for indexicals to
interact with operators if binding in a more global DRS is not possible. Third, I don’t think that
names should be prefixed with ↑, as I mention in Wider Scope, but this claim is not central to the
argument of this dissertation.)
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it becomes redundant at the level of the DRS in which it sits. Information is carried
down through a DRS, so the indexical presupposition, once bound to old information,
does not provide any new information to the DRS. It does not affect asserted content.
The final thing to note about PI’s lexical entries for indexicals, before return-
ing to example (2.11), is that indexicals do not have descriptive meanings in the
sense that there is no definite description in natural language that can be said to
capture the meaning—either the asserted content or the character—of the indexical.
This is meant to account for the general observation that indexicals are irreducibly
indexical (see Perry 1979).
Having laid out the lexical entries for a representative set of indexicals, we
are now in a position to explain how update with the content of (2.11) will proceed
in the context imagined above. I initially contributes the following under-specified
content in virtue of its lexical meaning.
(2.12) λP (∃x1(↑ ∃eπ1(ag(eπ1 , x1) ∧ eπ1 =?) ∧ P (x1)))
The discourse referent eπ1 needs to be bound and the ↑ operator requires that it be
bound in the highest DRS possible. We get eπ1 = eπ0 , which delivers the following
LF.
(2.13) λP (∃x1(↑ ∃eπ1(ag(eπ1 , x1) ∧ eπ1 = eπ0) ∧ P (x1)))
We can now combine this contribution of I with the predicate, whose lexical entry
we will assume is simply λz(tired(z)). We get the following formula:
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(2.14) ∃x1(↑ ∃eπ1(ag(eπ1 , x1) ∧ eπ1 = eπ0) ∧ tired(x1))
To tie this into the previous discussion, we can translate this into a DRS:
(2.15) [x1 : ↑ [eπ1 : (ag(eπ1 , x1), eπ1 = eπ0)], tired(x1))]
Note that when we convert the first order (or rather, first order + ↑) formula in (2.14)
into a DRS, the variables that were in the scope of existential quantifiers are converted
into discourse referents in the universe of a DRS. There are no existential quantifiers
in sight. Existential quantifiers, like indefinites, introduce discourse referents in DRT.
Unlike variables in the scope of existential quantifiers, however, discourse referents
in the universe of a DRS can be bound by other operators. This feature of DRT will
be crucial for my discussion of the binding of indexicals. It might sound suspicious
when I say that indexical presuppositions can be bound when I represent them as
existential formulas. But keep in mind that once we convert the first order formulas
into DRSs, the resulting discourse referents can be bound. This is what I have in
mind when I say indexical presuppositions can be bound.
As I said above, once content in the scope of ↑ is bound in a superordinate
DRS, it becomes redundant at the level of the sub-DRS in which it sits because this
sub-DRS will inherit information from DRSs superordinate to it. As a result, this
content can be eliminated without affecting the evaluation of the DRS as a whole.
The logical form in (2.14) is therefore equivalent to (tired(x0)) in a DRS in which
the indexical is bound at a superordinate level. I provide a derivation to show how
the redundant content can be eliminated.
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1. ∃x1(↑ ∃eπ1(ag(eπ1 , x1) ∧ eπ1 = eπ0) ∧ tired(x1)) (bind eπ1 to eπ0)
2. ∃x1(↑ ∃eπ1(ag(eπ0 , x1) ∧ eπ0 = eπ0) ∧ tired(x1)) (substitute eπ0 for eπ1)
3. ∃x1(↑ag(eπ0 , x1) ∧ tired(x1)) (eliminate tautology and vacuous quantifier)
4. ∃x1(↑ag(eπ0 , x0) ∧ tired(x0)) (ag(eπ0 , x0) from global context)
5. ↑ag(eπ0 , x0) ∧ tired(x0) (eliminate vacuous quantifier)
6. tired(x0) (eliminate redundant information and vacuous modal operator ↑)
Disregarding tense (for now), we get the following DRS for (2.11).
• [eπ0 , x0, y0, z0, t0, w0 : eπ(eπ0), ag(eπ0 , x0)[ : tired(x0)]]
I have left out conditions introduced by the utterance event that are irrelevant for
this example.
The lexical entries for indexicals reflect the sense in which indexicals are
presuppositional, according to PI. The lexical entries for each indexical type will
contain some content that falls in the scope of ↑ and some content that falls outside
of the scope of this operator. The content in the scope of ↑ is the presuppositional
content. The idea is that the presupposed content is content that has to be attached
somewhere in the incoming DRS. Its role is not to add new content to the discourse,
but to select a point in the DRS at which new content is to be added. For indexicals,
this point will almost always be the global DRS. Once an attachment site has been
found, the role played by the presupposed content is over. The presupposition does
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not add any new information; it does not figure in asserted content. This way of
understanding presupposition lines up with the traditional notion that presupposed
content is content that a speaker takes for granted. It also captures Kaplan’s insight
that the context-invariable meanings of indexicals do not show up in what he called
‘content’; but it does this while still treating presuppositional content as a genuine
form of content that is contributed to a DRS. The content that it contributes might
end up being redundant, but this is because its content is already in the DRS. The
presuppositional content of indexicals does not disappear; it shows up in the DRS
as a whole. PI’s presuppositions are unlike Kaplan’s character in this way.
Another way in which PI’s understanding of presupposition lines up with
many other theories of presupposition is that presupposition failure leads to infelicity
and/or it results in an inconsistent DRS.14 As I have already said, if a speaker
uses an indexical and it is not clear to her audience that the presupposition of the
indexical has been satisfied, the speaker’s utterance will seem infelicitous to the
interpreter.15 The interpreter will not be able to update her DRS with the content
of the speaker’s utterance. This normally does not happen, of course; it is difficult for
the presuppositions of indexicals to fail to be satisfied, but it can happen. Suppose
that a speaker S is talking to an individual A. Suddenly he turns and looks at the
14I should note also that PI borrows the notion of binding of a presupposition from van der Sandt
(1992). In addition, ↑ resembles Beaver’s operator ∂ in some respects, but ↑, unlike ∂, imposes a
requirement about where a presupposition is satisfied in the context (1995, 2001).
15This should be qualified. Suppose that a speaker says to an addressee, ‘You should come over
here,’ and that someone overhears this comment but cannot see the speaker. In this case, the
eavesdropper might not have independent evidence that there is an addressee in the context and
she might not know where ‘here’ is. Still, the speaker’s utterance won’t necessarily sound infelicitous
to her. An interpreter would need to have reason to doubt that the requisite presuppositions were
satisfied in order for apparent infelicity to occur.
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doorway and says, You look very nice today. He then turns back to A and asks, Don’t
you agree?. A would be more likely to return a confused look than a yes or a no. But
now suppose that both S and A are sharing a hallucination. They both think that
one of their co-workers has just walked through the door, but they are wrong. No
one is there. In this case, A might very well agree with S’s judgment. The utterance
would seem felicitous to the conversational participants, but PI will still treat this
as a case of presuppositional failure. There will be no way to successfully update the
context with this utterance.
2.2.4 Wide Scope
There are certain features that all accounts of indexicals are bound to share.
They all have to explain the (general) dependency of indexicals on utterances, for
example. PI does this by introducing a layer of DRSs for information from the
extra-linguistic context and by prefixing the lexical entries for indexicals with the ↑
operator; Kaplan achieved it with his more restrictive character function. Moreover,
all theories of indexicals will have to do something to ensure rigidity for indexicals,
at least in paradigmatic cases. Kaplanian, two-dimensional theories achieve rigidity
for indexicals by making sure that character delivers a value for an indexical be-
fore composition takes place and by positing that indexicals contribute constants to
logical form.16 PI contends that the Kaplanian response is overly severe. We need
only secure the insensitivity of indexicals to modal operators. Stipulating that the
16Kaplan said that indexical sentences express singular propositions. The first order correlate of
a singular proposition is a formula containing a constant or a variable under a constant assignment
function.
35
presuppositional meanings of all context sensitive expressions can never interact with
linguistic operators during composition is only one way to do this, and not a very
profitable one.
PI ensures rigidity for indexicals by ensuring that indexicals take wide scope
in the sense that an indexical presupposition must be bound outside of the sentence
altogether when possible. In order to clarify both the sense in which PI is a wide-
scope theory and the way that its account of indexical rigidity differs from that of
two-dimensional theories, I will start by considering PI’s treatment of two well-known
examples that have been used to motivate two-dimensional theories of indexicals over
wide scope theories. I will then show how PI secures rigidity.
(2.16) It is possible that in Pakistan, in five years, only those who are actually here
now are envied (Kaplan, 499).
(2.17) One day all persons now alive will be dead. (Kamp, 1971)
These examples require that we offer entries for verb phrase modifiers.
(2.18) JnowvpK = λPλeλx∃t(↑ ∃eπ(att(eπ, t) ∧ eπ =?) ∧ P (e, x)∧ att(e, t))
(2.19) JherevpK = λPλeλx∃y(↑ ∃eπ(in(eπ, y) ∧ eπ =?) ∧ P (e, x)∧ in(e, y))
(2.20) JactuallyvpK = λPλeλx∃w(↑ ∃eπ(atw(eπ, w) ∧ eπ =?) ∧ P (e, x)∧ atw(e, w))
Now let’s run through (2.17). Again, ignoring tense, the important part of this
example is the antecedent, which contains now. I assume that the entry for alive is
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λsλy alive(s, y) and use square brackets to mark the arguments below. We combine
the lexical meaning for adverbial now with the lexical entry for alive as follows.
• λPλeλx(∃t(↑ ∃eπ(att(eπ, t) ∧ eπ =?)) ∧ P (e, x)∧ att(e, t))[λsλy alive(s, y)]
• λeλx(∃t(↑ ∃eπ(att(eπ, t) ∧ eπ =?)) ∧ λsλy (alive(s, y))[e, x]∧ att(e, t))
• λeλx(∃t(↑ ∃eπ(att(eπ, t) ∧ eπ =?))∧ alive(e, x)∧ att(e, t))
An utterance of (2.17) will introduce the discourse referents eπ0 and t0 and the
conditions eπ(eπ0), att(eπ0 , t0) as before. Once eπ is bound to eπ0 , we can reduce
the long logical form to λeλx(alive(e, x)∧ att(e, t0)) using the same strategy for
eliminating redundant content that we used for I am tired above. I will skip the
details here, however, since the derivation runs exactly like the derivation above. The
λx in the final contribution of now alive will be bound by the universal quantifier
to get the final logical form for (2.17), which will be something along the following
lines.
(2.17’) ∃e∃e′∃t′∀x(alive(e, x)∧ att(e, t0)→ dead(e′, x)∧ att(e, t′) ∧ t0 < t′)
Using our entries for here and actually in addition to now, we derive the
following (reduced) analysis of (2.16).
(2.21) ♦ In Pakistan In five years ∀x(envied(x)→ ∃e located(e, x)∧ in(e, z0)∧
at(e, t0)∧ at(e, w0))
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The discourse referents z0, t0, w0 are contributed to the global DRS K0 by the ut-
terance and the occurrences of here, now, actually, respectively, introduce discourse
referents that are bound to these discourse referents in the now familiar way. Com-
pare (2.21) with Kaplan’s proposal for a wide-scope treatment of (2.16) and his
criticism of this proposal below.
(2.22) (∃w)(∃p)(∃t)[w = the actual circumstance ∧ p = here ∧ t = now ∧ ♦ In
Pakistan, In five years ∀x(x is envied→ x is located at p during t in w)]
Kaplan immediately criticizes this analysis:
But such transformations, when thought of as representing the claim that
indexicals take primary scope, do not provide an alternative to Principle 2
[indexicals are directly referential], since we may still ask of an utterance
of (5) [(2.22) above] in a context c, when evaluating it with respect to
an arbitrary circumstance, to what do the indexicals ‘actual’, ‘here’, and
‘now’ refer. The answer, as always, is: the relevant features of the context
c. (In fact, although (4) [(2.16) above] is equivalent to (5) [(2.22)], neither
indexicals nor quantification across intensional operators is dispensable
in favor of the other.) (Kaplan, 499)
Given what I have said so far about PI, PI is vulnerable to Kaplan’s criticism
of the wide scope analysis of (2.22). The discourse referents z0, t0, w0 in (2.21)
are bound outside of the scope of the modal operator to a discourse referent for an
utterance event. But so far, I have said nothing about how PI ensures that this
utterance event is picked out rigidly. Suppose there is a condition ag(eπ0 , x0) in the
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global DRS K0. If we let the set of all world-assignment pairs serve as input for this
DRS, then the output will be the set of world-assignment pairs 〈w, f〉 such that f
assigns to x0 an individual who is the agent in world w of the event that f assigns
to eπ0 . The assignment functions in the world-assignment pairs that survive update
with K0 will therefore assign x0 to different individuals. x0 will not be rigid.
At this point, we could introduce external anchors to ensure the rigidity of
indexicals. An external anchor, following Kamp (1985) and Kamp & Reyle (1993),
is a function from a discourse referent to an individual in the domain of individuals.
Its role is to constrain the assignment function for a DRS containing a discourse
referent for a referential expression such that the discourse referent receives the same
value regardless of the world at which the DRS is evaluated. External anchors are
constructed alongside DRSs so that what is evaluated when we evaluate a DRS K
containing a discourse referent x for a referential expression r is (K, 〈x, a〉) where a
is an element from the domain of individuals—the referent of r. An external anchor
based account of indexicals would be the most straightforward way to bring Kaplan’s
character based theory into DRT. An external anchor function for indexicals would be
exactly like the character function: it would be non-representational and constructed
external to the DRS. In addition, its only role would be to determine the contribution
of the indexicals to asserted content. What I am treating as presuppositional content
would not be treated as content of a DRS at all.
Because PI rejects Kaplanian, two-dimensional theories, external anchors
would be an inappropriate mechanism for PI to use in order to secure rigidity. I
explain in more detail how PI secures rigidity for indexicals in Hunter (ms); for
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now, I want only to present the basic idea of how PI ensures rigidity for indexicals.
First, the global context, K0 will always be evaluated relative to the actual world.
This will serve to restrict the assignments of discourse referents in the universe of
K0 appropriately. Consider the condition ag(eπ0 , x0) in K0. We start with the sin-
gle world-assignment pair 〈w, f〉 such that w = w@ and f is the empty assignment
function.17 Any assignment function f that survives update with K0, therefore, will
be such that it assigns to x0 whoever is the agent of the utterance represented by
eπ in the actual world. Second, each utterance event comes with an individuating
condition represented by a condition eπ in, e.g., eπ(eπ). This is not a descriptive con-
dition that a conversational participant should be expected to report. An individual
will in general have no non-indexical means of picking out an utterance event. But
such identification is not required by the semantics of indexicals.18 What is required
is that an utterance event be selected as the actual one, that this utterance event
(generally) determine the values of indexical expressions in the sentence uttered and,
once these values are fixed, that the values stay fixed even as the world of evaluation
changes. PI secures this by selecting a world as actual for the K0. The semantics of
indexicals strongly encourage them to bind at this level, so their interpretations will
almost always be those determined by the actual world, as desired.19
17The assignment function will be empty at the start because we assume that we begin with
an empty DRS. Evaluation of the DRS K0 will lead to an extension f ′ of the empty assignment
function f∅ such that the domain of f ′ is the universe of K0.
18cf. Kaplan’s discussion of occurrences and utterances in Remark 1, section XIX, p. 546.
Although PI uses utterance events rather than Kaplanian contexts for the semantics of indexicals,
we agree that the semantics of indexicals should not be about speech acts. The use of utterance
events allows for a very natural extension of DRT, which already uses an event based semantics.
19In Hunter (ms), graphs take the place of sequences of DRSs so that DRSs are evaluated relative
to graphs. The top node of each graph is the output value of the DRS K0 for a given DRS K, where
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PI is a wide scope theory in the sense that indexical presuppositions almost al-
ways bind in the global context. To some extent, a wide scope theory is unavoidable.
Even Kaplan’s theory was a wide-scope theory of a sort. Character simply provides
a way of ensuring, through brute force methods, that indexicals never fall in the syn-
tactic scope of operators. They don’t have wider scope than definite descriptions at
the syntactic level, but their ‘descriptive’ meanings in effect take super scope outside
of content altogether. PI’s solution is more natural: it assumes that information from
the extra-linguistic context will have a different status from information presented
in the linguistic context because we acquire the information through such different
means. Information presented via the extra-linguistic context, for example, might
come with a stronger relation to the external world. But from the point of view of in-
dexicals, this difference does not matter. The distinction between the global DRS K0
and its sub-DRS K1 is no different from the distinction between K1 and its sub-DRSs.
The fundamental difference between PI and the kinds of two-dimensional theories
that I am criticizing is that PI does not write the extra-linguistic/linguistic context
distinction into the semantics for indexicals. It is true that indexicals prefer binding
in the global DRS, but they can bind in intermediate DRSs and this possibility falls
the output value is the set of world assignment pairs that results from updating an empty DRS
with K0. The world in each world-assignment pair in the top node will be the actual world, as
explained above. Adding content from K1 triggers the construction of an arc and the introduction
of a new node. This node is the output value of K1 given the input graph that resulted from update
with K0. A complex condition in K1 will introduce further nodes in the graph that are the output
values of the arguments of the complex condition, relative to the input graph from K1. And so on.
A graph reflects the accessibility relations that hold between K0 and its sub-DRSs—each node will
have access to the information in its ancestor nodes. Graphs therefore have more structure than
the sequences of DRSs that I use in this chapter. The structure of the graphs together with the use
of pointed models allows PI to secure rigidity for indexicals.
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out naturally on the theory. PI allows for the interaction between presupposed and
asserted contents.20 Moreover, PI does not block other definite noun phrases from
binding in K0, as we will see later in this dissertation.
2.2.5 Tense
DRT uses an event based analysis of tense that is already well suited for the
PI framework. A verb will introduce a discourse referent e for an eventuality and
times can be specified for these eventualities. Sometimes the time of the eventuality
is related to the time of utterance in a conventional way and the tense provides
information about this relation that is added to the DRS. The English simple past,
for example, indicates that the event or state denoted by the verb lies strictly in
the past of the utterance time. We make this relation explicit as in the following
example.
(2.23) Mary called.
(2.24) [eπ0 , t0 : at(eπ0 , t0)[x, e : mary(x), call(e, x), at(e, t), t < t0]]
Binding to the utterance time then goes through as it does for overt indexical ex-
pressions.
20Maier (2009) offers a DRT-based, presuppositional account of indexicals that is very similar to
PI. He, however, creates an extra layer in DRT in order to account for the special nature of indexi-
cals. In so doing this, he supplements a presuppositional theory with a Kaplanian, two-dimensional
theory and brings all of the limitations of a two-dimensional theory into a presuppositional one.
This is exactly the kind of move I am arguing against in this dissertation.
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2.2.6 More Sophisticated Entries
In section 2.2.3, I introduced the functions, denoted by ag, ad, in, att, and atw,
that determine features of utterance events on which tokens of indexicals depend.
In particular, these functions determine an agent, addressee, location, time, and
world, respectively, for each utterance event. When an indexical is used, it triggers
a presupposition that will depend on one of these features. Its lexical meaning then
specifies a relation between this feature and the contribution of the indexical to
asserted content. For simplicity, I treated this relation as identity in every case I
considered. For example, I assumed that for some utterance event eπ0 and discourse
referent t0 where att(eπ0 , t0) that an utterance of now would simply offer the time t0
for predication. This assumption simplifies matters, but is not entirely accurate. Now
is more naturally understood as picking out an interval of time that properly includes
the utterance time. Our semantics need to be adjusted to let the contribution of an
indexical come apart from the relevant feature of the utterance event in this way.
For explicitness, I look first at an example involving tomorrow for which the
relation between the utterance time and the contribution to asserted content is de-
termined by the semantics. The example is a slight variation on (2.17).
(2.25) One day all persons born tomorrow will be dead.
Recall that the lexical entry for tomorrow was:
(2.26) JtomorrowK : λP (∃t′∃t′′(↑ ∃eπ(t′′ =t2(t′)∧ att(eπ, t′) ∧ eπ =?) ∧ P (t′′)))
The entry for the adverbial use will then be:
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(2.27) JtomorrowvpK : λPλeλx(∃t′∃t′′(↑ ∃eπ(t′′ =t2(t′)∧ att(eπ, t′)∧eπ =?)∧P (e, x)∧
att(e, t
′′)))
The problem is that not all of the content contributed by tomorrow can be bound in
the global context, so the information contributed by tomorrow is not automatically
rendered redundant once eπ is bound to an antecedent in the global context. Every
utterance event will introduce a time, but there’s no obvious reason to assume that
in so introducing a time into the context, an utterance also introduces a discourse
referent for the day after the day of utterance (or the year after the year of utterance,
or the day/year before the day/year of utterance, etc.). Thus, we will not be able to
eliminate the presuppositional content of tomorrow from the logical form of (2.25)
without some extra theoretical assumptions. To illustrate this, suppose that an
utterance of (2.25) introduces eπ0 and the other discourse referents and conditions
introduced by the utterance are as before (x0, y0, z0, t0...att(eπ0 , t0)...). Thus we bind
eπ in the entry for tomorrow to eπ0 from the global context.
• λPλeλx(∃t′∃t′′(↑ ∃eπ(t′′ =t2(t′)∧ att(eπ, t′)∧eπ =?)∧P (e, x)∧ att(e, t′′)))[λsλy born(s, y)]
• λeλx(∃t′∃t′′(↑ ∃eπ(t′′ =t2(t′)∧ att(eπ, t′)∧eπ =?)∧λsλy born(s, y)[e, x]∧ att(e, t′′)))
• λeλx(∃t′∃t′′(↑ ∃eπ(t′′ =t2(t′)∧ att(eπ, t′) ∧ eπ =?) ∧ born(e, x)∧ att(e, t′′)))
We then attempt to delete redundant material as before, but after deleting the
tautology eπ0=eπ0 , substituting t0 for t
′, and deleting the vacuous quantifiers ∃eπ
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and ∃t′, we end up here:21
• λeλx∃t′′(↑ (t′′ = t2(t0)∧ att(eπ0 , t0))∧ born(e, x)∧ att(e, t′′))
Because the formula att(eπ0 , t0) is redundant (at the discourse level), we can further
reduce the above logical form:
• λeλx∃t′′(↑ (t′′ = t2(t0))∧ born(e, x)∧ att(e, t′′))
But that is as far as we can go without adding material to the context.
I propose to treat examples with tomorrow as instances of partial matches of
information. Consider the following example from Beaver (2002):
(2.28) Yesterday a man was shot in Utrecht. The Amsterdam father of four...
In this example of a partial match, the definite description the Amsterdam father
of four is bound to the antecedent introduced by a man in the first sentence. But
binding also results in the addition of conditions to the effect that the man was from
Amsterdam, that he was a father, and that he had four kids. Similarly, in examples
involving tomorrow, the utterance event from the presupposition of tomorrow will
be bound to an antecedent in the global context, but we will have to add additional
information. We will add a discourse referent for the day after the day of utterance,
say, t2, and the condition t2(eπ0) = t2. Now the information in the scope of ↑
can be bound to an antecedent in the global context and we can proceed with our
elimination of redundant content and the consequently vacuous modal operator ↑.
21Deleting redundant material is not required by our theory. The point of deleting the material
is to show that the presuppositional content does not affect the asserted content of the utterance.
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1. λeλx∃t′′(↑ (t′′ = t2(t0))∧ born(e, x)∧ att(e, t′′))
2. λeλx∃t′′(↑ (t2 = t2(t0))∧ born(e, x)∧ att(e, t2)) (t2(t0) = t2 from the global
context)
3. λeλx(↑ (t2 = t2(t0))∧ born(e, x)∧ att(e, t2)) (eliminate vacuous quantifier)
4. λeλx(born(e, x)∧ att(e, t2)) (eliminate redundant material and vacuous modal
operator)
We can now proceed to the construction of the full logical form for the conditional
in (2.25), though I omit it here.
PI posits a similar solution for now and here, which pick out intervals with
pragmatically determined boundaries.
• JnowK : λP (∃t′∃t′′(↑ ∃eπ(t′ ⊆ t′′∧att(eπ, t′) ∧ eπ =?) ∧ P (t′′)))
• JnowvpK : λPλeλx(∃t′∃t′′(↑ ∃eπ(t′ ⊆ t′′∧att(eπ, t′)∧eπ =?)∧P (e, x)∧ att(e, t′′)))
We let the value of t′′ be ultimately determined by broad discourse factors, as opposed
to simply the features of the utterance event, and require only that the interval
ultimately picked out by t′′ includes the time of the utterance, t′. As in the case
of tomorrow, it is reasonable to expect accommodation of such material. We rarely,
if ever, use now to pick out the utterance time; we rather exploit the utterance
time plus pragmatic factors to determine a ‘current’ interval. In what follows, I will
continue to use the simpler lexical entries given in section 2.2.3, having shown that
the simpler lexical entries could be complicated as need be.
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2.3 Demonstratives
PI is a theory of non-demonstrative indexicals. However, because of the in-
tuitively very close similarity between demonstratives and indexicals, this chapter
would not be complete without a brief discussion of how PI’s treatment of indexicals
could be extended to a more general account of both indexicals and demonstratives.
Roberts (2002) proposes a theory of demonstrative pronouns that is very much in
line with the basic ideas of PI and I will use her account to demonstrate how a PI-like
account of demonstratives would look.
Roberts maintains, quite reasonably, that demonstrative expressions are un-
derspecified with regard to a demonstration.22 That is, an occurrence of a demon-
strative will presuppose that there is a salient demonstration available in the context
and that this demonstration has a demonstratum in the context. This presupposi-
tion is the counterpart to the indexical presupposition proposed by PI that there is
an utterance event in the context and that this event has an agent, addressee, time,
location, or world (depending on the indexical). Extending the framework of PI, we
get the following lexical entry for the bare demonstrative that.23
• JthatK : λP (∃x(↑ (∃δ∃eπ(dem(δ)∧acc(eπ, δ)∧of(δ, x)∧eπ =?∧δ =?))∧P (x)))
Disregarding the ↑ clause for the moment, this entry looks like the entries given by
PI for indexicals. The discourse referent x is what is offered to asserted content.
22This is also very Kaplanian in spirit.
23This is not the way that Roberts presents the presupposition for that, but I believe that this
formalization captures the aspects of Roberts’ presentation that are relevant for the discussion at
hand and using it saves the time and space that would be required to introduce a very different
notation.
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Turning now to the ↑ clause, that presupposes the existence of a demonstration (δ)
and an utterance event (eπ) and also presupposes that δ is a demonstration (dem(δ)),
that δ accompanies the utterance event (acc(eπ, δ)), and that δ is a demonstration
of x (of(δ, x)). Thus x serves both as the demonstratum and the referent of an
occurrence of that.
To distinguish between this and that, we should also add proximality features
to our presuppositions. Following Roberts, this will carry an additional presupposi-
tion that x is (+)proximal, while that will carry the additional presupposition that x
is (–)proximal. These features make demonstratives useful in contrastive construc-
tions.
(2.29) That [pointing at a dress] is appalling, but this [pointing at another dress], I
would like to try on.
Using this instead of a second occurrence of that doesn’t change the truth conditions
or update conditions of what is said, but it nevertheless plays the important role of
underscoring a salient contrast in the discourse context.
One of the most important and interesting features of Roberts’ account, at
least from the point of view of PI, is that Roberts allows for the presuppositions
of demonstratives to bind to entities introduced in discourse. In what she calls
discourse deixis, the demonstration presupposed by a demonstrative is a piece of
linguistic material.24 The demonstratum is the discourse referent introduced by
24An alternative would be to construe the utterance of the linguistic material as the demonstration
so that a demonstration would still be an act of some sort. That would be more intuitive to me,
but it is not how Roberts treats the demonstrations in discourse deixis.
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the demonstration, as usual; discourse deixis is structurally like paradigmatic deixis
except that the demonstration is linguistic instead of extra-linguistic.
Another important feature of Roberts’ account is that it does not treat demon-
stratives as referential expressions. Instead, she says that the seemingly referential
and rigid behavior of so many occurrences of demonstratives derives from the di-
rectness of certain kinds of demonstrations. If I point at a hat on the table and
say, that is my hat, then my demonstration raises a particular hat to salience. The
presupposition for the demonstrative then secures a connection between the token
of the demonstrative and my demonstration. Because my demonstration picked out
an actual object in the actual world, the demonstrative does, too. All of this is
consistent with the possibility that the presupposition of a demonstrative could be
bound by a quantifier. In such a case, the demonstrative would not have a referen-
tial or rigid interpretation. Roberts’ analysis of the referential and rigid readings of
demonstratives is therefore similar to PI’s explanation for the seemingly referential
and rigid behavior of indexicals: the presuppositions of indexicals do not require
binding to the global context, but when binding is achieved at this level, rigidity
follows because the utterance event is fixed to be an actual utterance event.
There is no doubt a lot of empirical work that remains to be done on demon-
stratives and I do not claim that Roberts’ theory is entirely adequate as it stands.
For example, it is not always clear in Roberts’ theory how the presuppositions of
demonstratives are satisfied when the demonstrative falls in the scope of a quan-
tifier. I’m not sure what the demonstration would be for Every professor admires
most that first book of his and other similar examples discussed by King (2001). In
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addition, Roberts’ presupposition might be too strict in light of examples that have
been discussed by Nunberg (1993) and Elbourne (2008), among others.
(2.30) That is a good wine. [pointing at an empty bottle on display in a restaurant]
(2.31) These [pointing at a single plate] are over at the warehouse, but those [point-
ing at another plate] I have in stock here. (Nunberg 1993)
(2.32) Now he [pointing at a painting] was a good painter.
In these cases, it seems that the demonstration raises an entity to salience, as ex-
pected, but it is not the demonstratum that is contributed to asserted content. For
this reason, one might want to relax the connection that Roberts takes to hold be-
tween the demonstratum and referent of a given demonstrative token. We might add
to the presupposition that the demonstratum and the referent are related by some
relation R and then let R be specified by the context. Then, R could be identity,
as Roberts maintains, but it could also be another relation licensed by the discourse
context.
I will not attempt to advance the discussion of demonstratives in this disserta-
tion; my main focus is non-demonstrative indexicals. Nevertheless, I have suggested
how PI could be extended to handle demonstratives. I think Roberts’ theory is on
the right track and it is certainly better suited to explain examples of local binding of,
say, the sort that King talks about than is Kaplan’s theory of demonstratives. Local
binding of presuppositions is allowed in discourse-based, presuppositional theories of
definites like Roberts’ theory of demonstratives and PI’s theory of indexicals.
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2.4 Conclusion
PI extends the basic framework of DRT in two important ways. First, it
extends the notion of a DRS to include information introduced not only through
discourse, but also through the extra-linguistic context in which a discourse takes
place. Information from the extra-linguistic context is kept in the most global DRS,
K0, because it is information that is in an important sense antecedent to the informa-
tion presented in a discourse and because it is information determined by the actual
world. Information presented in discourse is recorded in sub-DRSs of the global
DRS. Second, PI adds lexical entries for indexicals in which the presuppositional
components of the indexicals are prefixed with an operator ↑. The presuppositional
components of the indexicals are anaphoric in the sense that they need to bind to
an utterance event. The ↑ forces the presuppositions to bind to an antecedent in the
highest possible context. Because K0 will always contain information on an utterance
event when an utterance has been made, indexicals will easily bind to antecedents
introduced by the actual utterance event, as desired.
PI captures the dependence of indexicals on the actual context that Kaplan
insisted was so important. However, this dependence is not written explicitly into the
lexical entries of indexicals. There is no feature in the entries of indexicals that says
that they have to bind in the global context or that they have to be understood as
referential or rigid, etc. It is true that indexicals do have a preference to bind to actual
utterance events, but PI allows for the possibility that their presuppositions could
be bound in intermediate contexts. Moreover, PI secures the context sensitivity of
indexicals without treating the extra-linguistic context as a special kind of context
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from the point of view of definites. The global context is a DRS like any other
DRS—it’s just more global. As we will see in coming chapters, this allows PI to be
consistent with a theory of definite descriptions that allows definite descriptions to
also have their presuppositions satisfied in K0.
The semantics of ↑ together with the lexical entries for indexicals reveal the
sense in which indexicals are presuppositional. Indexicals contribute two kinds of
content: content in the scope of ↑ and content outside of the scope of ↑. The former
is the presupposed content, which replaces Kaplan’s character in PI, and the latter
is the asserted content, which replaces Kaplan’s truth-conditional content. The ↑
operator says that the content in its scope is supposed to be attached somewhere in
the existing discourse structure; the role of this content is not to add information to
the discourse context but to bind to a point in the discourse at which new content,
i.e. the content outside of the scope of ↑, will be added. As we will see later, the
under-specified entries for indexicals prevent them from overriding this preference and
accommodating in the sub-DRSs in which the indexical presupposition is triggered.
This ensures that the content in the scope of ↑ will always be old content, at least
for indexicals. It also ensures that if the indexical presupposition cannot bind or be
accommodated outside of the local context in which the indexical presupposition is




In the last chapter, I claimed that one advantage of PI over two-dimensional
theories of indexicals is that PI allows for the interaction between indexical presup-
positions and content from the surrounding discourse context. I did not, however,
make use of this fact. The aim of this chapter is to motivate a need for this feature
of PI. My discussion will focus on adverbial uses of the indexical now that need not
depend on the actual time of utterance but which presuppose a contrast between
the material in the scope of the adverb and information nearby in the discourse con-
text. For example, if I say, Mary, once an indefatigable optimist, now a disappointed
cynic... I presuppose that there was a time at which Mary was not a disappointed
cynic and the presupposition in this case is satisfied by the immediately preceding
discourse. The use of now to refer to past times is therefore similar to uses of aspec-
tual verbs like stop and begin which presuppose a change of state. I will argue that
the lexical entry for now offered in the previous chapter should be extended to treat
these uses and offer an analysis that makes use of the fact that PI allows indexical
presuppositions to interact with the surrounding discourse. I will also show that
there is reason to think that many indexicals, in particular here, actual and actually,
also demonstrate intermediate binding.
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3.1 The Behavior of Now
It is well known that English now can be used in narratives to pick up on a
time other than the utterance time. Consider the following example of free indirect
style.
(3.1) What a folly! All his life long Peter had been fooled like that; first getting
sent down from Oxford; next marrying the girl on the boat going out to India;
now a wife of a Major in the Indian Army—thank Heaven she had refused to
marry him! (Mrs. Dalloway, Virginia Woolf).
Free indirect style affords the reader a glimpse into the mind of a character. The
judgment described in (3.1) is Mrs. Dalloway’s, not the author’s or narrator’s, and
now is Mrs. Dalloway’s now. But Mrs. Dalloway’s thoughts are not being quoted—
she certainly did not think to herself (even in the story), “All his life long Peter had
been fooled like that”, nor did she refer to herself in the third person1. Woolf employs
more subtle means to shift the perspective. Even though the tense and person do
not match those of Mrs. Dalloway’s thoughts, she is nevertheless understood as the
agent of the thought and indexicals like now follow the shift to her perspective.
Banfield (1982), Doron (1991), and Schlenker (2004) argue on the basis of
examples in free indirect style, that indexicals should be evaluated relative to two
contexts, which Schlenker calls the context of thought and the context of utterance.
1For a discussion of how free indirect style differs from direct discourse, see Banfield (1982) and
Schlenker (2004).
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Following Banfield and Doron,2 the context of thought is the context from which
a given thought is taken to originate and the context of utterance is the context
in which the thought is expressed. Supposedly, person and tense are determined
by the context of utterance while all other indexicals, including here, the temporal
indexicals, and demonstrative pronouns, are given their values by the context of
thought. Either one of these contexts can come apart from the context of speech,
which is determined by the actual agent, location, time and world. In free indirect
discourse, the hypothesis is that the context of utterance is aligned with the context
of speech, or actual context, while the context of thought comes apart from the
context of speech and is determined by the point of view of a character. In (3.1), for
example, the context of thought is the context of Mrs. Dalloway’s thought.
Schlenker argues that the same distinction between context of thought and
context of utterance can be used to analyze the behavior of tense and indexicals in
examples of the historical present, such as (3.2).
(3.2) Fifty eight years ago to this day, on January 22, 1944, just as the Americans
are about to invade Europe, the Germans attack Vercors.
The historical present, maintains Schlenker, is the ‘mirror image’ of free indirect
discourse: in the historical present, the context of thought is aligned with the context
of speech while the context of utterance comes apart from both of these. Thus, the
value of the temporal indexical expression fifty eight years ago to this day is given
by the context of thought/speech, while the tense is determined by the context of
2Following them in spirit—the terminology is Schlenker’s.
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utterance. (3.2) expresses a thought about a time in the past, but the thought is
attributed to the actual speaker. The time at which the events are taken to unfold
is not the time of the actual speech event, however, despite the use of the present
tense. It is as though we have been shifted to the past and someone else is narrating
the events as they unfold.
I will not pursue a more thorough discussion of Schlenker’s proposal, or of
Banfield’s or Doron’s, because I think that these accounts cannot possibly do justice
to the full range of behavior exhibited by now. They may very well shed light on
certain aspects of particular literary styles—this question is beyond the scope of this
dissertation—but we must look beyond them to construct a full semantic account
for now. Schlenker’s analysis of the historical present is particularly ill-suited for the
task, for consider the following example from Predelli (1998).
(3.3) It is 1796. Napoleon, now commander of the French troops in Italy, defeats
the Sardinian forces and turns against Austria. (Predelli 1998)
In (3.3), now is not the now of the actual speech act, despite Schlenker’s predictions
that now follows the context of thought and that the context of thought is aligned
with the context of speech in the historical present.
The real shortcoming of all of these views, at least from the point of view of
someone who wants to explain the full range of now’s behavior, is that now can pick
up on a time other than the time of actual utterance even outside of the historical
present and free indirect discourse. As Recanati has pointed out, examples like (3.3)
are often perfectly felicitous in the past tense, even with now, as shown in (3.4).
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(3.4) It was 1796. Napoleon, (who was) now commander of the French troops in
Italy, defeated the Sardinian forces and turned against Austria. (Predelli
1998).
Here now picks out a time from the past, but this is clearly not an example of the
historical present as the present tense is not used. Nor is it an example of free indirect
speech, as no one’s thought is being recorded here except for the author’s.
Examples like (3.3) and (3.4) are common, at least in written discourse. They
are found in, for instance, old English narratives, the Bible (at least in parts trans-
lated from Greek) as well as current newspapers and blogs.
(3.5) Behold a wonder! they but now who seemd/ In bigness to surpass Earths
Giant Sons/ Now less than smallest Dwarfs. . . (Paradise Lost, J. Milton, Book
I, 777-779)
(3.6) But the ship was now in the midst of the sea, tossed with waves: for the wind
was contrary.3 (King James Bible, Matthew 14:24)
(3.7) The writer was Lucy Mercer Rutherfurd, who decades before had been FDR’s
mistress and who now was making arrangements for what would be their last
fateful meeting at the president’s rural retreat. (The Washington Post)4
(3.8) It finally dawned on me that what she had was irreversible. As she started to
recover from her hip injury, we discovered she had lost the capacity to speak
3Now in this example is a translation of ηδη, which is also translated as even now, already, by
this time. But comes from δε.
4‘What was for FDR’s eyes only is now for yours’, July 29, 2010.
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properly. She was now able to emit only a series of sounds mixed with the
occasional word. Her frustration was tangible. She cried for her lost voice.
(Daily Mail)5
(3.7) is an excerpt from a newspaper article about a recent acquisition of the National
Archives. This particular quote is about a personal letter written to President F.D.
Roosevelt by a former mistress of his; now is the time of the letter writing. (3.8) is
from a personal article written by Fiona Phillips about her mother’s struggle with
Alzheimer’s. Now in this example picks out a time after Phillips’ late mother had
suffered a hip injury. I provide many more examples like (3.5)-(3.8) at the end of
this chapter.
(3.5)-(3.8) are all narrative examples, but they are not examples of free in-
direct discourse or the historical present. A requirement of the historical present is,
of course, that the present tense be used. This is not the case in any of (3.5)-(3.8).6
Free indirect discourse, on the other hand, is used to indirectly report the thoughts
of a character. (3.5)-(3.8), however, are very direct reports. The point of view is the
narrator’s and the tense is determined by the time of writing. One might suggest
that they are indirect reports of the narrator’s thoughts. Perhaps, but the examples
5MailOnline, ‘Her misery was now so deep, her existence so shallow. . . I wanted to
grab her pillow and smother her – Fiona Phillips on dealing with Alzheimer’s’, August 28,
2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1307015/Her-misery-deep-existence-shallow–
I-wanted-grab-pillow-smother-her.html
6This is less clear in the example from Paradise Lost, but we could change the example slightly
to show that now need not be accompanied by the present tense in this example: ‘Behold a wonder!
they but now who seemd/ In bigness to surpass Earths Giant Sons/ Now were less than smallest
Dwarfs. . ....
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don’t really seem to be about thoughts at all; they are rather straightforward nar-
ratives. Moreover, note that in examples very similar to (3.7) and (3.8), now can
easily be used to pick up on the actual time of utterance. This suggests that it is
not merely the perspective or tense in (3.7) and (3.8) that explains the shift of now
in these examples.
(3.8’) Thinking about her frustration brings tears to my eyes even now/to this very
day.
(3.7’) The writer was Lucy Mercer Rutherfurd, who decades before had been FDR’s
mistress and who was making arrangements for what we now know would be
their last fateful meeting at the president’s rural retreat.
(3.8’) is a perfectly felicitous continuation of (3.8) and (3.7’) involves a very minimal
change from (3.7). There is no forthcoming reason for arguing that the perspective—
either of the narrator or some other thinker—has shifted between either (3.8) and
(3.8’) or (3.7) and (3.7’). The behavior of now cannot be explained in terms of
perspective only. Nor can it be explained by studying a particular literary style—
there is no style, genre or even literary period that ties (3.5)-(3.8) together.
I conclude that any account of now that tries to preserve the traditional
picture of now as an indexical expression that must refer to the time of utterance or
thought will be unsuccessful. Under certain conditions, the presupposed meaning of
now can simply be bound in an intermediate discourse context. This possibility, is,
of course, predicted by PI. I turn now to a more positive discussion of how examples
(3.5)-(3.8) should be treated.
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3.2 Kamp & Reyle
Kamp and Reyle (1993) recognize that now can be used to refer to past times,
even outside of special literary environments. They argue that the interpretation of
now depends on a temporal perspective point, subject to two constraints. First, the
relation between the temporal perspective point and the time of utterance—and, con-
sequently, the relation between the interpretation of now and the time of utterance—
is sensitive to tense. Kamp and Reyle, influenced by Reichenbach (1947)7, claim that
in the following example, the simple past sets the perspective point to 10.00, rather
than, say, 6.00 or the time of utterance.
(3.9) Fred arrived at 10. He had set off at 6. (p. 593)
10.00 serves as the temporal perspective point not because it is closer in some sense
to the utterance time (though of course it is), but rather because it is introduced
by the simple past and then exploited, in this case by the past perfect. Kamp and
Reyle explain that the function of the past perfect “is to situate the described state
or event in the past of some point which is itself in the past of the time of utterance”
(593). In the case of a simple-past/future construction, as in the example below,
the temporal perspective point will again lie behind the time of the utterance, but
the time of the eventuality described by the future tense clause will lie between the
temporal perspective point and the utterance time.
(3.10) Mary got to the station at 9:45. Her train would arrive at 10:05.
7Hans Reichenbach (1947): Elements of Symbolic Logic, London: Macmillan.
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In this example, the perspective point is 9:45, and the tense of the future clause
is determined relative to the temporal perspective point rather than the utterance
time.
The second constraint on the temporal perspective point for Kamp and Reyle
is determined by aspect. They argue that now can only depend on a past time in
sentences which describe states, not in sentences that describe events. Consider the
following pair from Kamp and Reyle:
(3.11) Bill had come home at seven. Now he wrote a letter.
(3.12) Bill had come home at seven. Now he was writing a letter.
They claim, correctly I think, that (3.11) is not good, while (3.12) is acceptable. As
a result of this disparity, they propose that the English simple past is ambiguous.
When it is used in a sentence describing an event, the temporal perspective point
is given by the utterance time; when it is used in a sentence describing a state,
the temporal perspective point lies (or at least can lie) in the past relative to the
utterance time. The intuitive explanation is that while the past tense suggests that
the temporal perspective lies in the past, in order for it to really shift away from
the context of utterance, it needs to be used—events or states described by the past
tense clause must be described as unfolding or holding at the relevant time in the
past. In Kamp and Reyle’s words, “when one describes something as going on at the
time of description, one must describe it as just that, viz. as something that is then
going on” (596). For this reason, say Kamp and Reyle, states are more naturally
described from the perspective of a past point than are events.
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There is a lot of data, however, that do not support the second constraint
regarding aspect. The first thing to note is that (3.11) is not a particularly good
example even without now.
(3.11’) (?) Bill had come home at seven. He wrote a letter.
While it may be acceptable, it begs for extra scene-setting from the context. But
now, compare (3.11) with the following examples, which are very similar.
(3.13) That was the kind of people in whom Paul had become so interested, and to
whom he now wrote his letter.8
(3.14) In Macedonia he was rejoined by Timothy, whose name is associated with his
own, in the opening salutation of the Second Epistle, which he now wrote to
Corinth.9
Even without much help from the context, these examples are far more felicitous
than (3.11). I believe that this is because they hang together in a way that the two
sentences of (3.11) do not. The event described by the second sentence in both (3.13)
and (3.14) concerns an entity introduced in the first sentence. By contrast, the two
sentences in (3.11) don’t obviously have anything to do with each other and are thus
awkward even without now.
8From, ‘The Story of the New Testament,’ by Edgar J. Goodspeed, http://www.religion-
online.org/showchapter.asp?title=584&C=803
9The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, http://www.searchgodsword.org/enc/isb/view.cgi?number=T8794
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The infelicity of (3.11) does not clearly stem from the combination of now
with a verb phrase denoting a past event and cannot help us to predict when now
will be sensitive to past times. Moreover, a Google search produced a wealth of
examples like (3.13) and (3.14) in which now modifies a verb phrase denoting a past
event, including (3.15) and (3.16). (3.17) is a contrived example.
(3.15) But Rokiroki, exerting all his strength, gripped the strangers wrists so that
he could not draw his hatchet. And now he called again to his little daughter,
who stood trembling on the bank above.
(3.16) Before being dipped into the liquid air, it would not burn; but now it ex-
ploded, it was consumed so rapidly.
(3.17) Napoleon, having taken control of the French troops in Italy, now laid siege
to Stagira.
Even in variations of these examples in which the simple past is preceded by the
past perfect (to mirror (3.11) and (3.12)), now still combines easily with past tense
clauses describing events.
(3.18) He had gripped the stranger’s wrists so that he could not draw his hatchet.
Now he called again to his little daughter, who stood trembling on the bank
above.
(3.19) Normally, it wouldn’t explode, but the scientist had dipped it in liquid hot
air. Now it exploded, it was consumed so rapidly.
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(3.20) Napoleon had taken control of the French troops in Italy. Now he laid siege
to Stagira.
A final point is that now does not always combine felicitously with simple
past clauses describing past states.
(3.21) a. John just arrived. I’m hungry now so I think we should go to the restau-
rant.
b. John (had) arrived at 10. *I was hungry now, so I thought we should
go to the restaurant.
(3.22) a. It’s noon. I’m always hungry now
b. It was noon. (?) I was always hungry now
Kamp & Reyle mention the possibility that now might pick out the utterance time
even in past tense clauses that describe past states. But I think that this fact,
combined with the fact that now can pick out past times in past tense clauses that
denote events, is more problematic for their account than they seem to think it is.
Tense and aspect no doubt have something to do with now’s behavior, but they fall
far short of giving us the full story.
3.3 Recanati (2004)
Recanati (2004), who also writes about the use of now in examples like (3.5)-
(3.8), suggests that what is missing from a story like Kamp & Reyle’s is a requirement
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of contrast between two times. Recanati claims that now can pick up on a past time
just as long as this time is contrasted with another time which is in some sense less
close than the time of now. Consider (3.7) again.
(3.7) The writer was Lucy Mercer Rutherfurd, who decades before had been FDRs
mistress and who now was making arrangements for what would be their last
fateful meeting at the president’s rural retreat.
Here the time at which Lucy Rutherford was writing the letter is contrasted with a
period of time decades before the time of the letter writing, so the use of now to pick
out a past time is felicitous.
Based on the fairly liberal behavior of now, Recanati proposes that now is
not a true indexical, but a perspectival. The interpretation of now need not depend
on the context of utterance or the context of thought—the perspective on which
a perspectival depends need not belong to any agent in the context. Rather, now
depends on a time that serves as a perspective point in the sense of Kamp & Reyle’s
temporal perspective point. Recanati uses come to illustrate what a perspectival is.
(3.23) When the beggars came to town, the rich folk went to the shore. But soon
the beggars came after them, so they went home. [Lewis 1983: 243]
For an utterance of (3.23) to be felicitous, the agent (or addressee) need not be in
town or at the shore, nor must she imagine or present herself as being in either
location. Nevertheless, the shore and the town are perspective points, according to
Recanati: the first occurrence of come is directed towards the town and the second
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is directed towards the shore. Clearly, the perspective points are not determined
by the agent’s location; in this example, it seems to be the discourse context that
introduces the first perspective point and then changes the perspective to the next
perspective point.
Recanati doesn’t say much about what determines a temporal perspective
point in his theory. Although he cites Kamp & Reyle when he introduces the concept
of a temporal perspective point, he gives no reason to believe that he endorses their
theory concerning how temporal perspective points are introduced and shifted, or
that he accepts their judgments on data. He simply says that now “can refer to any
period, provided it is contrasted with another more distant period” and that “the
only constraint [on the reference of here and now] is that the place or time referred
to be close in a sense which need not be absolute but may be as relative as you wish”
(Recanati 2004). Yet surely now is not so free as this quote suggests, for we can
easily come up with examples in which two times are contrasted, one of which is in
some sense ‘closer’, but in which now is not felicitous.
(3.24) Bill came home at 7:00 after leaving work an hour before. He poured himself
a glass of wine *now.
(3.25) When I came back to Rome in 2005, having set off six months earlier for
Tokyo, I was really excited to be in Italy *now/then.10
Clearly, more is required than a contrast between two times.
10This is a variation on an example that Recanati uses to show that here does not always follow
the perspective point of come.
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3.4 PI and Intermediate Binding
A fundamental claim in Kamp & Reyle’s proposal was that the interpretation
of now can be anaphoric on a time—the temporal perspective point—introduced in
discourse. In terms of PI, this means that the presupposition of now can be bound in
an intermediate context. Recall that according to PI information concerning an ac-
tual utterance event is represented in the global DRS and all information introduced
through discourse is represented in sub-DRSs of the global DRS. Thus, binding to a
time introduced in previous discourse amounts to intermediate binding in PI.
Intermediate binding is allowed in PI; the lexical entries for indexicals do
not require that their interpretations be determined by the actual utterance event.
Indexicals have a strong preference to bind at the global level, but under certain
conditions, they can bind elsewhere. To the extent that Kamp & Reyle’s proposal is
that now can be anaphoric and that tense and aspect play a crucial role in determin-
ing when this is possible, I think they are certainly correct. Now does not contribute
a time of its own so it will either have to get one from the extra-linguistic context
or it will have to get one from the discourse. Tense and aspect are clearly important
for constructing the temporal structure of a discourse and they will play an equally
important role in shaping the interpretive possibilities for a token of now. What was
missing from Kamp & Reyle’s proposal was a convincing story about when now can
pick up on a past time, given that a past time has been introduced and is salient in
the context.
Recanati suggested that what was missing was a requirement of contrast and
I think that he is right. However, as we saw, we can not leave it at that, for a contrast
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is not always sufficient to bring about a felicitous past time use of now. Let’s take
apart one of our examples to get a better look at how a contrast is involved. Consider
(3.8) again.
(3.26) As she started to recover from her hip injury, we discovered she had lost the
capacity to speak properly. She was now able to emit only a series of sounds
mixed with the occasional word.
The clause as she started to recover introduces a time which overlaps the time at
which the author discovered that her mother had lost the capacity to speak prop-
erly. The clause containing now depends on this time as well; this sentence merely
elaborates on what the author meant when she said that her mother had lost the
ability to speak properly. The clause we discovered she had lost the capacity to speak
properly implies (in this example) that the author’s mother had the capacity to speak
properly before the hip injury. This makes salient a contrast between a period in
which her mother could speak properly and a period, following the first period, dur-
ing which she could not speak properly. Now then modifies the clause denoting the
closer to ‘current’ period.
PI’s proposal is that a felicitous use of now requires a very specific discourse
structure. It must be the case that the discourse sets up a contrast between two times,
one at which a certain eventuality holds and another time at which this eventuality
does not or did not hold. Moreover, the contrast must be very local and salient in
the sense that the now clause either immediately follows the clause with which it is
contrasted or it elaborates on a clause that is immediately contrasted with another
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clause. Past uses of now are like pronouns in the sense that they cannot reach
back very far in a discourse to find their antecedents. I provide some examples for
illustration.
(3.27) The U.S., which had been self-sufficient in energy as recently as 1950, was
now importing some 35% of its energy needs.
In (3.27), the parenthetical clause provides background information that is explicitly
contrasted with the now clause. In (3.28), the paragraph preceding the one that I
include here introduces Abu Ghraib as an Iraqi prison. (3.28) then describes the
transfer of control from Iraq to the US. The contrast is between the time at which
Iraq was in control of the prison and the time at which the US gained control. The
now clause is not explicitly contrasted with another clause—in the sense that it is not
preceded by the contrastive clause—but rather elaborates on one of two eventualities
that are contrasted in the immediately preceding discourse.
(3.28) In the looting that followed the regimes collapse, last April, the huge prison
complex, by then deserted, was stripped of everything that could be removed,
including doors, windows, and bricks. The coalition authorities had the floors
tiled, cells cleaned and repaired, and toilets, showers, and a new medical
center added. Abu Ghraib was now a U.S. military prison.11
(3.8) is similar to (3.28) in that the now clause is not contrasted with the preceding
clause. It rather elaborates on a clause that presupposes a contrast.
11The New Yorker, ‘Torture at Abu Ghraib,’ May 10, 2004,
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa fact.
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I propose that we change the lexical entry for now to reflect its contrastive
function. I provide the lexical entry from Chapter 2 in (3.29) and the new lexical
entry in (3.30).12
(3.29) JnowvpK = λPλeλx∃t(↑ ∃eπ(at(eπ, t) ∧ eπ =?) ∧ P (e, x) ∧ at(e, t))
(3.30) JnowvpK = λPλeλx∃t(↑ ∃e1(at(e1, t) ∧ e1 =? ∧ ∃e2∃t′(at(e2, t′) ∧ ¬P (e2, t′) ∧
((t′ < t∧¬∃t′′(t′ < t′′ < t))∨ (t′ > t∧¬∃t′′(t′ > t′′ > t)))∧P (e, x)∧at(e, t))13
The content outside of the scope of ↑ is the same in both entries, so I will ignore
it here. Let’s break down the presuppositional part of the entry. The first part,
∃e1(at(e1, t) ∧ e1 =?), looks fairly normal. It says that the presupposition for now
must be bound to a discourse referent for an eventuality (e1=?) and that t is the
time of the eventuality (at(e1, t)). With regard to this part of the entry for now, the
biggest difference between the new entry for now and the old entry is that the original
entry required that now be tied to an utterance event, while the new entry requires
only that it be tied to some eventuality. What the data from this chapter show
is that now doesn’t have to pick out times of utterance events, even if it normally
does.14
12My research on the discourse sensitivity of now is ongoing. An alternative approach would be to
derive the contrastive features of now using pragmatic principles rather than writing the contrast
explicitly into the lexical entry. I use the more explicit lexical entry in order to illustrate more
clearly the important features of now that are under discussion in this chapter.
13This entry treats now as a verb phrase modifier. Now can also operate on sentences, as in
Now, the next story that we are going to read is called ‘Goodnight Moon’. These cases call for a
more complicated analysis because there is no event to modify. What is important for the present
discussion, however, is that even these uses require a contrast between two times of the sort that
PI posits for nowvp.
14We might change the presuppositions of other indexicals accordingly. I will argue at the end
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The next part of the new lexical entry for now, ∃e2∃t′(at(e2, t′) ∧ ¬P (e2, t′)),
says that there is another eventuality (e2) and another time t
′ such that t′ is the time
of e2 and that e2 is not an event or state for which P holds. The final part of the
new entry, (t′ < t ∧ ¬∃t′′(t′ < t′′ < t)) ∨ (t′ > t ∧ ¬∃t′′(t′ > t′′ > t)) says that t′ lies
either in the past or the future of t and that in either case, there is no time t′′ that
lies between t′ and t. The new entry, therefore, says that P holds at time t, but that
P did not hold or will not hold at some time immediately in the past or immediately
in the future of t, where t is either the time of utterance or a time introduced in
discourse. This captures the intuition that now is used to contrast two times or at
least emphasize a specific time (or interval).
When now binds in an intermediate context, as I am here arguing that it can,
it is not only because the intermediate context provides the right kind of contrast,
but also because binding at the global level is blocked by the combination of now
with the past tense. PI predicts that now cannot bind in the global context when
used with the past tense unless it is in the scope of an attitude or speech verb, as
the following discourse demonstrates.
(3.31) A. I wonder if Mary is still depressed all of the time.
B. John said that Mary was much happier now.
PI also predicts that now will bind at the global level when used in the present
of this chapter that here, actual and actually have uses very similar to the ones currently under
discussion for now. I see no reason to conclude that the presuppositions of I and you do not depend
on utterance events, however, so I will continue to use discourse referents for utterance events in
their lexical entries.
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tense unless it is used as part of a special style like the historical present. In this
case, I assume that world knowledge about the events being reported will keep the
presupposition of now from binding in the global context.
3.4.1 Is Now an Indexical?
Following Reichenbach, Recanati defines indexicals as expressions that are
token-reflexive, where an expression is token-reflexive if the interpretation of a token
of the expression depends on features concerning the token itself, such as its agent
and the time and location at which it was uttered.15 For now to count as an indexical
for Recanati, it would have to be token-reflexive in the following sense:
• The meaning of now is the rule that a token of now will refer to an interval of
time which includes the time at which the token is produced. (Recanati 2004)
This rule is clearly not followed by English now. If we maintain Recanati’s (and
others’) hard and fast notion of what it is to be an indexical, then we must conclude
that either now is not an indexical or now is ambiguous in English between an
indexical use and a non-indexical use.16
Let’s reconsider what we know about now, without worrying about how to
classify it for the moment. Now almost always picks out the time of utterance. It
can, at least in written discourse, refer to past times; however, the cases in which it
can do so are highly restricted. There must be a salient contrast between two states
15In H. Reichenbach (1947): Elements of Symbolic Logic, New York, pp. 284-287.
16These appear to be the two options that Recanati considers, though he does not choose between
them.
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or events in the local discourse structure. In these cases, now, when used, is used in
the clause that is most central to the main point of what is being said in order to
center the reader’s attention on that clause.
There is an undeniable relation between paradigmatic, present uses of now
and uses of now to refer to past times (call these past uses to save space): both uses
have the effect of emphasizing a certain time and both presuppose alternative times
to the one under discussion. For past uses of now, the alternatives have to be given
by the discourse. Generally this happens because there is a contrast between two
events or states that are under discussion. The eventualities provide two different
times, or intervals of time, and the contrast presents these times as alternatives. For
present now, the alternatives do not have to be explicitly given in the discourse. We
already have a sense of the past, present, and future; now picks up on the present
interval.
It might seem less obvious that present uses of now presuppose alternatives
or any sort of contrast, but alternatives play an important role in these cases as
well. Tense can almost always do what now can do; adding now to a sentence in
the present tense often does not effect the asserted content of the sentence. Yet
now is frequently used with the present tense and my prediction is that it is used
when its use has a certain effect on the discourse. For example, it can be used to
emphasize one out of two events or states that are being contrasted as in, e.g., One
day, all persons now alive will be dead. It can also be used when another time is
not explicitly contrasted with the present, but the speaker wants to emphasize the
present time. Donate now is a call to immediate action—don’t wait, do it now. I’m
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hungry now is a good way either to tell someone that you have recently become
hungry or to emphasize the immediacy of your hunger, depending on the intonation
used. In other words, the semantic effect of an utterance of now is largely felt at the
discourse level, not the sentential level, even for present uses. In this way, now is like
but: it doesn’t (usually) change sentential truth conditions, but it certainly affects
what information is communicated by an utterance.
So, is now an indexical? According to PI, yes. As I explained in the introduc-
tion, I am interested in a broad notion of indexicality, marks of which are sensitivity
to certain properties of eventualities, an essentially non-descriptive component and
dependence on an agent’s perspective. The class of English indexicals that are truly
token-reflexive appears to be very small. It arguably includes I and some temporal
indexicals in English, as I hint in the following subsection. Nevertheless, there is
a significantly larger class of expressions that show strikingly similar behavior to
the best candidates for token-reflexive expressions. If we opt for the narrow, token-
reflexive notion of indexicality, we will not be able to explain what we thought was
interesting about these expressions in the first place. I am more interested in what
makes these expressions interestingly similar than I am in token-reflexivity.
Moreover, the interpretation of now, even in the examples I am discussing in
this chapter, is determined by the perspective of the agent. Recanati says that now
can be used to refer to a past time so long as it is contrasted with another time that
is in some sense less ‘close’. He does not, as we have seen, elaborate on this notion
of closeness, but he does warn that it should not be understood in terms of closeness
to the agent. I don’t see why it shouldn’t be. Recanati offers no counterexamples
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to the claim that closeness for now depends on the perspective of the agent. It is
true that eventualities denoted by past now clauses are presented as occurring in the
past of the agent’s actual time. However, I think what now is sensitive to in these
cases is not so much the actual times of the events themselves, but the temporal
structure of the narration of the events and the agent’s perspective on these events.
The speaker uses now to emphasize something in the discourse, something that she
wants her addressee to focus on. It is the perspectival and ‘presentifying’ nature of
now that allows it to play this focussing role in discourse. What the agent’s use of
now contributes to the discourse will be a time, and it will be a time that lies in
the past. But what licenses the use of now is a certain discourse structure and this
structure is set by the point of view that the speaker has on the discourse.17
In examples like (3.5)-(3.8), the perspective remains that of the agent even
when now is used to pick out a past time. Note that even in contexts in which a
past use of now is licensed, it is also possible for the speaker to use then to refer to
the past time.
17Sometimes now is used in a seemingly non-temporal way. For example, suppose that I have
been presenting a certain viewpoint on a controversial issue. I might stop and say, Now, I’m not
saying that this is the right way to think about things. I just want to point out that it is a reasonable
perspective. Similarly, suppose I’ve talking about a girl who has a very praiseworthy character. I
might shift the topic to her brother by saying, Now that brother of hers is a different story. He’s
always up to no good. In these cases, now seems to be deprived of its temporal meaning and appears
only to shift the discourse topic, or at least a perspective on the topic. Here I would say that now
still serves its normal function of spotlighting a current event or state and contrasting alternatives.
However, what is relevant is not the the temporal relations between actual eventualities, but rather
the structure of the discourse. Now in these cases marks the current bit of discourse that is under
discussion and presupposes that there has been a change. In this case, the change is something like
a change in discourse topic, though this is admittedly vague.
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(3.32) I was alone in her bleak room. Alone, because there was none of her in it,
just a body that now held no essence of my mum. I could have killed her
there and then.
Kamp & Reyle’s notion of a temporal perspective point—and, I take it, Recanati’s—
does not help explain what is going on in this example. The tense and aspect of the
final sentence do not suggest a change in time between the second sentence and the
final sentence. Yet now is used to pick out the past time in the second sentence and
then is used to pick out the very same time in the third sentence. The tense and
aspect of a sentence can no doubt serve to introduce a time into a discourse or to
make a time salient, but perspective is something that belongs to an agent.
PI does not require token-reflexivity for indexicals; it adopts a broader notion
of indexicality. For this reason, one might think it would be better for indexicals
not to be called indexicals in PI. We might, for example, reserve indexical only for
those expressions that fit the narrow notion of indexicality. But this issue is purely
terminological, and I have already said that I take the broader notion of indexicality
to be the interesting one. When I say that now is an indexical, I mean that it
should not be rejected from the class of expressions I introduced as indexical in the
introduction of this dissertation based only on the fact that it has discourse anaphoric
uses. I think we had rather broaden our idea of what it is to be an indexical.
3.4.2 Other Indexicals
My focus in this chapter has been exclusively on now and this might suggest
that now is unique among the indexicals in exhibiting unorthodox behavior. This is
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far from the case. While I will not offer an in-depth analysis of how other indexicals
behave, I do want to point out, so that we don’t make too rash a conclusion about
now’s status as an indexical expression, that other indexicals exhibit similar behavior.
Actual and actually are well known to suggest a contrast of some sort.
(3.33) A poet’s object is not to tell what actually happened but what could or would
happen either probably or inevitably.... For this reason poetry is something
more scientific and serious than history, because poetry tends to give general
truths while history gives particular facts.18
(3.34) The ceaseless, senseless demand for original scholarship in a number of fields,
where only erudition is now possible, has led either to sheer irrelevancy, the
famous knowing of more and more about less and less, or to the development
of a pseudo-scholarship which actually destroys its object.19
(3.35) I am come, young ladies, in a very moralizing strain, to observe that our
pleasures of this world are always to be for, and that we often purchase them
at a great disadvantage, giving readi-monied actual happiness for a draft on
the future, that may not be honoured.20
(3.36) At this time they are called to rejoice that the struggle is over, the aim
achieved and the women of the nation about to enter into the enjoyment
of their hard-earned political liberty. Of all the conventions held within the
18Aristotle’s Poetics, 1451a, translated by W.H. Fyfe (Loeb).
19Hannah Arendt (1972): ‘On Violence,’ in Crises of the Republic.
20Jane Austin (1818), Northanger Abbey, Henry Tilney, ch. 26.
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past fifty-one years, this will prove the most momentous. Few people live to
see the actual and final realization of hopes to which they have devoted their
lives. That privilege is ours.21
As with now, using actually or actual merely to talk about actual things is generally
redundant. We have modal expressions that we use when we want to talk about
non-actual situations or objects, and if one doesn’t use such an expression, then it
is reasonable for the addressee to assume that it is the actual world that is under
discussion. Actual and actually are used to emphasize a contrast between, say, a fake
object and a real one, an expectation of what would happen versus something that
actually did or would happen, or a hope versus the realization—or lack thereof—of
the hope, and so on. Again, this use seems to be derived from the paradigmatic
‘indexical’ use. Actual and actually do modify noun phrases and verb phrases (re-
spectively) that denote real events or objects, just as theories of indexicals predict.
But their contribution is often at the discourse level, not the sentential level. More-
over, as with now, there are examples in which actual and actually are not even
bound in the global context, but rather in contexts introduced by modals.
(3.37) If McCain had won the election, then the Commander in Chief would actually
be an experienced military man.
(3.38) Had Pakistan not been created, all of the money spent on defence by the
whole of South Asia in the past 60 years would have actually been spent on
21Carrie Chapman Catt (1859-1947), U.S. suffragist. As quoted in History of Woman Suffrage,
vol. 5, ch. 19, by Ida Husted Harper (1922).
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welfare and development.22
(3.39) Perhaps if those tapes had been made available to the police and to the public
we would have had actual images of the person or persons she was actually
seen talking with.23
Here is well known to have demonstrative uses and thus need not pick out,
or even depend on, the location of utterance in a token-reflexive way. These non-
standard uses can be sensitive to a demonstration, as when a speaker points at a
country on a map, far away from where she actually is, and says, I want to go here.
But here can also be sensitive to locations introduced in discourse, as the following
examples by Predelli show.
(3.40) Here, to the sheltered columned coolness, Ramanujan would come. Here,
away from the family, protected from the high hot sun outside, he would
sometimes fall asleep... (Kanigel 1991: 29-30) (1998a)
(3.41) If an entire neighborhood could qualify as an outdoor museum, the Wash-
ington district would probably charge admission. Here, just northwest of




23Adapted from http://www.c-ville.com/index.php?cat=11101808092903167&ShowArticle ID=11800802104188707.
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3.5 Conclusion
I have argued that the presupposition of now can bind in intermediate con-
texts. Although now strongly prefers binding in the global context, under special
conditions, i.e. when it modifies a clause that is contrasted with another clause in
the immediate discourse environment, it can bind in a lower context. This use of
now is very sensitive to discourse structure, but I have argued that the paradigmatic,
present tense uses of now often have a discourse functional role as well. They are
generally used to contrast two times or to emphasize one time to the exclusion of
others. Present and past uses of now are not so different; past uses therefore do not
motivate an ambiguity based account of now. Moreover, when we consider the fact
that other indexicals, such as here, actual, and actually, and demonstratives (see
Chapter 2) also have uses in which they do not depend on features of the actual,
extra-linguistic context but rather depend on the discourse context, it is hard to deny
that these uses should be taken seriously by any semantic account of indexicals.
More Now Examples
(3.42) Originally touted as a tool in the struggle against terrorism, the Patriot Act
now was being used in the hills of East Tennessee as part of a shadowy war
that had been going on for decades, a struggle that pitted the federal govern-
ment against a homespun Appalachian culture that had churned out gener-
ation after generation of proud outlaws. (Knox News, ‘Sneak-and-peek war-
rants debated; Patriot Act used to search for evidence in cockfighting case’,
August 13, 2007, http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2007/aug/13/sneak-and-
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peak-warrants-debated/)
(3.43) The weather by now was beautiful: sunny and warm, but not too hot. As we
crested range after range, the view was one of gorgeous isolation, nary a sign
of humanity to be seen in any direction. Off in the distance, to the west, was
a thin purple line that any coastal Californian knows means dense fog, but it
was many miles away. (Loose Grave (blog), ‘What Once Was Lost, Now Is
Found; California’s Lost Coast,’ by Sam Taylor, http://www.loosegravel.us/LostCoast/lost.htm)
(3.44) I was alone in her bleak room. Alone, because there was none of her in
it, just a body that now held no essence of my mum. I could have killed
her there and then. I could easily have killed my mum. In the eyes of the
law, I would have murdered her. In anyone else’s eyes, I would have re-
lieved the misery, the pain, the suffering, the indignity. (MailOnline, ‘Her
misery was now so deep, her existence so shallow. . . I wanted to grab her
pillow and smother her – Fiona Phillips on dealing with Alzheimer’s’, Au-
gust 28, 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1307015/Her-
misery-deep-existence-shallow–I-wanted-grab-pillow-smother-her.html)
(3.45) Last June, Janis Karpinski, an Army reserve brigadier general, was named
commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade and put in charge of military
prisons in Iraq. General Karpinski, the only female commander in the war
zone, was an experienced operations and intelligence officer who had served
with the Special Forces and in the 1991 Gulf War, but she had never run a
prison system. Now she was in charge of three large jails, eight battalions, and
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thirty-four hundred Army reservists, most of whom, like her, had no training
in handling prisoners. (The New Yorker, ‘Torture at Abu Ghraib,’ May 10,
2004, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa fact)
(3.46) Dresens theatre director father, Adolf Dresen, was exiled to West Germany
for supporting dissident poet-singer Wolf Biermann in 1977. “A wall was now
between us,” Andreas recalls, explaining how his political consciousness was
forged. “Politics was not an abstract thing.” (New Zealand Listener, ‘A wall
was now between us,’ November 7-13, 2009, http://www.listener.co.nz/issue/3626/artsbooks/14338/a wall was now between us.html)
(3.47) President Nixon, as part of his ill-fated price control program, had slapped
controls on oil in March 1973. The U.S., which had been self-sufficient
in energy as recently as 1950, was now importing some 35% of its energy
needs. U.S. petroleum reserves were nearly gone. Governments, corpora-
tions and individuals were entirely unprepared for what would happen next.
(Buy and Hold, ‘The Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-74,’ by Brian Trumbore,
http://www.buyandhold.com/bh/en/education/history/2002/arab.html)
(3.48) When OPEC announced the sharp price rise, the shock waves were im-
mediate. Industrial democracies, accustomed to uninterrupted sources of
cheap, imported oil, were suddenly at the mercy of a modern Arab na-
tionalism, standing up to American oil companies that had once held their
countries in a vise grip. Many of these “new” Arabs were Harvard edu-
cated and familiar with the ways of the West, and to many Americans it
was impossible to understand how their standard of living was now be-
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ing held hostage to obscure border clashes in strange parts of the world.
(Buy and Hold, ‘The Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-74,’ by Brian Trumbore,
http://www.buyandhold.com/bh/en/education/history/2002/arab.html)
(3.49) Brutally, the banks knowingly gamed the system to grow their balance sheets
ever faster and with even less capital underpinning them in the full knowledge
that everything rested on the bogus claim that their lending was now much
less risky. That was not all they were doing. (The Gaurdian, ‘Now we know
the truth. The financial meltdown wasn’t a mistake—it was a con,’ April
18, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/apr/18/goldman-sachs-
regulators-civil-charges)
(3.50) Elizabeth Cotten was born into the Nevilles family on January 5 in 1895, near
Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Her parents couldn’t agree on a name, so, she
was called “Little Sis,” “Babe,” and “Shug,” until her first day of school, when
she announced that her name was now Elizabeth. (‘Remembering Elizabeth
Cotten,’ by L.L. Demerlee, http://www.eclectica.org/v1n1/nonfiction/demerlee.html)
(3.51) Cotten and her daughter Lillie moved to Syracuse, New York. Now in her 90’s,
her hands were becoming weak and she had trouble with the guitar. (‘Remem-
bering Elizabeth Cotten,’ by L.L. Demerlee, http://www.eclectica.org/v1n1/nonfiction/demerlee.html)
(3.52) C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in
attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove
Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism
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and WMD. (The Times online, ‘The Secret Downing Street Memo,’ May 1,
2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article387374.ece)
(3.53) The discharge was now very proftuse [sic], running continually from the
mouth. The patient continued in this state till August 27th. (British Medical
Journal, ‘A Case of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in the Human Subject,’ October
26, 1872 by William T. Briscoe, http://www.bmj.com/content/2/617/464.1.citation)
(3.54) At lap 8, Lewis had a lead of 5.5 seconds, and he looked comfortable. It looked
like nothing but a mechanical failure or situation beyond his control was going
to stop him. Good consistent sector times followed, and he set another fastest
lap time on lap 11. So far, so good. Jarno Trulli in fifth place, was now looking
comfortable with a small margin between him and Kimi Raikkonen. The pace
of the Ferrari was nowhere it seemed, and Kimi knew he was in for a long day.
(Bleacher Report, ‘Lewis Hamilton Gives the Brits that Special Feeling at
Hockeheim!’ by Andrew Davies, http://bleacherreport.com/articles/39379-
lewis-hamilton-gives-the-brits-that-special-feeling-at-hockenheim)
(3.55) It was now evening, and I immediately dressed myself in the costume of an
Indian, equipped with a small hatchet, which I and my associates denomi-
nated the tomahawk, with which, and a club, after having painted my face and
hands with coal dust in the shop of a blacksmith, I repaired to Griffin’s wharf,
where the ships lay that contained the tea. (‘An Eyewitness Account of the
Boston Tea Party, As Told By George Hewes,’ http://www.earlyamerica.com/review/2005 winter spring/boston tea party.htm)
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(3.56) Now Thomas, one of the twelve, named Didymus, was not with them when
Jesus came. (Bible in Basic English, John 20:24, http://bible.cc/john/20-
24.htm)
(3.57) he is also said to be “one of the twelve” apostles, which was their number at
first, though Judas now was gone off from them, and therefore are sometimes
only called the “eleven”; but this having been their complement, it is still
retained. . . (Commentary on John 20:24, http://bible.cc/john/20-24.htm)
(3.58) It was now about the sixth hour, and darkness came over the whole land until
the ninth hour. (Luke 23:44, New International Version, 1984)
(3.59) This was now the third time Jesus appeared to his disciples after he was raised
from the dead. (New International Version, 1984, John 21:14, http://bible.cc/john/21-
14.htm People’s New Testament)
(3.60) When he had finished praying, Jesus left with his disciples and crossed
the Kidron Valley. On the other side there was an olive grove, and he
and his disciples went into it. Now Judas, who betrayed him, knew the
place, because Jesus had often met there with his disciples. (John 18:1-2,
http://bible.logos.com/passage/NIV/Jn%2019.28#ref=Jn%2019%3A28%2Chi%3DJn%2019%3A28-
Jn%2019%3A28&ver=NIV)
(3.61) Then the Jews led Jesus from Caiaphas to the palace of the Roman governor.
By now it was early morning, and to avoid ceremonial uncleanness the Jews
did not enter the palace; they wanted to be able to eat the Passover. (John
18:28)
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Intuitions about the rigidity of indexicals and definite descriptions play a
crucial role in motivating Kaplanian, two-dimensional theories. It is claimed that a
wide-scope theory of indexicals alone cannot explain why (S’) has a non-rigid reading
while (I’) does not (Kaplan (1989), Maier (2009), and Zeevat (2000); cf. also Kripke
(1980)).
(I’) I am speaking.
(S’) The speaker is speaking.
Both (I’) and (S’) are atomic sentences and share the same syntactic form. The only
difference between them is that (I’) contains an indexical in subject position where
(S’) contains a definite description with a meaning closely related to that of I. On the
surface, then, an analysis of the Indexical Modal Argument (IMA) that holds that I
in (I’) takes wider scope than the speaker in (S’) is hopeless. An extra dimension of
meaning is needed.
This is the charge presented in Maier (2009) against a wide-scope presuppo-
sitional view of definites with the structure of PI. However, a careful analysis of the
modal argument and PI’s treatment of it will dispel the illusion that the IMA poses
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a problem for PI. I start with a review of the argument and what it is supposed to
show. I then turn to an analysis of the argument using PI and a straightforward
extension of PI for definite descriptions. I then argue that while the IMA does not
show that PI needs more structure, it does show that PI cannot be extended en-
tirely straightforwardly to a general theory of definite noun phrases. We will have
to allow for different definites to have different strategies for the resolution of their
presuppositions.
4.1 Rigidity and Simple Sentences
4.1.1 A Basic Introduction to Maier’s IMA
Consider the following two sentences:
(I) Necessarily, I am speaking
(S) Necessarily, the speaker is speaking.
From (1) and (2) below, we can conclude (C1).
1. An utterance of (I) is false
2. An utterance of (S) is true
C1. I and the speaker do not make the same contribution to asserted content.
Now suppose that we remove the modal operators from (I) and (S) and consider:
(I’) I am speaking.
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(S’) The speaker is speaking.
From (3)-(5) below, we can conclude (C2). Adding (6), we arrive at (C3).
3. An utterance of (I’) is contingently true.
4. An utterance of (S’) is necessarily true.
5. (I’) and (S’) are both simple sentences.
C2. The semantic difference between (I’) and (S’) cannot be explained in terms
of scope. In particular, we cannot say that I makes the same contribution to
asserted content as the description the speaker does when it takes wide scope,
for there is no sense in which I in (I’) takes wider scope in (I’) than the speaker
does in (S’).
6. The semantic difference between (I’) and (S’), namely that I and the speaker
make different contributions to asserted content, is the same semantic difference
seen between (I) and (S).
C3. The semantic difference between (I) and (S) cannot be explained by appealing
to differences in scope either.
In order to bring out the difference between the relevant readings of (I’) and (S’),
one could say, ‘Imagine a context in which I am speaking’ and, ‘Imagine a context in
which the speaker is speaking’. In the former case, the contexts imagined will all be
contexts in which the actual speaker is speaking; in the latter case, the speaker will
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vary from one context to another and every context (understood in a Kaplanian way
here) will be a context in which the speaker is speaking. In the IMA, of course, the
sentences are not prefixed with ‘Imagine a context in which’. The idea is that even
without this prefix, we can still detect the requisite distinction between (I’) and (S’).
4.1.2 The Worry for PI
To understand Maier’s criticism of a wide-scope theory like PI, let’s look first
at a ‘naive’ presuppositional view of indexicals. Suppose that the presuppositional
component of I were simply: ∃x(speaker(x)) and that the asserted component were
P (x) for some predicate P . Now suppose that the presuppositional component of
the speaker were ∃y(speaker(y)) and that the asserted component were P (y) for
some predicate P . The naive view will not be able to derive the requisite distinction
between (I’) and (S’). The indexical I in (I’) and the description the speaker in (S’)
will both presuppose that there is a speaker. Moreover, when uttered in the same
context, the presuppositions of both definites will be bound to the same antecedent.
The individual assigned to x will be identical to the individual assigned to y by any
assignment function—both will be assigned to the speaker in the context. Because
the definites in (I’) and (S’), when uttered in the same context, will have the same
presuppositional content and the same antecedent, they will also have the same
asserted content. There will be no semantic difference between (I’) and (S’).
Now suppose that we add the operator ↑ to the lexical entry of I. Maier claims
that this will not help the naive view. ↑ will force the presupposition of I to take
the widest scope possible. That is, it will force the presupposition of I to bypass
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accessible sub-DRSs created by logical operators and bind in the global context.
This is trivial in (I’) because (I’) is a simple sentence; the global context is the only
option for resolution. Now because (S’) is also a simple sentence, the global context
will be the only option for resolution of the speaker’s presupposition in (S’). Even if
the presupposition of I is prefixed with ↑ and the presupposition of the speaker is not,
then, (I’) and (S’) will still receive the same interpretation. The presuppositions of I
and the speaker will be bound to the same antecedent in the same context, because
there is only one context to choose from, and will therefore have the same asserted
content once again. Here is how Maier puts his worry: ‘the proposed mechanisms [i.e.
↑] only work in embedded contexts, so, like the naive theory and the presuppositional
account of proper names [Geurts (1997)] it fails the Kripke test: it cannot generate
distinct outputs for [I am speaking] and [the speaker is speaking], given a suitable
input context with a speaker. As there are no embeddings, there is nothing to take
scope over and the uparrow in the indexical PrelDRSs will not affect resolution at
all.’
Maier’s worry is slightly obscured by his use of the IMA to make his point.
(S’) is awkward; one is left wondering, ‘what speaker?’ or ‘the speaker in what
context?’. (S’) would sound better if the speaker were replaced with a description
such as the current speaker, the present speaker, or the agent of this utterance. These
descriptions, however, are themselves indexical, and the tendency to understand
them as rigid descriptions is pronounced enough that they would be less useful for
Maier’s purposes. He needs a definite description with a clear non-rigid reading to
make his point.
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Despite the obscured way in which Maier presents his worry, however, his
concern is justified. It could be brought out more clearly by forgetting indexicals for
the time being and considering rigid and non-rigid readings of definite descriptions
in simple sentences.
(4.1) The President of Iran is tall.
(4.1) has two readings. On the one hand, were it used today in a normal, non-
philosophical conversation, it could be understood as saying of Mahmud Ahmadeni-
jad that he is tall. On the other hand, (4.1) has a non-rigid reading according to
which it is true in a world w just in case whoever is the President of Iran in w is tall
in w. Using (4.1), we can reframe Maier’s worry as follows. Were we to extend PI
to a more general theory of definite noun phrases, the resulting theory would have
to be able to generate both the rigid and the non-rigid readings of the President of
Iran. Because PI is a wide-scope theory, it will not provide enough structure to do
this; the definite description the President of Iran has two different readings in (4.1),
but its scope does not change.
Maier concludes that the structure provided by a theory like PI is insufficient.
We must supplement a presuppositional theory of indexicals with a two-dimensional
logic so that the presuppositions of rigid definites can exist in a dimension apart
from the presuppositions of non-rigid definites.1
1Maier does not believe that definite descriptions can have truly ‘semantic’ rigid interpretations
and I take it that this belief is in part what leads him to present his worry by comparing indexicals
to definite descriptions, rather than by comparing rigid and non-rigid readings of definite descrip-
tions directly. His prohibition on rigid definite descriptions leads him to draw a slightly different
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4.1.3 PI’s Response
Maier’s criticism hinges on the assumption that because (I’) and (S’) are sim-
ple sentences, there will be only one context for the presuppositions of I and the
speaker to choose from in these examples. This assumption is true in presupposi-
tional theories that do not distinguish a context dedicated only to information from
the extra-linguistic context (e.g. Heim (1982, 1983), van der Sandt (1992), Geurts
(1997)), but it is false in PI. Even for simple sentences, there will be a choice between
binding or accommodating at K0 and binding or accommodating at K1.
PI distinguishes between K0 and K1 for the intuitive reason that the extra-
linguistic context and the linguistic context constitute different sources of informa-
tion. These contexts also have different properties. Discourse contexts are hierar-
chical, for example. PI takes the further step of making the extra-linguistic context
more global than the linguistic context because it is assumed that when there is an
extra-linguistic context2, discourse takes place within the extra-linguistic context.
This assumption is supported by the fact that while the extra-linguistic context can
affect the interpretation of discourse, discourse cannot affect the interpretation of
the extra-linguistic context. Because of the accessibility constraints in DRT, this
asymmetry is captured best by making the extra-linguistic context superordinate to
the linguistic context.
Because of the distinction between K0 and K1, PI can generate distinct out-
conclusion from the one I draw here. It is that the presuppositions of indexicals (and proper names)
must exist in a dimension apart from the presuppositions of definite descriptions.
2This might exclude fictional contexts, though I remain agnostic on this point.
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puts for (I’) and (S’). The presupposition of I in (I’) will be bound at K0. The
non-rigid reading of (S’) that is relevant for the IMA will be derived by allowing
the presupposition of the speaker to accommodate in K1. I assume local binding is
not an option because we are considering (S’) in isolation. (S’) will be non-rigid, as
desired, and (I’) will be rigid, also as desired, because the presupposition of I will be
bound at K0.
PI gets the desired readings of (I’) and (S’) without positing two-dimensionalism,
contrary to Maier’s claim that a wide-scope, presuppositional account of indexicals
cannot do justice to the basic IMA without adopting two-dimensionalism. What’s
more, PI can also generate the logical form for the rigid reading of (S’), according to
which (S’) is only contingently true, and it can do this without positing ambiguity
for definite descriptions. The non-rigid reading of (S’) is generated by allowing the
presupposition of the speaker to bind or accommodate at K0 along with the presup-
position of I.3 However, note that even if the presupposition of the speaker binds at
K0 and (I’) and (S’) have the same asserted content, on the assumption that they are
uttered in the same context, (I’) and (S’) still won’t have the same overall meaning.
Given the lexical entry that PI posits for I, (I’) will have the logical form in (I’b):
(I’) a. I am speaking
b. ∃x(↑ ∃eπ(ag(eπ, x) ∧ eπ =?) ∧ speaking(x))
3I say that it can be bound or accommodated at K0 because I have not taken a stand on whether
the antecedent for the speaker will already be available in K0. I assume that it will be so long as
someone is speaking in K0, but I need not settle this issue for the purposes of my argument here.
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There is no reason to assume that the definite description the speaker will have the
same presupposed content as I. I and the speaker will not be synonymous, so neither
will (I’) and (S’).
4.2 Resolution Strategies
A wide-scope, presuppositional theory of definites based on PI will have the
structural resources needed to generate all of the requisite readings of (I’) and (S’).
Addressing the IMA, it turns out, does not require the structure of Kaplanian, two-
dimensionalism as Maier (2009) argues that it does. Nevertheless, showing that PI
can generate the requisite readings is not enough to show that PI fully addresses
the issues brought out by the IMA. One might want to know what it is that makes
indexicals different from other definites. Why, for example, does I in (I’) not have a
rigid reading when the speaker in (S’) does?
The IMA reveals that we will not be able to extend PI straightforwardly to
all definites. Different definites have different strategies for the resolution of their
presuppositions. Here is one way to bring out the point. Suppose that PI could be
straightforwardly extended to a general theory of all definite noun phrases. Definite
descriptions would be presuppositional just like indexicals. Their presuppositions
would not be prefixed with ↑, perhaps, but it would still be reasonable to expect
that local accommodation would be the least preferred strategy for the resolution of
their presuppositions—being presuppositional implies a preference for having one’s
content presupposed. In van der Sandt’s system, this preference is reflected in his
algorithm: local accommodation is chosen only when all other options have been
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exhausted. I am positing local accommodation for the presupposition of the definite
description in (S’), but is it really the case that all other options have been exhausted
in the IMA? Not likely. It would be easy enough to consider (I’) and (S’) uttered
in a context in which there is a speaker (just imagine that the tokens are spoken
rather than written). Binding at K0 would be an option for the presupposition
of the speaker, but still, the non-rigid, i.e. K1, reading would also be available.
Furthermore, if binding or accommodating at K0 were really blocked in the IMA, we
would expect that binding at K0 would be blocked for I as well and that (I’) would
have a non-rigid, or perhaps a non-sensical, reading. But it doesn’t. This difference
between indexicals and definite descriptions needs to be accounted for. We cannot
simply extend PI to a general theory of definites after all.
So what makes indexicals different from definite descriptions? We might turn
the above point around and argue that the fact that indexicals can’t have non-rigid
readings in the IMA, when definite descriptions can, shows that indexicals are seman-
tically referential or rigid after all. Recanati (1993) offers an account of indexicals
that is structurally similar to PI—it is not two-dimensional—but which nevertheless
stipulates that indexicals and proper names are referential in order to ensure rigidity
for these expressions. Recanati posits a feature +REF in the lexical entries of all
indexicals and proper names, and this feature indicates that the truth conditions for
a name or indexical will be singular. Definite descriptions lack this feature; the truth
conditions for one token of a definite description might be singular but the truth
conditions for another token of the same description might be descriptive. The fact
that indexicals have +REF and definite descriptions do not accounts for the different
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interpretive possibilities of indexicals and definite descriptions brought out by the
IMA.
↑, like +REF, is a lexical feature, but it is subtly and importantly different
from +REF. An indexical—in fact, any definite noun phrase—will have a referential
and, therefore, rigid interpretation if its presupposition is bound at K0, but referen-
tiality is not stipulated as such in PI. While a feature like +REF would not allow
binding or accommodation outside of K0, ↑ does allow binding or accommodation
at other levels when the conditions are right. Moreover, while Recanati holds that
proper names also have the feature +REF, which would explain their rigid behavior
in the modal arguments for proper names, I do not think that ↑ is appropriate for
proper names. I will elaborate on this point below but the picture I want to motivate
is one on which definites have far more nuanced strategies for the resolution of their
presuppositions than a theory like Recanati’s would suggest. Having +REF and not
having +REF would come down to having to bind at K0 versus not having to bind
at K0 in PI. This distinction is unhelpful. First, as I have emphasized repeatedly, I
don’t think that there are any expressions that have to bind at K0 as a matter of
semantic fact, so the class of expressions with the feature +REF would be empty in
PI. Second, even if there were expressions that could only bind in K0 as a matter
of semantic fact, the simple distinction between +REF and not +REF would not
provide all of the distinctions that we need. It encourages us to throw definites into
a single group that are importantly different from one another—like indexicals and
proper names—and thus sets us on the wrong track if we’re aiming for a more general
account of definites.
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I claim that all definites vary according to a single theme: their strategies for
presupposition resolution. Arguing for this claim would require an in depth study of
all definites, which would certainly take us too far afield. Still, I think that a brief
comparison of some differences observed between the behavior of different definites
will be enough to suggest that we ought to allow for a wide range of presupposition
resolution strategies and that these strategies are what we must explore if we are
to find out what makes indexicals special and why their presuppositions cannot
accommodate locally.
Let’s consider some basic possibilities for resolution in PI and look at which
possibilities are open to which definites. I divide the possibilities into four general
groups: binding and accommodation at K0 and binding and accommodation at K1
or lower. Looking at these differences alone we get a variety of strategies among
definites. Indexicals, as we have seen, can bind at K0 and, in very special situations,
they can bind below K1. They cannot accommodate anywhere. Demonstratives,
like indexicals, are happy to bind in K0. They can also bind in K1 and they seem
to do so more easily than indexicals—they have well accepted discourse anaphoric
uses. Like indexicals, however, they cannot accommodate anywhere. Third person
pronouns bind very easily at both K0 and K1 or below and I am hesitant to say
that their their presuppositions are prefixed with ↑. I stand by my choice of ↑ for
indexicals, but determining the resolution strategies for other definites will require
more empirical work. Note that we cannot simply adopt van der Sandt’s algorithm
for pronouns in PI. Van der Sandt did not discuss the level of content that I am
calling K0; his algorithm applied only to K1 and below. Pronouns, like indexicals
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and demonstratives, cannot accommodate.
Unlike indexicals, demonstratives and third person pronouns, proper names
can accommodate, though accommodation at K1 and below, if possible at all, is
markedly more difficult than accommodation at K0. Geurts (1997) argues that the
following example from Bach (1987) is one example of local accommodation:
(4.2) The electoral process is under attack, and it is proposed, in light of recent
results, that alphabetical order would be a better method of selection than the
present one. Someone supposes that ‘Aaron Aardvark’ might be the winning
name and says, ‘If that procedure had been instituted, Ronald Reagan would
still be doing TV commercials, and [(4.2)] Aaron Aardvark might have been
president’ (Bach 1987: 146-7).
Local accommodation at K1 is likely to be far more difficult than accommodation at
lower levels—as is well-noted, proper names have rigid readings in the IMA. How-
ever, it would be interesting to study what effect discourse topic would have on the
interpretation of names. In Bach’s example, the discourse topic makes it clear that
an interpreter need not look for a referent for Aaron Aardvark in K0. This might
make a difference.
Not only do names accommodate, but contrary to fairly conventional wisdom,
they also bind locally and without too much fuss.4
4See Geurts 1997 for an interesting and in depth discussion of the interpretive possibilities for
proper names.
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(4.3) Had John had a son, he would have named him John Jr. and John Jr. would
have inherited this house.
(4.4) My daughter thinks that there is a monster under her bed named Manny and
she can’t sleep at night because she’s scared that Manny will attack her in
her sleep.
(4.5) If a child is christened Bambi, and Disney Inc. hear about it, then they will
sue Bambi’s parents (Geurts 1997).
And it might even be that local binding is preferred to global binding when the choice
presents itself. Suppose, while lecturing on Aristotle the philosopher, a lecturer goes
off on the following small tangent.
(4.6) Kripke said that Aristotle was fond of dogs. I named my first dog Aristotle
because of that. Aristotle was very intelligent. I miss him very much.
It seems that even in the context in which Aristotle the philosopher would be available
and salient in the global context, the third occurrence of Aristotle above would still
pick out the speaker’s dog. Again, discourse topic is likely to make a difference in
where the presuppositions of names decide to bind.
Definite descriptions have the most liberal resolution strategies of all. All
four options are available for definite descriptions. However, as van der Sandt (1992)
recognized, it might be more difficult to accommodate the presuppositions of definite
descriptions with very impoverished descriptive contents (see also van der Sandt &
Geurts (1999), Geurts (1997)).
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(4.7) The table is brown.
(4.8) The table in the Oval Office at the White House is brown.
If there is no table salient in the context, one cannot simply accommodate the ex-
istence of some unique table in some context in order to interpret an utterance of
(4.7). However, if there is no antecedent for the more robust description the table
in the Oval Office, then, assuming the interpreter knew that the Oval Office was a
name for a particular office, accommodation of an antecedent would be very easy.
Definites exhibit a wide range of resolution behavior. In the following, and
final, two subsections I present two frameworks in which to think about the different
resolution strategies of definites and suggest how the frameworks might be relevant
to our question of what makes indexicals special. However, I leave a proper study of
these frameworks for future research.
4.2.1 At-Issue Content
The resolutions strategies of some definites appear to be more influenced by
discourse structure and topic than do other definites. In particular, I think that
discourse topic can affect when a definite description will accommodate locally or
not. If this is true, then the presuppositions of definite descriptions should be able
to accommodate locally even when global binding or accommodation would not lead
to inconsistency. This is what we see in the IMA.
Suppose that someone, who holds Aristotle to be the greatest philosopher of
antiquity, is lecturing on the philosophers of antiquity. To introduce Aristotle, he
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utters (4.9).
(4.9) The greatest philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher, but he might not
have been. He wanted to be a shipbuilder.
Here the definite description binds or accommodates globally (depending on the
previous discourse context) and we get a reading of the definite description according
to which it picks out Aristotle, even if we assume that Aristotle has not yet been
mentioned by name in the context. I claim that this is because the discourse is clearly
about Aristotle. But now suppose some philosophers are having a conversation about
how things might have been. Someone asks the others to imagine a world that is,
say, better than this one. She asks them to describe the world. People start blurting
out descriptions that would apply to their ideal world and one person says,
(4.10) The greatest philosopher of antiquity was a woman!
There is no modal operator in (4.10). The discourse has made relevant worlds other
than the actual world, but one need not conclude on account of this that the discourse
introduces a hidden modal operator that takes scope over the definite description.
Yet the description is understood as describing a non-actual, possible world; the
descriptive content of the definite description does not bind at K0. This, I maintain, is
because the discourse topic makes it clear that neither Aristotle nor the actual world
is at issue here and the semantics of definite descriptions allow their interpretations
to be sensitive to discourse topic.
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The discourses above are artificial and I am not suggesting that I have recre-
ated the right discourse topic (if there is one) for the IMA. The point is that by
shifting the discourse topic, we can influence the way that definite descriptions are
understood in simple sentences. In particular, by explicitly detaching the discourse
topic from the actual world, we can make the non-rigid reading of a definite descrip-
tion more salient. This, I claim, is exactly what happens in the IMA. The non-rigid
reading of (S’) requires that an interpreter not try to connect the use of the definite
description with her representation of the actual world.
The idea that normally projective content can fail to project when brought
into question is at the heart of Simons et al. (2010). Simons et al. distinguish between
backgrounded content and ‘at-issue’ content to provide a solution to the classical
projection problem for presuppositions, though the solution is intended to apply to
all content that shows the ability to project over entailment-canceling operators,
not only presuppositional content. According to Simons et al., an implication of an
embedded sentence will project just in case it is not at-issue, where projection is
defined in the traditional way as follows.
An implication projects if and only if it survives as an utterance implica-
tion when the expression that triggers the implication occurs under the
syntactic scope of an entailment-cancelling operator.
Simons et al.’s notion of at-issueness is based on Roberts (1996). According to
Roberts, discourses are structured around questions that the discourse seeks to an-
swer. There is generally one main question under discussion, the Question Under
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Discussion (QUD), which provides the topic of the discourse, but there can also be
sub-questions under discussion, answers to which will provide at least partial an-
swers to the QUD. In Simons et al., content is at-issue if it provides at least a partial
answer to the question under discussion. Any information that is irrelevant for an-
swering the question will project outside of at-issue content; only at-issue content can
be targeted by entailment-cancelling operators, so non-projection of content reveals
at-issuenss. Here is their hypothesis in their words (p. 6):
(4.11) Hypotheses about what projects and why
a. All and only those implications of (embedded) sentences which are not-
at-issue relative to the Question Under Discussion in the context have
the potential to project.
b. Operators (modals, negation, etc.) target at-issue content.
Simons et al. do not go into detail about how the at-issue/not-at-issue dis-
tinction interacts with the semantics of definite noun phrases, but they do offer the
following example.
(4.12) QUD: Does France have a king?
a. Well, the King of France didn’t attend the opening of Parliament.
b. Did the King of France attend the opening of Parliament?
c. Perhaps the King of France attended the opening of Parliament.
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In this example, they claim that because the QUD brings the existence of the King of
France into question, the presupposition of the definite the King of France does not
project outside of the entailment-canceling operators in (4.12a)-(4.12c). The result-
ing logical form in each of the responses is of the following form (or something along
these lines), where O is a variable for an operator: O∃!x(KoF(x) ∧ at-opening(x)).
Simons et al’s theory motivates that claim that sometimes what information
is understood as given in a discourse depends on broader discourse factors, notably
discourse topic. Furthermore, their claim has a very broad scope: it applies not only
to typically presuppositional expressions such as definite noun phrases, clefts, fac-
tives, particles like too, and aspectual verbs like stop, but also to non-presuppositional
expressions and constructions that show the ability to project including appositives,
non-restrictive relative clauses, epithets, and even politeness morphemes like those
seen in languages such as German, French and Dutch where a distinction is made
between a formal and informal second person pronoun. My focus in this chapter is
on the behavior of indexicals and definites in general, but it is important to point
out that the discourse-based analysis of the resolution preferences of definites would
be motivated by a very widespread phenomenon in language and discourse.
The most interesting point for the purposes of this chapter, however, is that
the combination of PI’s hierarchical contexts and Simons et al.’s hypothesis about
projection and discourse topic, strongly suggests that discourse topic could play a
role in the projection of content even in simple sentences. PI, as we have seen, posits
a distinction between the extra-linguistic context, K0, and the linguistic context, K1
and below—and it posits this distinction for reasons independent of the IMA. As a
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result of this distinction, however, projection of content becomes an issue even for
simple sentences in PI-based theories of definites. There is always in principle a choice
to be made between binding or accommodating at K0 and binding or accommodating
at K1, as I explained above. Given that this choice is possible in PI, one would expect,
given Simons et al.’s analysis of projection in terms of discourse topic, that discourse
topic could affect the strategy of resolution ultimately chosen for a definite in a
simple sentence.
Viewing the behavior of definite descriptions in the IMA from the perspec-
tive of the at-issue/not-at-issue framework would allow us to reframe our question
about what makes indexicals special. Rather than asking why the presuppositions
of indexicals cannot locally accommodate, we would ask why it is that indexical
presuppositions cannot be made at-issue.
4.2.2 Givenness
Another way to view the nuanced behavior of definites is through the lens of
what is sometimes called the Accessibility Heirarchy or Givenness Hierarchy. The
Givenness Hierarchy, developed notably by Jeannette K. Gundel (see Gundel 1993)
and Mira Ariel (see Ariel 1990), is a statistically-based model for noun phrase pref-
erences. Although work on the hierarchy was not originally understood in terms of
presuppositions, in light of our current discussion, I will present the data as reveal-
ing preferences about presupposition resolution. What follows is one version of the
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hierarchy, taken from Aloni (2005)5, with the condition for selection of each type
of noun phrase given in parentheses. Following Aloni, I will call this hierarchy the
Referential Device Principle (RDP).
(4.13) reflexive pronouns (c-command) → 1st and 2nd person pronouns (conversa-
tional participant)→ demonstratives (presence in attention space), anaphoric
pronouns (high salience through mention), attenuated definites (old, depen-
dence on high salient), proper names (familiarity) → robust definites (new
and unique) → indefinites (new)
The hierarchy is based largely on statistical research on the conditions under
which different definites are chosen. The conditions in parentheses provide necessary
conditions for use of a given noun phrase. A reflexive pronoun should be used only
when the pronoun is c-commanded; first and second person pronouns can be used
only to refer to conversational participants, etc. But the order of the hierarchy also
reveals preferences for choosing one definite over another. For example, suppose a
speaker wishes to refer to himself. He has a choice between using the first person
pronoun I or a designator from any of the categories ranked lower in the hierarchy.
He could, for instance, refer to himself in the third person or by using a definite
description. What the hierarchy shows, is that in such a situation, the first person
5Aloni borrows this from Zeevat (2002), but adds proper names. Also, what Aloni called ‘short’
and ‘long’ descriptions, I have called ‘attenuated’ and ‘robust’ descriptions, respectively. A more
robust definite description does not necessarily contain more words than an attenuated definite
description. Adding words can help make an attenuated description more robust and easier to
accommodate, as we saw in (4.7) and (4.8), but adding words is not always necessary. The oldest
person will probably be easier to accommodate than the old person, for example. Robustness, as I
use the notion, is not well defined and I will not attempt to go beyond a rough, intuitive use of it.
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pronoun is preferred over lower ranked types of noun phrases. Again, the RDP is
statistically based, so this does not mean that there won’t be some situations which
call for choosing a lower ranked expression (Who is she [pointing at a photograph]?
Oh! She is me!). It simply means that the first person pronoun is generally preferred
in such situations.
There are many factors that influence the choice of noun phrase in a context
and many are not easy to define. There is still a lot of work being done on the
RDP that focuses on trying to pin down notions such as distance (between a noun
phrase and its antecedent) and robustness, and on studying the role of such factors
as topic and focus in determining preference for one noun phrase over another. I do
not pretend that these issues are settled. What emerges from all of the work on the
RDP, however, is enough to bolster the point I have been urging. Different definites
have different resolution strategies.
Note that indexicals, which I have argued have the most restrictive prefer-
ences, are almost at the top of the hierarchy, while robust or descriptively rich defi-
nite descriptions, which have the most liberal strategies, are at the bottom (ignoring
indefinites). Noun phrases (both definite and indefinite) are used to talk about indi-
viduals and each has a context-insensitive level of meaning that helps them perform
their function. There are semantic differences between, say indexicals and definite
descriptions, but not because one is more equipped to ‘refer’ than another; rather,
it is because their presuppositional meanings will make one a better candidate for
picking out an individual in a given context rather than another. This point deserves
reiteration for proper names. The picture that I am motivating does not privilege
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K0 for the presuppositions of proper names. Their presuppositions can bind easily at
K1 or lower. The reason why names are not used more often in cases of local binding
is not because names have a feature +REF (or even ↑), but rather because there is
a better choice for picking out highly salient entities: pronouns.
The RDP casts an interesting light on our question about why indexicals can’t
accommodate locally. The RDP suggests that if it is a more distant entity that we
are interested in picking out, rather than an immediately accessible one, then we
should use an expression from lower down in the hierarchy. For example, it suggests
that we should use a definite description rather than an indexical in such a case.
Using an expression from higher up when a lower one could be chosen suggests that
the immediately accessible entity is the relevant one.
4.3 Conclusion
The IMA does not motivate a two-dimensional account of indexicals. A wide-
scope, presuppositional theory like PI can generate the requisite readings of (I’) and
(S’) so long as it distinguishes between the extra-linguistic and linguistic context. PI
captures this distinction by letting the most global DRS, K0, represent information
from the extra-linguistic context, while stipulating that information from discourse
is represented at K1 or below. Once we make this distinction, it is no problem to
show that definite descriptions, like the speaker in (S’), can have both a rigid and a
non-rigid reading. The rigid reading arises when the presupposition of the definite
description is bound or accommodated at K0, i.e. when the definite description is
used to refer to an entity in the actual world. The non-rigid reading arises when the
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presupposition is accommodated locally at K1.
Although the IMA does not motivate a two-dimensional view, I have argued
that it does show that we cannot extend PI in an entirely straightforward way. We
cannot, for example, assume that all definites have presuppositions prefixed with ↑;
rather, we must allow for a very nuanced picture of presupposition resolution for
different definites. Definites give instructions on where to find their antecedents.
Some definites, indexicals in particular, give very particular instructions on where to
look for their antecedents. Other definites, like robust definite descriptions, are very





Nunberg (1993) and Elbourne (2008) take data like (5.1) and (5.2) to pose
insurmountable difficulties for any Kaplan-style theory of indexicals.
(5.1) Said by a U.S. Supreme Court Justice: If Democrats had won the last few
presidential elections, we might have been liberals. (Nunberg, 1993)
(5.2) Uttered two days before Thanksgiving: Tomorrow is always the busiest day to
travel.
The intended readings of (5.1) and (5.2) are (loosely) captured by (5.3) and (5.4),
respectively.
(5.3) If Democrats had won the last few presidential elections, the Supreme Court
Justices might have been liberals.
(5.4) The day before Thanksgiving is always the busiest day to travel.
Nunberg and Elbourne claim, correctly, that the descriptive readings of the indexi-
cals in (5.1) and (5.2) are not explained by a Kaplan-style theory of indexicals and
propose a revision of the semantics of indexicals to allow for such descriptive read-
ings. They claim that from a semantic perspective, an indexical can always have a
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descriptive interpretation, but in certain cases, the indexical has a referential reading
for pragmatic reasons.
Although PI rejects the two-dimensional framework of Kaplan’s Logic of
Demonstratives (LD), it does not reject the features of LD that Nunberg and El-
bourne are criticizing. I in PI always refers to an agent of an utterance event; today
refers to the day of utterance or, perhaps, a general period including the day of ut-
terance as in Children today are addicted to electronic devices. Indexicals are never
interpreted as definite descriptions in PI. PI and LD agree about the kinds of meaning
that need to be analyzed in a semantics for indexicals; they simply disagree on the
formal analysis of those meanings. In my discussion of Nunberg (1993) and Elbourne
(2008), then, I will treat PI and LD as one of a kind.
I will argue that data like (5.1) and (5.2) do not motivate a rejection of PI
or LD.1 At most, they call for a pragmatic supplementation of these theories. I
will offer the outline of a solution according to which indexicals always keep their
standard indexical meanings at the level of logical form but in certain cases, material
is added to these interpretations during the composition process in order to repair
problematic predications. My argument will proceed in two broad steps. First, I
will argue that Nunberg and Elbourne’s argument against a pragmatic account of
descriptive indexicals, like that proposed in Recanati (1993), is not convincing. Next,
I will sketch my pragmatic solution and argue that such a pragmatic approach is more
desirable than a descriptive account of the Nunberg and Elbourne sort.
1Although I do not think that Kaplan’s LD is the right theory for indexicals, it is not because
of the points that Nunberg and Elbourne make.
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5.1 Descriptive Readings of Indexicals
The data on which I rely are either borrowed from or inspired by data pre-
sented in Nunberg (1993), but while Nunberg treated these data as exhibiting a
single phenomenon—‘deferred reference’—I do not think that these data form a het-
erogeneous class. In this section, I focus on two subclasses of Nunberg’s data. The
first, which I call intensional reconstruction (ir), is exhibited in (5.1)-(5.9).
(5.1) Said by a U.S. Supreme Court Justice: If Democrats had won the last few
presidential elections, we might have been liberals. (Nunberg, 1993)
(5.5) Because the last few presidents have been Republicans, we are mostly con-
servatives.
(5.6) Said to Nancy Pelosi/the House of Representatives: If the Taliban were in
charge, yousing would be a man/youpl would all be men.
(5.7) You should have checked the peephole. I/she could have been a burglar.2
(5.8) If the Republicans had won the last election, he [pointing at Obama] would
have been an old white guy.
(5.9) Said on November 25 by someone born on November 25: Had I been born a
month later, I would have received a lot more gifts today.
2This is a close variation of an example given by Nunberg (1993) in his footnote 34. I believe
the example is originally due to Hans Kamp.
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These examples can be (loosely) paraphrased by substituting definite descriptions
for the italicized indexical expressions; the intended readings of (5.1) and (5.5),
for example, can be captured by replacing we with the Supreme Court Justices.
Moreover, the descriptive readings in these examples are triggered by the presence
of intensional operators—were we to remove the intensional constructions, neither
intuition nor charity would require descriptive readings of the indexicals.3
A similar phenomenon, which I will analyze as quantificational coercion (qc),
can arise when indexicals interact with certain quantifiers:
(5.2) Tomorrow is always the busiest day to travel.
(5.10) The bookstore crowds usually abate a week from now. (Nunberg, 1993)
(5.11) There is always a post office around here. [uttered by the town hall]
(5.12) He is usually of a different party from the president. (Nunberg, 1993)
(5.13) We are often conservative/We have always been a conservative group.
(5.14) Traffic is rarely heavy this weekend.
(5.15) Sometimes, that/It is made of ice. [talking about a high-profile sculpture at
a yearly gala]
3Following Kaplan, I will often use the term indexicals in this chapter to include both demon-
strative and non-demonstrative, indexical expressions. From now on, I will explicitly mention
demonstratives only when necessary.
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(5.2) and (5.10)-(5.15), like (5.1) and (5.5)-(5.9), can be (loosely) paraphrased by
replacing the indexicals with definite descriptions. Suppose an agent utters (5.2) on
November 25, 2009, which is two days before Thanksgiving in 2009. The intuitive
reading of this example is not one equivalent to November 25, 2009 is always the
busiest day to travel; a particular date does not have recurrent properties. Rather,
the agent is understood as saying something like the day before Thanksgiving is
always the busiest day to travel. As in ir cases, were we to remove the adverb of
quantification from (5.10)-(5.15) the descriptive readings would not be forced upon
us.4
5.2 Previous Accounts: Nunberg, Elbourne, and Recanati
Both Nunberg (1993) and Elbourne (2008) argue that a Kaplanian account of
indexicals cannot handle ir and qc data. Let’s look at how Kaplan would represent
(5.2) and (5.16).
(5.2) Tomorrow is always the busiest day to travel.
(5.2’) Always(t2 is the busiest day to travel)
(5.16) (If a Democrat had won the last gubernatorial election, then) I might have
been Mexican.
4As stated, this is too strong. Sometimes tense and predication are sufficient to bring about
a descriptive reading, as in Tomorrow is the busiest day to travel. I will discuss this in more
detail below, but what is important is that there is an element of the sentence that requires a
quantificational reading of the indexical and if we remove this element—by, for example, changing
the tense—the quantificational reading is no longer required.
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(5.16’) ♦(Mexican(a)), where a refers to the agent
It is clear that Kaplanian account alone cannot generate the intended readings of (5.2)
and (5.16). A Kaplanian treatment of (5.2) will yield a reading according to which
the particular day after the day of utterance is always the busiest day to travel, as
shown in (5.2’), and a Kaplanian treatment of (5.16) will yield a reading according
to which the agent might have been Mexican, as shown in (5.16’). Furthermore,
because PI will generate roughly the same logical forms for (5.2) and (5.56), it is
clear that PI alone cannot generate the intended readings.
A reasonable hypothesis at this point would be that (5.2’) and (5.16’) are the
logical forms for (5.2) and (5.16), but the contexts in which (5.2) and (5.16) receive
their qc and ir readings, respectively, allow for pragmatic supplementation of the
literal logical forms. The context makes it clear that the literal interpretation is not
the desired one and so the interpreter uses her knowledge of the standard interpreta-
tion of the indexical plus the context to construct a new concept. For example, upon
hearing an utterance of (5.2) two days before Thanksgiving, an interpreter might use
her knowledge that the day after the day of utterance is also the day before Thanks-
giving to construct a concept of the day before Thanksgiving. The interpreter will
realize that the speaker does not intend to attribute the property of always being the
busiest day to travel to a single day, so she will move from thinking about the day
itself, which is given by the semantics of tomorrow, to thinking about a contextually
salient property of that day. If this is right, then ir and qc do not require a major
overhaul of a Kaplanian theory; they merely show that such a theory must be sup-
plemented with pragmatic mechanisms. This is the explanation chosen by Recanati
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(1993) and it will be my choice as well.
Nunberg, and Elbourne after him, argue that the pragmatic account will
not do. If it were true that (5.2’) were the logical form of (5.2) and (5.16’), the
logical form for (5.16), and that pragmatic mechanisms were responsible for delivering
appropriately supplemented logical forms, then we would expect to see ir and qc
examples with proper names. In both LD and PI, names and indexicals make the
same contribution to truth-conditional (LD) or asserted (PI) content. In LD, both
contribute an individual (or perhaps a constant that denotes the relevant individual)
and in PI, both contribute a discourse referent. If the pragmatic mechanisms work on
the logical forms for examples with indexicals, why wouldn’t they work on the logical
forms for examples with proper names? Here are some examples from Nunberg and
Elbourne to show that ir and qc examples cannot be reproduced for names.
(5.1) a. we might have been liberals.
b. O’Connor, Rehnquist, Thomas etc. might have been liberals.
c. The first woman appointed to the Court, the Chief Justice, the most
recent Supreme Court appointee, etc. might have been liberals.
(5.17) a. He is usually an Italian [pointing at Pope Benedict XVI].
b. Benedict XVI is usually an Italian.
(5.1a) is the consequent of example (5.1) above. Nunberg claims that if we list the
Supreme Court Justices by name, as in (5.1b), or by using supposedly referential
descriptions, as in (5.1c), then we cannot get the ir reading that we get for (5.1a).
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Similarly, Elbourne argues that while (5.17a) has a qc reading paraphrased as the
Pope is usually Italian, (5.17b) does not have this reading. We might add, as Nunberg
did, that replacing (he) in (5.17a) with a uniquely referring definite description like
the current Pope does not give rise to a qc reading either.
Based on the data that they consider for proper names, Nunberg and El-
bourne conclude that ir and qc do not arise through pragmatic mechanisms alone
but are rather made possible by the unique semantics of indexicals and demonstra-
tives. In effect, what they propose is that pragmatic mechanisms like those proposed
by Recanati should be incorporated into the semantics of indexicals. This creates
the desired asymmetry between indexicals and other definites; only indexicals have
these pragmatic mechanisms built into their semantics. The general idea is that an
indexical can in principle contribute any contextually salient description or property
to truth-conditional content so long as the property or description contributed is
related to the appropriate contextual parameter in a way that is constrained by the
semantics of the indexical. Character, which for Kaplan was a function that de-
livered an interpretation of an indexical in a context, becomes a mere constraint on
indexical interpretation and we find that ir and qc data is not special from the point
of view of the semantics of indexicals, according to Nunberg. The fact that index-
icals often appear to have standard, functional Kaplanian characters or consistent
presuppositions (as in PI) is only a matter of pragmatics, not semantics.
Nunberg (1993) argues that true indexicals and demonstratives—or, more
accurately, deictic uses of indexical and demonstrative expressions—have a three part
semantics. First, they have a deictic component. For each indexical, this is a function
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from utterances of the indexical to an element of the context of utterance, which
Nunberg calls an index.5 The deictic component of I, for example, will map every
utterance of I to the agent of that utterance; thus the index for I, as well as for we, will
be the agent. Next there is a classificatory component, which determines the number,
gender, animacy, etc. for the semantic contribution of a deictic expression. The
classificatory component of he, for instance, will constrain the semantic value of he
to be singular, masculine and animate. Finally, the relational component of a deictic
expression constrains the relation that holds between the index of the expression
and the interpretation of the expression in a context. The relational component of
tomorrow, for example, requires that the interpretation of tomorrow be either the day
that succeeds the day of utterance or a description or property that holds of the day
that succeeds the day of utterance; the relational component for I requires that its
interpretation be either the agent of the utterance or a description or property that
holds of the agent. (My proposal, by contrast, does not allow for the possibilities
presented in the second disjuncts.) For pragmatic reasons, as an agent ‘cannot
ordinarily instantiate an individual person to whom he is not identical’ (Nunberg
1993, p. 20), the interpretation of I is normally the agent of the utternace, but this
need not be the case.
It is not clear what the logical form of an ir or qc example would look like for
Nunberg, but Elbourne (2008) offers a formalization of Nunberg’s proposal. Accord-
ing to Elbourne, demonstratives, pronouns, and, one assumes, indexicals always con-
5Following Peirce, C.T.: 1955, ‘Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs’, In Justice Buchler
(ed.), Philosophical Writings of Peirce, Dover, New York.
119
tribute definite descriptions to semantic content.6 The descriptions are determined
in a Nunberg-ian fashion. First, the semantics of each demonstrative, pronoun, and
indexical assign an index to the expression in a given context (as in LD). The index
for a token of a demonstrative will be the demonstratum; the index for a token of
I will be the agent of the token; and so on. Next, the lexical entry of each demon-
strative, pronoun, and indexical contains a relational component, which determines
the relation that must hold between the index and the final interpretation of any
token of the expression, as Nunberg proposed. Elbourne’s proposal would deliver
the following logical form for (5.2) (or something very close to it).
• ∀s(ιz(z is the day before Thanksgiving in s) is the busiest day to travel in s)
Always is treated as a quantifier over situations. The expression ιz(z is the day before
Thanksgiving in s) will restrict the set of relevant situations to those situations s
that contain a unique day z that is the day before Thanksgiving in s. The whole
formula will be true just in case every situation, s, which is such that it contains a
unique day before Thanksgiving (z) is also such that z is the busiest day to travel
in s. The most important point here, though, is that the description ιz(z is the day
before Thanksgiving in s) would be the truth-conditional/asserted contribution of
tomorrow in (5.2), according to Elbourne.
6Elbourne does not discuss non-demonstrative indexicals in detail, but it is clear that the pro-
posal is meant to extend to non-demonstrative indexicals. The proposal is, after all, a particular
formalization of Nunberg’s proposal.
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5.2.1 Proper Names and Definite Descriptions
I agree with Nunberg and Elbourne that there is an asymmetry between
names and indexicals in qc and ir, or at least in the examples that they consider.
Nevertheless, I find their conclusions to be too rash. First, even if ir and qc are
more difficult with proper names and descriptions, this does not entail that ir and
qc arise from special mechanisms in the semantics of indexicals. In PI, it’s not
only the asserted content of a definite that matters; presupposed content is genuine
content and can make a difference in how a definite is interpreted in the discourse
and in determining which definite is appropriate in a particular context. Indexicals
and names may have the same kinds of asserted contents, but they do not have the
same overall content, so we cannot conclude that a pragmatic mechanism that gives
rise to a certain effect when applied to an indexical should give rise to exactly the
same effect when applied to a proper name. Recall that the RDP (introduced in
the last chapter) suggests that a proper name will generally not be used when an
indexical could be. In all of the cases that Nunberg and Elbourne consider, it is clear
that a pronoun (indexical or otherwise) could be used. The choice of a proper name
or description in these contexts would suggest that the way that the referent is being
picked out is relevant to what the speaker intends to communicate. It would be
reasonable, then, to expect that it would be more difficult to ignore the descriptive
content of a name or definite description as is required for ir and qc phenomena.
Moreover, I think that proper names can figure in ir data. Consider the
following pair of sentences, understood to be about Nancy Pelosi.
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(5.18) I/she might have been a Republican.
(5.19) Nancy might have been a Republican.
It might simply be that using a list of names (as in (5.1b) above) is distracting
and requires more processing on the part of the interpreter, which in turn makes it
harder for her to construct an ir reading of the example. Indeed, I think there are
ir examples involving short lists of names (i.e. far fewer than nine) that are more
felicitous than Nunberg’s example.
(5.20) If conservatives had fared better in the congressional elections...
a. They might have been Republicans (pointing at Nancy Pelosi and Harry
Reid).
b. Pelosi and Reid might have been Republicans.
Sometimes ir readings appear to be possible with definite descriptions as
well. That is, there are examples in which a definite description is used to pick out a
certain individual a so that we can consider another individual b who might have had
a property P that a has, but which is not the property determined by the definite
description. Suppose that John is at home when his mother, Jane, knocks on the
door. He opens without checking the peephole.
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(5.21) You should have checked the peephole...
a. I/She could have been a burglar.
b. Jane could have been a burglar.
c. Your mom could have been a burglar.
I get an ir style reading of the last example according to which it’s not literally
true that John’s mom could have been a burglar, but that it might have been that
someone else was knocking on the door and that person was a burglar. We can create
similar examples for metaphysical possibilities.
(5.22) If you had chosen a partner with more money,
a. Pointing at the addressee’s birthday gift: that would have been made
out of platinum.
b. your birthday gift would have been made out of platinum.
Imagine a case in which a man has just given his girlfriend an engagement ring for
her birthday. The description your birthday gift makes salient the ring’s property of
being her birthday gift, but the predication (would have been made out of platinum)
concerns an engagement ring that she would have received had she been with a
richer man. The property of being a birthday gift turns out to be irrelevant for the
predication—the counterfactual fiancé might have chosen to give it to her on a day
other than her birthday and the example would still work. This is, I believe, a true
ir example involving a definite description.
123
Proper names and definite descriptions might be more resistant than index-
icals to ir readings, but we have seen that they can figure in ir examples. Their
behavior is less free in qc.
(5.23) She [pointing at Nancy Pelosi] is usually male.
(5.24) ?Nancy is usually male.
It is very difficult to hear Nancy in (5.24) as anything but referential. However, if
we pluralize Nancy, I suspect that the example (with the ir reading) is improved.
(5.25) Nancys are usually male.
This example would perhaps be more felicitous in Washington, where it is common-
place to think about Nancy Pelosi and to think of her qua Speaker. In any case, I
find it better than (5.24).7
In fact, it seems that proper names can in general combine with quantifica-
tional adverbs when we pluralize the name.
(5.26) a. *Vogel is almost always German.
b. Vogels are almost always German.
(5.27) a. *Einstein usually stands out at a fairly young age.
b. Einsteins usually stand out at a fairly young age.
7I have talked to a handful of native English speakers who are less bothered by (5.24) than I
am. To the extent that (5.24) is felicitous, it only serves to support my argument that qc is not
a character level phenomenon. However, most of the people that I have questioned have admitted
that even if (5.24) is acceptable, they find (5.25) to be more so.
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In (5.26), for example, Vogels allows us to quantify over the group of all people
named Vogel. In (5.27), Einstein(s) is meant to be read as geniuses—a true qc style
reading. So names can figure in qc cases, but it appears that they prefer to be made
plural first. I take it that pluralization allows a shift to a property reading of the
name, which then allows a qc style reading.8
I don’t think that there are true qc style examples involving definite descrip-
tions.
(5.38) The gift that I gave you for your birthday is usually made out of gold.
(5.39) Your mom is usually male.
8As many have noted, proper names can have property readings even outside of qc contexts.
(5.28) True Einsteins are rare.
(5.29) She’s a real Einstein.
(5.30) She’s the next Einstein.
(5.31) She’s the new Einstein I was telling you about.
Indexicals can figure in some of these constructions, but not all.
(5.32) *True wes/yous/hers are rare.
(5.33) ?She’s a real you/me/her.
(5.34) She’s the next you/me/*her.
(5.35) She’s the new you/me/*her.
The latter two examples could be explained using the sort of coercion I will introduce below. Note
that we can create similar examples with common nouns:
(5.36) Green is the new red.
(5.37) A billion is the new million.
yet I don’t think anyone would want to argue that red and million have non-standard meanings on
account of these examples. Rather, in these examples, the constructions the new and the next are
allowing us to harness a property of red and a million (dollars, etc.) in a context and use that to
talk about other things having that property.
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(5.40) Your birthday is always the busiest day to travel.
I cannot get the following readings of these examples (respectively):
(5.41) Engagement rings are usually made out of gold.
(5.42) Speakers of the House are/The Speaker of the House is usually male.
(5.43) The day before Thanksgiving is always the busiest day to travel.
even if the birthday gift was an engagement ring, the addressee’s mom is the Speaker
of the House and the addressee’s birthday falls on the day before Thanksgiving in
the year of the utterance.
Still, I don’t think that qc data support a clear division between indexicals
on the one hand and proper names and definite descriptions on the other. First of
all, even though qc examples can sometimes work with singular personal indexical
pronouns, indexicals, like proper names, are more felicitous with the plural forms.
(5.44) I’m usually tall.
(5.45) We’re usually tall.
The second example is a far better way for Obama to communicate that American
Presidents are usually tall. The problem is that not all indexicals can be made
plural in the right way. When we make tomorrows plural, for example, we end up
talking about the group of days which lie beyond the time of utterance. I’m not
sure what heres or nows would mean, were they words in English. A set of regions
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overlapping the utterance location or a set of intervals overlapping the utterance
time, respectively?
(5.46) a. Tomorrow is always the busiest day to travel.
b. *Tomorrows are always the busiest days to travel.
(5.47) a. The best mushrooms are usually found around here. (qc reading: around
places relevantly similar to our current location)
b. *The best mushrooms are usually found around here (vs. places like
this).
Furthermore, although both singular and plural demonstratives work in qc-
style examples, there might be pragmatic reasons for choosing the singular form in
certain cases. I have in mind the contrast between (5.48) and (5.49)
(5.48) He is usually Italian.
(5.49) They are usually Italian.
where in both cases the speaker is pointing at Benedict XVI qua Pope to communicate
the idea that Popes are usually Italian. It could be confusing for an addressee if the
speaker were to point at an individual and use a plural indexical. The use of a
plural demonstrative can easily be taken to mean that the demonstratum is a part
of a group (or even that the speaker intends to demonstrate an entire group of
individuals). While it is in a sense true that Benedict XVI is a part of the group of
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all Popes, there is only one Pope at any given time. The role is filled by a unique
individual so using a plural indexical to talk about the Pope could be misleading.9
5.3 Coercion and reconstruction
Nunberg and Elbourne’s rejection of a pragmatic account of ir and qc rested
on their claim that ir and qc are impossible for proper names and definite descrip-
tions. We have seen that that claim requires more justification. So far, neither
Nunberg or Elbourne has shown that a pragmatic account would not fare just as
well, if not better, than theirs. Their arguments therefore are consistent with a the-
ory like LD or PI supplemented with the appropriate pragmatic mechanisms. I turn
now to a sketch of how a pragmatic account would treat ir and qc
5.3.1 Quantificational Coercion
I say that qc examples involve a kind of coercion because there is a tension in
these examples between the demands of an adverb of quantification and the standard
interpretation of an indexical. The adverb of quantification wants to quantify over
a group of entities—days, events, situations, etc.—but it is presented only with a
single time or entity, namely, the value of the (singular) indexical. This leads to a
9Nunberg (1993) offers an interesting example with demonstratives to show that one can point
at an individual object to talk about a group. Taking a variation of his example, a salesperson can
point at a plate on sale in a store and say, ‘I have those in the back’ to mean that he has a set of
plates of which that plate is a member or representative in the back of the store. This example is
different from the Pope example because, as I said, there really is just one Pope at a time, so we
do not simply think of him as being a member of a group of many Popes; rather, we think of him
as the current Pope. Group membership in qc examples is importantly time sensitive.
128
problem with the construction of logical form for qc examples that is driven in part
by the types of predicates and arguments, not only by their contents. If a speaker
says, tomorrow is usually R for some R and the interpreter doesn’t hear what R is,
then she will still likely understand that the intended reading is a qc reading, even
if she can’t figure out what R is or what property about tomorrow is relevant for
the predication (e.g. its being the day before Thanksgiving). Similarly, if someone
says, Y is usually Romanian for some individual Y , then again, even if we assume
that the interpreter doesn’t hear the name or expression that the speaker used in
place of Y , then she is still likely to figure out that a qc reading is intended. Being
Romanian is just not the kind of property that one would have at most times but not
all.10 Nunberg (1993) argues that literal interpretations of qc examples don’t even
seem possible, and I agree. While I do not think that qc licenses one to meddle with
the semantics of indexicals, I do think that it suggests a process that arises during
composition in order to repair a problematic predication. Therefore ‘coercion’ seems
appropriate here.
Asher (forthcoming) provides a type-driven account of coercion that provides
the mechanisms we need to give a formal account of coercion in qc examples with-
out meddling with the semantics for indexicals offered by PI. In Asher’s system,
each lexical item is assigned a type, as in Montague grammar, but the types as-
signed are far finer-grained than the types posited by Montague. Each word root
may have a distinct type and further types can be formed by combining types in
10One can change nationality, of course, one salient reading of this particular construction would
make it sound like one could simply have Romanian and not-Romanian days in the way that
someone can have happy and not-happy days.
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various ways. Predicates presuppose types of their arguments; that is, they make
demands on what type their arguments must have. When these presuppositions fail,
under certain conditions, Asher posits that a special kind of coercion can take place,
due to an operation of (type) presupposition accommodation. A type clash during
composition can trigger the addition of extra content to ‘glue’ together a predicate
with its argument in a problematic predication.11 Asher applies his account to many
examples inter alia:
(5.50) The guitar was deafening.
(5.51) John enjoyed the book.
In (5.50), the predicate was deafening wants to modify a sound, not a concrete object.
It’s not really the guitar that was deafening, but the sound made by the guitar.
Through coercion, we do not change the meaning or type of guitar or deafening, but
we add extra material so that it is the sound of the guitar that ends up having the
property of being deafening. In (5.51), enjoy requires an event of some sort, but a
book is not an event. Again, through coercion we get the result that John enjoyed
doing something with the book, such as reading it, but we do this without changing
the type or meaning of the argument or the predicate.
I think that this kind of coercion is exactly what is going on in qc. In these
examples, there is a clash between the type demands of a quantificational adverb, or
11The coercion I’m talking about here is neither argument nor predicate coercion. See Asher’s
book for the formal details of coercion as well as detailed arguments about why simple argument
or predicate coercion is not always appropriate.
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some kind of quantificational context, and the type of an indexical. Let’s look first
at a non-qc example involving a quantificational adverb.
(5.52) Nicholas always smokes after dinner.
Here we assume that the quantifier takes propositions as arguments, but it still
needs to quantify over a set of times, situations or events. We get something like the
following:
(5.53) ∀e(after-dinner(e)→Nicholas-smokes(e))
This means roughly that for all events e, if e is an after-dinner event, then e is an event
of Nicholas smoking. This reading is too simple probably to be the correct reading of
the example—we need to restrict the event to be one that holds shortly after dinner,
for example, not five hours later. These details, however, are irrelevant to the basic
point I want to make. The idea is that a quantificational adverb will quantify over a
set of times (events or situations), and that it will take two propositions as arguments.
Let’s look now at (5.2). Again, we assume that always wants to quantify over
a set of times, events or situations, but the only time it is offered is the time given by
the value of tomorrow and represented by t2. Because t2 is bound in a higher DRS,
however, always cannot quantify over it; and as there is no other eventuality or time
to quantify over, it has nothing to quantify over. In line with Asher’s mechanisms,
we could posit a coercion in this case that would allow always to quantify over a set
of times that are like t2 in some contextually salient way. For example, these times
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might all share the property of being the day before Thanksgiving in some year.
What always needs is a shift like the following, where φ ranges over properties:
(5.54) φ(t2)⇒ λx(x ∼p t2 → φ(x))
The term (x ∼p t2) in the coerced formula denotes an equivalence class of individuals
which are such that each x in the class shares some contextually salient property p
with t2. The relation ∼p should be read as ‘same with respect to p’ or ‘shares p with’.
The variable p ranges over properties; its final value is determined by context.
The question as to how this shift is implemented during composition is a
delicate one. We can realize this shift for (5.2) by adding content around the value
of tomorrow as follows.
(5.55) λP (P (t2))⇒ λPλx(x ∼p t2 → P (x))
Supposing that p were the property of being the day before Thanksgiving, (x ∼p t2)
would denote the equivalence class of days that share the property of being the day
before Thanksgiving (in some year) with t2. Now always has a variable to quantify
over.
One advantage of adopting an Asher-inspired analysis of ir and qc would
be that Asher’s coercion would allow us to restrict the supplemental mechanisms at
work in ir and qc locally to a problematic predication. The result would be that the
standard interpretation of the indexical would be unchanged and therefore available
for subsequent predication and anaphoric reference that would require the standard
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meaning of the indexical. I will argue for the importance of this approach in the
next section.
When I first introduced Asher’s account, I introduced it as an example of a
pragmatic account that could be used to supplement PI. To the extent that Asher’s
account involves coercion driven by type clashes, however, it is not a pragmatic
account. qc readings might be brought about by pragmatic factors such as speaker
intentions and discourse topic; for example, He is usually happy has a normal, non-
qc reading, but it might also receive a qc reading in the right context. Nevertheless,
once pragmatic factors make it clear that a qc reading is the intended one, the
construction of the logical form triggers coercion for purely semantic reasons—to
repair a problematic predication that would otherwise have failed due to a type
clash. Asher’s account, therefore, is a largely semantic account. Perhaps it would be
better then, to simply say that qc shows that PI needs to be supplemented with extra
mechanisms—pragmatic or semantic. The important point is that these mechanisms
do not require that we change any of the tenets of PI, only that we supplement them.
5.3.2 Intensional Reconstruction
Consider (5.56):
(5.56) If a Democrat had won the last gubernatorial election, then I might have
been Mexican.
Suppose that (5.56) is uttered by the most recently elected Texas Supreme Court
Justice, who happens to not be Mexican. Imagine further that the Democratic
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candidate implied that she would appoint a Mexican Justice if elected. Now, the
antecedent of (5.56) makes relevant the set of worlds that are just like our world
save that the Democrats won the last few gubernatorial elections (and all that this
change entails). This set of worlds in turn serves as a modal background for the might
claim in the consequent.12 Against this modal background, a literal interpretation
of the consequent will conflict with what an interpreter is likely to believe about
her world—world knowledge tells us that the outcomes of gubernatorial elections
should have no effect on peoples’ nationalities. The ir reading of (5.56)—according
to which the role of the most recently appointed Justice, though actually filled by a
non-Mexican, might have been filled by a Mexican—will therefore be preferred.
Where xa is a discourse referent bound in K0 that picks out the agent, a literal
representation of the consequent of (5.56) would be:
(5.56’) ♦(Mexican(xa))
This is not what we want. The intuitive, ir reading of (5.56) is not about the
actual agent. Rather, it concerns individuals who in some possible world w from the
modal background determined by the antecedent have, in w, a contextually salient
property that the agent has in the actual world—namely, the property of being the
most recently elected Texas Supreme Court Justice (relative to the time of utterance,
of course). Again, we will need to add content around the standard interpretation
12The context sensitivity of ir sentences would be naturally analyzed in a dynamic framework
like Veltman (1996). As I will not exploit the dynamics of Veltman’s system for the purposes of
this paper, however, I will not pursue this point.
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of I to build a class of individuals who share the property of being the most recently
elected Supreme Court Justice with the agent of the utterance. In this case, however,
the individuals will have to share the property across the space of possible worlds
instead of sharing the property across time. We need a world sensitive equivalence
relation. Let ∼c be such a relation, where c, like r and p, is a property variable. After
undergoing the shift in (S) we get the logical form in (5.56”) for the consequent of
(5.56).
(S) λP (P (xa))⇒ λPλx(x ∼c xa → P (x))
(5.56”) ♦∀x(x ∼c xa →Mexican(x))
The consequent will be true just in case there is a world w in the modal background
provided by the antecedent which is such that all of the individuals who have the
property c in w that xa has in the actual world, are Mexican in w.
13
Although the mechanisms involved in qc and ir are similar, according to my
account, I do not think that qc and ir are exactly the same. While qc examples
involve some sort of clash between the demands of an adverb of quantification and the
standard interpretation of an indexical, ir seems to arise only from a clash between
a literal reading of a sentence and an interpreter’s knowledge about her world. ir
13Note that for counterfactuals, the actual world will not be a member of the set of worlds in
the modal background determined by the antecedent. This is exactly what we want. Suppose
the consequent for (5.56”) had been I would have been Mexican. Despite the fact that xa has the
property of being the most recently elected Justice in the actual world, xa will not be one of the
individuals who has the property c in one of the worlds in the modal background, so we will not
end up attributing the property of being Mexican to xa, as desired.
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seems to be a much more pragmatic phenomenon. Were we to change the antecedent
in (5.56), for example, a qc reading of the consequent would be less salient.
(5.57) If Mexico hadn’t lost Texas to the US, then I might have been Mexican.
So it’s not that there is a problem with the combination of the modal, the stan-
dard indexical interpretation and the predicate in ir examples. Rather, the literal
meaning of the ir examples is not consistent with what the interpreter takes to be
common knowledge given the modal background determined by the discourse. Also,
qc data are more restricted than ir data: qc examples do not appear to work with
definite descriptions and they do not work in French (except with demonstratives).
ir examples, by contrast, seem to be far easier to generate than qc examples, work
with definite descriptions, and work in French. It might be that these differences
result from the fact that ir is a modal phenomenon while qc is not, or it might be
because ir is less semantically constrained than qc. Exactly what underlies these
differences I leave open for future research.14
14There are certain predications of non-demonstrative indexicals that seem to require coercion
even in the absence of operators like those present in ir or qc cases—Nunberg’s ‘I’m parked
out back’ is a good example. Even in these cases, however, there are clear differences between
indexicals and deferred uses of demonstratives (cf. Nunberg 1993, appendix) that suggest that the
non-demonstrative indexicals do not have non-standard meanings in these examples either. The
following are from Nunberg’s ‘Transfers of Meaning’:
(5.58) This is parked out back and may not start. (ex. 4)
(5.59) *This fits only the left front door and is parked out back. (ex. 5)
(5.60) *I am parked out back and may not start. (ex. 9)
(5.61) I am parked out back and have been waiting for 15 minutes. (ex. 8)
If we imagine the speaker holding up a set of keys, then the first two examples show that an agent
can use his keys to successfully refer to his car—it is the car, not the keys, that is picked up in
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5.3.3 Plural Indexicals
Interestingly, an equivalence relation like ∼p might already be at work in
standard uses of plural indexicals like we. Obama, for example, can say, ‘We have
all been men’ to mean that the U.S. Presidents have all been men, even without
an adverb of quantification (or an intensional operator). The semantics of we may
require that the agent of an utterance of we be a member of the group picked out by
the utterance, but the semantics do not determine the other members of the group
in the same way. Factors such as speaker intentions and conversational topic play a
crucial role in determining the other members of the group. Nunberg (1993) offers a
perfect example to show that the interpretation of we depends on such factors:
We do not know much about this part of the brain, which plays such an
important part in our lives, but we will see in the next chapter... (p. 11)
In each of the uses of a first person plural pronoun above, the agent of the utterance
figures in the group picked out by the pronoun; it is left to context (in the broad
anaphora. The story with I is very different: it is the agent—the standard meaning of I—that is
accessible for anaphora, not the car belonging to the agent. This strongly suggests that I has its
standard meaning in (5.60) and (5.61) and that in these cases, as in ir and qc cases, it behaves very
differently from that in (5.58) and (5.59). The indexicals you, we, and even he and she, pattern with
I in variations on (5.58)-(5.61), giving us further support for the claim that examples of deferred
ostension are very different from other seemingly abnormal examples involving indexicals.
I have relegated the discussion of the parked out back examples to a footnote because I think it is
clear that they do not call for a revision of Kaplanian character. ir and qc data, by contrast, are
the best candidates I know of to motivate a descriptive or polysemous descriptive/non-descriptive
account of indexicals. Due to the nature of the equivalence relations involved in these data, it is
much harder to use tests like co-predication and anaphora to argue that the indexicals in them have
their standard meanings.
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sense that includes speaker intentions, etc.) to specify the other members of the
group.
Many of the examples discussed in Nunberg (1993) involve plural indexicals.
Nunberg used plural indexicals as a starting point and then generalized his claims
to singular indexicals. If it is true that plural indexicals already contain something
like ∼p, then Nunberg was in a sense right to do this. Still one should be cautious
in concluding from the premise that plural indexicals have ∼p in their semantics
and the premise that ir and qc employ ∼p to the claim that ∼p must figure in the
semantics of singular indexicals all of the time.
5.4 Points for a Pragmatic Theory
15 The main difference between the account that I am pushing and the ac-
counts offered by Nunberg and Elbourne is that my account does not require one to
revise either PI or LD. Proponents of the pragmatic account agree with Nunberg and
Elbourne that ir and qc examples could be paraphrased by substituting a non-rigid,
definite description for the relevant indexical in each example. We disagree only on
how serious these readings should be taken by a semantic account of indexicals. PI
and LD hold that a semantic theory of indexicals needs to provide an analysis only
of the standard interpretations of indexicals—the ones that indexicals by and large
have. Nunberg and Elbourne think that a semantic theory of indexicals should make
15As I said above, coercion is not an entirely pragmatic phenomenon, so the theory I am pushing
requires supplementation with both semantic and pragmatic mechanisms. I will bracket this detail
for the rest of the chapter, however. When I talk about pragmatic theories of ir and qc, I mean
theories that do not require us to meddle with the semantics of indexicals.
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room in the semantics for the pragmatic mechanisms at work in ir and qc. The
distinction is subtle and I don’t have a knock-down argument to show that Nunberg
and Elbourne’s approach is wrong; I will, however, make some points in favor of the
pragmatic theory.
First, note that neither Nunberg nor Elbourne actually overhauls Kaplanian
character (or PI’s presuppositions). What they do is make room in the semantics of
indexicals for pragmatic mechanisms that function on top of LD’s character or PI’s
presuppositions. Let’s look again at (5.2). The index for tomorrow will be the time
of utterance and, if Nunberg and Elbourne are right, the interpretation of tomorrow
will be something like the day before Thanksgiving. But in order to get from the
index to this interpretation, we must first pass through the standard interpretation
of the indexical. The property of being the day before Thanksgiving holds of the
day after the day of utterance, not the index.16 There is no getting around the fact
that the standard interpretation of an indexical must be determined prior to the
determination of the logical form for any ir or qc data, as the pragmatic account
16Compare the following examples.
(5.2) Tomorrow is always the busiest day to travel.
(5.62) Tomorrow is always a new day.
The second example can be uttered any day of the year and have the same meaning. This example
might involve local binding of the presupposition of tomorrow, though I will not argue for that here.
The important point is that this example is very different from (5.2). To get the qc reading of
(5.2) that we have been considering, where tomorrow is understood as the day before Thanksgiving,
one must utter (5.2) the day before the day before Thanksgiving, just as we would expect based on
the indexical meaning of tomorrow. The difference in these examples has been a large part of my
motivation to argue that qc (and ir) is not a character level phenomenon. One must first determine
the standard indexical interpretation in a qc case and then use this interpretation, together with
further contextual information, to figure out what is being said.
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predicts. This is not a direct argument against Nunberg and Elbourne’s way of
treating ir and qc data; it’s an argument against their use of this data to revise a
theory like PI or LD.
Despite the similarities between Nunberg and Elbourne’s semantic account of
ir and qc and the pragmatic account that I am defending, the accounts do make dif-
ferent predictions. First, because Nunberg and Elbourne posit the relevant pragmatic
mechanisms in the semantics of indexicals only, they predict that no other definites
will give rise to ir and qc examples. We have seen, however, that this prediction is
not borne out. ir happens with both proper names and definite descriptions, and
qc works for proper names. There is an asymmetry between the behavior of index-
icals in ir and qc and the behavior of other definites, but Nunberg and Elbourne
need something stronger than an asymmetry to support their claims. Moreover, as
I have already argued, the asymmetry that we see with different definites in ir and
qc is not surprising given that the class of definites is not homogenous. Of course,
Nunberg and Elbourne could build the pragmatic mechanisms into the semantics
of proper names and definite descriptions as well so that they could account for the
data while maintaining their semantic account. ir and qc data with proper names or
definite descriptions do not show that the semantic account is wrong. Nevertheless,
I’m not sure what benefits the semantic account will bring if it cannot be shown that
ir and qc data are tied to a particular class of expressions. The semantic account
holds that sometimes the semantics of indexicals deliver a standard interpretation
and sometimes they deliver a standard interpretation supplemented with some prag-
matic content. The pragmatic account is simpler: it says that indexicals always have
140
standard interpretations and then leaves the pragmatics to the pragmatics.
Another prediction that Nunberg and Elbourne make, though they do not
put it in these terms, is that in ir and qc examples, what I am calling the standard
interpretation of the indexical will be completely inaccessible. Tomorrow in (5.2)
actually means (in the context we are considering) the day before Thanksgiving, so
we should not be able to access the standard meaning of tomorrow in subsequent
utterances without either reusing tomorrow or using some other expression to pick
out the day after the day of utterance. In particular, it should be impossible for
indexicals to figure in co-predications where one predicate requires the standard
interpretation of the indexical and the other requires an ir or qc reading. This
prediction needs to be defended, especially since such examples of co-predication
appear to be possible.
(5.63) a. We, all Southern Baptists, might have been liberal North-Easterners if
the last election had gone differently.
b. We are staunch Southern Baptists but/who might have been crazy lib-
erals if the Democrats had won the last election.
c. If Democrats had won the last few presidential elections, things might
have been different for this case. We, who just took a very conservative
stance on X vs. Y, might have been liberals and then X probably would
have won.
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(5.64) a. Today, the day my ever-thoughtful sister is flying in, is always the most
popular day of the year to travel.
b. My sister is arriving today, which, unfortunately, is always the most
popular day to travel.
c. Tomorrow is my 30th birthday and always the biggest party night of the
year.
qc cases, moreover, figure in similar examples of co-reference:
(5.65) It’s really surprising that today is so calm, since it’s usually the most popular
day to travel.
(5.66) Tomorrow is sure to be a disaster—it always is.
(5.67) Tomorrow is usually the busiest shopping day of the year, but I expect it to
be slow this year because of the economy.
According to Nunberg, an indexical offers either its standard interpretation (as I have
been calling it) to logical form or a property or description that holds of the standard
interpretation. If an indexical contributes a property, then it cannot contribute its
standard interpretation unless it is reused. Thus, the standard interpretations are
not available for co-predication or anaphora in his theory.
This problem can be made more explicit in Elbourne’s theory. Consider (5.68).
(5.68) Tomorrow is my 30th birthday and, unfortunately, always the biggest party
night of the year.
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Suppose that I utter (5.68) in Austin on the night before the last day of classes for
the universities in Austin. Suppose further that what will make the day after the
day of my utterance the biggest party night is its being the night of the last day of
classes. What description does tomorrow contribute to the logical form of (5.68) in
Elbourne’s system? Ignoring the first predication for the time being, the contribution
of tomorrow must be something like this17:
• λs.ιz(z is the last day of classes [for the fall semester at the universities in
Austin...] in s)
Suppose we take this to be the meaning of tomorrow in (5.68). Always is a quantifier
over situations in Elbourne’s system, so we get the following logical form.
(5.68’) ∀s(ιz(z is the last day of classes in s) is my 30th birthday in s. is the biggest
party night of the year in s)
In this case, always quantifies over all situations in which there is a unique day that
is the last day of classes (for a given semester, for the universities in Austin, etc.).
The problem is that (5.68’) will come out false in Elbourne’s system even when
(5.68) is intuitively true. Even if the day after the day of my utterance is in fact my
30th birthday and the biggest party night of the year, it will not be true that in all
situations in which there is a unique day that is the last day of classes, that day will
be my 30th birthday. I only have one 30th birthday, after all.
17If we construct the contribution of tomorrow based on the first predication, we won’t be able to
explain the qc reading determined by the second predication. The contribution for tomorrow that
follows provides, I think, the only hope for an adequate analysis of (5.68) in Elbourne’s system.
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Elbourne and Nunberg actually change the interpretations of indexicals in
order to handle qc and ir data. We must choose between a standard, rigid inter-
pretation of the indexical or a qc (or ir), non-rigid interpretation; we cannot have
it both ways, though we need to for co-predication cases. The pragmatic account
that I have presented, however, can have it both ways. ir and qc readings require
pragmatic content to be added to the literal logical form delivered by the semantics
of indexicals, but this content does not replace the indexical’s interpretation; it is
added to it. The standard interpretation sticks around and can therefore be picked
up in predication and anaphora.
Nunberg claims that indexicals are not capable of entering into co-predications
of the sort I am taking seriously here. It is true that many co-predications are
questionable: (5.69), for example, is very difficult to interpret (though I’m hesitant
to say it is uninterpretable given the right context).
(5.69) ? Today, November 25, 2009, is always the busiest day to travel.
Nevertheless, this does not justify the claim that indexicals do not have their standard
interpretations in qc examples. Indexicals appear to place weaker constraints on
how interpreters are to think about their referents than do some other definites. By
using a proper name, and even more so, a definite description, when an expression
higher up in the RDP hierarchy could be chosen, a speaker will in general indicate
that the particular choice of definite is important for her point. Not only is the
referent of the definite important, but the context-invariable, presupposed content
of the definite is important as well. In (5.69), the fact that the speaker chooses the
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richer definite November 25, 2009 over, say, November 25 suggests that the year is
important for what she wants to say. She then proceeds to make no use of this
additional information and, in fact, indicate to her interpreter that it should be
ignored by using a qc predication. It’s no wonder that (5.69) sounds incoherent.
But this doesn’t show that November 25, 2009 and today (in (5.69)) make different
contributions to truth-conditional or asserted content; at most it shows that they
make different contributions to the content of the discourse as a whole. This claim
is consistent with both PI and LD.
5.4.1 Conventions
The pragmatic view that I have defended in this chapter holds that ir and
qc arise only in certain predicational environments, i.e. environments created by a
modal or adverb of quantification. Yet it is clear that ir and qc will not take place
just any time that an adverb of quantification or modal operator is present. The mere
salience of a relevant property—i.e. a property that could be used to construct an
equivalence class from the standard interpretation of an indexical—is not sufficient.
Suppose, for instance, that I am about to give birth to my 20th child tomorrow; I tell
you this and make salient the days of birth of my last 19 children. Even though the
property of being a day on which one of my children is born is salient, it still seems
odd to say, ‘tomorrow is always such a special day’.18
Let’s look at qc examples first. My hunch is that whatever the property is
that is relevant for qc cases (that is, the property p), it has to specify a role (speaking
18Thanks to Aidan McGlynn for this example.
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loosely enough to allow the day before Thanksgiving to be a role played by exactly
one day every year) that interlocutors expect to be filled by different individuals at
different times. We expect there to be multiple Speakers of the House and multiple
Popes through time and for there to be multiple days before Thanksgiving through
time. We do not expect—it is not a matter of convention to expect—that I will
continue having children, much less that I will continue having them at any regular
intervals.19 Roles of this special sort—roles that we expect to be filled by different
individuals through time at more or less regular intervals—are what allow the move
from the standard interpretation of a singular indexical to a group interpretation in
qc examples; conversely, they are also what justifies the use of a singular indexical
when a group is really under discussion, as I explained in section (5.2.1).
In ir cases, the property p must again specify some sort of role. It is hard to
imagine an ir-style case in which ‘Einstein’ is used to talk about an individual other
than Einstein who might have been a genius (the genius?) under certain conditions.
There may be many geniuses in other worlds—which one do we check to evaluate ir-
style examples about Einstein? In contrast to qr examples, however, the role need
not be one that interlocutors expect to be filled by multiple people through time.
19I use the notion of regular intervals loosely here. Josh Dever offered the following example.
Suppose Josh is teaching a course that meets one day a week throughout the semester (15 weeks).
He doesn’t have a set time for his seminar, but determines the time of the seminar every week
based on his and his students’ schedules. One day, he runs over time by 20 minutes. He can say,
‘I’m normally home by now’ to mean something like ‘I’m usually home 20 minutes after the class is
supposed to end’. In this case, there need be no regular intervals between the time one seminar ends
and the time the next one ends. Still, this example works because there is an expected recurring
property. The class meets weekly and is meant to meet for three hours each time. In this case,
the relevant property of the time of utterance is not its being a particular time, but it’s being 20
minutes after the class was supposed to end.
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What is needed in these cases is for multiple individuals to play the role across the
space of possible worlds, which is exactly what possible worlds give us. We can take
a situation in this world in which an individual is playing a certain role—someone is
knocking on the door, for example—and then look at other possible worlds and ask
how things might have been if another individual had knocked on the door.
(5.70) You should have checked the peephole. He could have been a burglar
5.5 Conclusions
I have argued that although ir and qc data seem at first glance to motivate
a descriptive theory of indexicals, these data are actually compatible with both PI
and LD. ir and qc show that PI and LD need to be supplemented with pragmatic
mechanisms, of course—simply combining the predicate with the standard interpre-
tation of the indexical in an ir or qc example will not be enough to construct the
logical forms for the ir and qc readings. But forcing the pragmatic mechanisms into
the semantics of indexicals, as Nunberg and Elbourne do, does not yield a superior
analysis of ir and qc; it only complicates the semantics of indexicals. Moreover,
Nunberg and Elbourne’s accounts make the wrong prediction with regard to other
definites. While they predict that proper names and definite descriptions cannot
enter into either ir or qc data, I have argued that there are qc examples involving
proper names and ir examples with both proper names and definite descriptions.
Furthermore, Nunberg and Elbourne’s treatment of ir and qc entail that once an
indexical enters into a qc or ir predication, the standard meaning of the indexical
will be unavailable for anaphoric reference or co-predication. This prediction, too,
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appears to be incorrect. Viewing qc and ir as pragmatic phenomena that arise in
order to repair problematic or literally false predications, as Recanati and I do, actu-
ally doesn’t require any more pragmatic mechanisms than Nunberg and Elbourne’s
theories do; but by keeping the pragmatic mechanisms out of the semantics of in-
dexicals, a pragmatic theory allows for a wider range of data. Furthermore, it also
puts ir and qc in a more general class of pragmatic coercion phenomena, like those
discussed in Nunberg (1995), Pustejovsky (1991), and Asher (forthcoming), or quan-
tificational phenomena, like those discussed in Aloni (2000, 2005), which suggests





My primary aim in this dissertation was to show that a wide-scope, presup-
positional theory of indexicals can replace a Kaplanian, two-dimensional theory. My
secondary aim was to show that a wide-scope account paves the way to a general the-
ory of definite noun phrases and is therefore preferable to a two-dimensional theory.
The distinction between presupposed and asserted content provides a solid founda-
tion to achieve both of these goals. Presuppositional content does not (normally)
show up in asserted content. By treating Kaplanian character as a presupposition
and treating an indexical’s Kaplanian ‘content’ (in a context) as its contribution to
asserted content, therefore, we attain the result that the context-invariable meanings
of indexicals do not show up in truth-conditional content. Furthermore, presuppo-
sitional frameworks have already been used with much success to treat third person
pronouns and definite descriptions. A presuppositional framework is more appropri-
ate than a character-based framework for these definites because it allows for the
interaction between presupposed content and asserted content that is so important
for third person pronouns and definite descriptions. This suggests that a presup-
positional theory of indexicals will be more easily extended to a general theory of
definites than will a character-based theory.
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The trick for a presuppositional theory of indexicals is to show that a presup-
positional theory—which in principle allows for the interaction between presupposed
and asserted contents—can satisfy the constraints (a)-(e) introduced in the introduc-
tion and repeated below. In particular, a presuppositional theory needs to show that
it can secure rigidity for indexicals, at least in paradigmatic cases. In Presupposi-
tional Indexicals I presented my presuppositional theory, PI, and laid the groundwork
for PI’s treatment of (a)-(e). PI adds two features to a basic, discourse-based presup-
positional theory in order to capture the idiosyncrasies of indexical semantics. First,
PI extends the notion of a structured discourse context by adding a layer in the
context dedicated only to information from the extra-linguistic context. This layer,
K0, represents information gained through perception and, perhaps, encyclopedic
knowledge and common knowledge and is evaluated relative to the actual world. K0
is more global than the layers of the context that represent the content of a discourse;
it is assumed that discourse takes place within the extra-linguistic environment and
is therefore subordinate to it. This hierarchy is further supported by the fact that
while the extra-linguistic context can affect the interpretation of what is said in a
discourse, what is said in a discourse cannot affect the nature of the extra-linguistic
context.1 The second feature that PI introduces is the ↑ operator. ↑ forces the
resolution of material in its scope at the highest context possible. By prefixing the
presuppositions of indexicals with ↑, PI secures rigidity for indexicals. Indexical pre-
suppositions can almost always be resolved in K0, so because K0 is evaluated relative
1It may be that interpreters add information to their representation of the extra-linguistic context
as a result of what is said in discourse, but this is very different from changing the nature of the
extra-linguistic context itself.
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to the actual world, it follows that the presuppositions of indexicals will be evaluated
relative to the actual world, as desired.
↑ secures rigidity for paradigmatic uses of indexicals by forcing indexical pre-
suppositions to scope out of contexts created by logical operators whenever possible.
Interestingly, however, ↑ leaves open the possibility that an indexical presupposi-
tion could bind in a lower context, if the conditions were right. Such interaction is
prohibited by a two-dimensional theory. In What ‘Now’? I argued that the flexi-
bility offered by ↑ is more than just a curiosity; it is motivated by the behavior of
indexicals. Certain indexicals, including now, actual, actually and here can bind in
contexts introduced in discourse when a) binding in the global context is blocked and
b) the structure of the local discourse context provides the right conditions. In the
examples I considered, what is needed was a certain kind of contrast between two
clauses. The indexical then modifies the clause that the speaker wishes to emphasize.
In Wider Scope, I considered a potential problem for PI’s wide-scope approach
in order to clarify PI’s notion of a discourse context. The worry was that even if
PI manages to secure rigidity for indexicals, it cannot provide the basis of a more
general theory of definites because it does not have enough structure to distinguish
between rigid and non-rigid readings of definites in simple sentences. While index-
icals do not have non-rigid readings in simple sentences, other definites do, so PI’s
contexts will need to allow for these readings. Fortunately, PI’s contexts do allow
for these readings. PI distinguishes between the extra-linguistic context, represented
by K0, and the linguistic context, represented by K1 and below. Rigid readings are
brought about by binding or accommodating at K0 while non-rigid readings for sim-
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ple sentences are brought about by binding or accommodating at K1. PI has all of
the structure that it needs. Still, one might wonder if we need to say more than PI
does about what makes indexicals special given that indexicals cannot have non-rigid
readings when other definites can. I maintain that while this difference shows that
PI cannot be straightforwardly extended to a theory of definites, i.e. by prefixing
the presuppositions of all definites with ↑, this is not a problem for PI. The answer
to what makes indexicals different from other definites is found in their particular
strategies for the resolution of their presuppositions. If we want to know more about
how indexicals are different from other definites, we will have to extend our view and
look at how the resolution strategies vary for different definites. I offered various
paths that one might take to explore this question.
In ‘Descriptive’ Indexicals, I considered data that Nunberg (1993) and El-
bourne (2008) argue motivate a descriptive theory of indexicals. Descriptive readings
of indexicals appear to pose a problem for PI because PI, like Kaplan’s LD, does not
allow for indexicals to have descriptive interpretations. However, I showed that these
examples do not in fact challenge PI (or LD). All that they show is that we must
supplement PI with pragmatic mechanisms.
6.2 Responding to (a)-(e)
As a final demonstration of how PI works, I now show how PI responds to
each of the constraints presented in Chapter 1.
(a) Indexicals are not anaphoric pronouns (in the traditional sense). First of all, this
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claim is not entirely accurate. I argued in What ‘Now’? that in certain cases, index-
icals can bind to antecedents introduced in discourse. Nevertheless, this constraint
holds in most cases and the fact that is does is accounted for by the semantics of
↑. ↑ forces the presuppositions of indexicals to be resolved in the highest context
possible. Because K0 is almost always accessible, indexical presuppositions almost
always bind there, regardless of their linguistic environment.
(b) Indexicals are modally rigid. Rigidity is secured for indexicals as explained above
and in Presuppositional Indexicals. First, the conditions in the global context, K0, are
evaluated relative to the actual world. This appropriately restricts the assignment
functions that survive update with K0, thereby ensuring that all discourse referents
in the universe of K0 have a rigid interpretation. Second, indexical presuppositions
are normally bound at K0 due the the ↑ operator in their lexical entries. That is,
they are bound to discourse referents with rigid interpretations. It follows that the
contribution of an indexical to asserted content will normally be rigid because of the
relation that holds between its presupposed and asserted contents, as specified in the
lexical entry of the indexical.
(c) The context-invariable meaning of indexicals never figures in truth-conditional
content. The only way for the context-invariable meaning of an indexical to fig-
ure in truth-conditional content would be for it to be locally accommodated at the
trigger site. The semantics of ↑ together with the structure of discourse contexts
in PI ensure that this is all but impossible. One might wish, however, to have a
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deeper explanation. The question of why indexicals—or demonstratives, third per-
son pronouns, and proper names for that matter—cannot locally accommodate is an
interesting one. I do not have a deeper explanation of why this is the case, and, to
my knowledge, neither does anyone else. But I offered some interesting frameworks
in which to consider the question in Wider Scope.
(d) Indexicals are not blocked by plugs. First, it is not a foregone conclusion that
indexicals are never blocked by plugs. Suppose that I am very upset and have been
sitting outside in a park at night on a bench talking to myself outloud. Suddenly, I
start to wonder if one of the people who often takes shelter in the park at nighttime
is listening to my complaints. It seems that I could say,
(6.1) If there is someone around who has been listening to me complain all this
time, then you are a very patient listener.
I have a hunch that someone is listening but I really don’t know. To my ear, this
would be felicitous even if I were to later find out that there was in fact no eaves-
dropper in the context; it would certainly be more acceptable in that context than
would be my saying, ‘You are a very patient listener’ when I am not sure anyone is
around.
Other indexicals are more resistant to plugs, but this makes sense. The fact
that there is an agent, time, location and world of utterance is manifest to an inter-
preter any time an utterance is made, so it is difficult to see how a plug could block
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the entailment of indexical presuppositions.
(e) Indexicals cannot be accommodated. Following Zeevat (2000) and Zeevat and
Beaver (2007), accommodation is impossible for demonstratives and indexicals be-
cause if the presuppositions of these expressions fail to hold, then under normal
circumstances, it will be obvious to the conversational participants that they fail to
hold. Adding the information that they do hold would therefore lead to inconsis-
tency.2
6.3 Looking Ahead: Bound and Shifted Indexicals
One of the more interesting features of PI is that it allows for the possibility
of bound indexicals. I have argued for some cases of local binding in What ‘Now’?,
but an interesting avenue for future research would be to explore how PI could be
applied to other examples of supposedly bound indexicals in the literature. Schlenker
(2003) and Anand (2006) argue that many indexicals shift under speech and/or
attitude report verbs in some languages. A now well-worn example of such shifting
is Schlenker’s (6.2):3
(6.2) Johnj says that Ij am a hero.
2Zeevat (2000) discusses examples in which someone overhears a speaker using a demonstrative
but is not in a position to witness the accompanying demonstration. In this case, the eavesdropper
will certainly add the information that there was a demonstration, but according to Zeevat, this
does not count as true accommodation because the speaker did not, and could not, intend it as
such.
3cf. Anand 2006 for a careful study of supposed monstrous verbs in other languages.
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In the Amharic translation of (6.2), I refers not to the speaker making the report, but
to John; in English, this would be translated as, ‘John said that he is a hero’. Judging
from the data used by both Schlenker and Anand (among others), such shifted uses
of indexicals appear to be sufficiently widespread to deserve consideration by PI.4
Examples involving so-called ‘fake’ indexicals also suggest that indexicals can
have both bound and referential readings.5
(6.3) I’m the only one around here who can take care of my children. (Kratzer
2009; modeled after Partee 1989:fn. 3)
(6.4) Only you remember our first appointment. (Kratzer 2009)
(6.3) has a sloppy reading according to which only the speaker is an x such that x
takes care of x’s children. There is also a bound reading of (6.4) according to which
the addressee is the only individual y such that y remembers y’s first appointment
with the speaker. The following examples also suggest that indexicals can be bound
outside of K0.
(6.5) Tomorrow is always a new day.
(6.6) If you leave the class without telling the teacher, then you get in trouble.
I discussed (6.5) in a footnote in ‘Descriptive’ Indexicals. This example is unlike
a qc example because tomorrow does not seem to refer to a particular day. The
4See Maier (2009) for a treatment of Amharic I that employs the operator ⇑ from Hunter &
Asher (2005). ⇑ is a stronger version of ↑ that does not allow binding in lower levels.
5cf. Kratzer (2009) for a recent study of these uses of indexicals.
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qc example Tomorrow is always the busiest day to travel, recall, has to be uttered
two days before Thanksgiving in order to give rise to the reading The day before
Thanksgiving is always the busiest day to travel. By contrast (6.5) can be uttered
any day of the year with the same meaning. No particular day seems to be under
discussion. (6.6) is interesting if we imagine, say, that the speaker is a child talking
to one of her parents. She uses you, but she need not mean that the parent is going
to get in trouble if the parent leaves the class without telling the teacher. Here you
is used like the indefinite one or someone and the second occurrence of you seems to
be bound. Interestingly, politeness features in some languages such as French, which
distinguish between a polite and informal second person pronoun, will be adjusted
for the addressee.
I will not attempt to give an account of these data here. However, I will say
that to the extent that these examples show that indexicals can bind outside of K0,
they offer prima facie support for a presuppositional theory of indexicals that, like
PI, allows the presuppositions of indexicals to be bound.
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